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Abstract 
Based on the data of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) this master thesis 
aims at analysing the extent to which Western European integration policies diverge 
with regard to inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, the analysis shows whether 
different welfare systems may influence the configuration of integration policy. The 
main hypothesis suggests that countries with larger welfare programmes pursue 
inclusive approaches of integration policy in order to promote solidarity and support for 
redistribution. For scrutinising MIPEX data quantitative methods of comparing average 
scores and standard deviations and cluster analysis are applied. Via bivariate data 
analysis these are then being compared with OECD Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX) indicators and welfare system typologies. While national integration policies 
clearly diverge in their inclusiveness and the simple size of welfare programmes does 
not show a clear correlation, welfare system types may explain the configuration of 
integration policies: Social-democratic welfare systems tend to have inclusive policies, 
while Liberal welfare systems tend to have exclusive polices. Conservative and 
Southern welfare systems are in-between, but show a tendency of becoming inclusive 
over time. Thus, different objectives of welfare systems might affect integration policy, 
but the welfare system size might not.  
 Abstract 
Basierend auf den Daten des Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) wird in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit untersucht, inwiefern westeuropäische Staaten Unterschiede 
bezüglich der inkludierenden oder exkludierenden Ausrichtung der Policies im 
Integrationsbereich aufweisen. Anschließend wird versucht die Unterschiede anhand 
wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Systeme zu erklären. Die zentrale Hypothese lautet, dass Staaten 
mit umfangreichen Wohlfahrtsleistungen eher eine inkludierende Integrationspolitik 
verfolgen, da diese Solidarität und Befürwortung von Umverteilung in der Gesellschaft 
sicherstellen soll. Zur Beschreibung der MIPEX-Daten kommen quantitative Vergleiche 
der Mittelwerte und Standardabweichungen, ein Zeitvergleich der Daten zu 2007 und 
2010, und Clusteranalysen zur Anwendung. Mittels bivariater Datenanalyse werden die 
Daten anschließend mit Indikatoren der OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) 
und wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Typologien verglichen. Während sich zeigt, dass nationale 
Integrationspolitiken im Hinblick auf Inklusion und Exklusion sehr unterschiedlich 
ausgeprägt sind und der Umfang der Wohlfahrtsleistungen darauf keinen eindeutigen 
Einfluss hat, können unterschiedliche Wohlfahrtsmodelle die Ausrichtung von 
Integrationspolitiken klar erklären: So zeigt sich, dass sozial-demokratische 
Wohlfahrtsstaaten auf Inklusion ausgerichtete Policies aufweisen, während liberale 
Wohlfahrtsstaaten tendenziell exkludierende Integrationspolitiken verfolgen. Die 
Integrationspolitiken der konservativen und südlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten sind nicht 
eindeutig zuordenbar, zeigen im Zeitverlauf aber eine Tendenz zu Inklusion. Ein 
möglicher Rückschluss von diesen Ergebnissen ist, dass die unterschiedlichen 
Zielsetzungen sozialdemokratischer, konservativer und liberaler Wohlfahrtsmodelle 
eher für die Konfiguration von Integrationspolitiken sind, als deren schlichte Größe.  
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I. Introduction 
In the last decades debates about the “proper” integration of immigrants received a lot of 
public and academic attention. Since Western European countries faced various forms of 
immigration, including labour migration, forced migration, and family reunion from large 
parts of the world this does not surprise much. As a consequence nation-states had to 
accept that their societies became multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural. Using 
the words of Stephen Castles, they had to abandon the myth of being homogenous and 
monocultural national entities (Castles 2002: 1156). Hence nation-states had to deal with 
new forms of diversity, fostering immigrant integration in a changing society. In academic 
literature different approaches of immigration and integration policy are largely described 
as national idiosyncrasies, reflecting a country’s individual history and political and 
economic system. Hence, immigrant integration policies were either analysed in single 
case studies or in studies including a small number of cases allowing for a detailed in-
depth analysis (e.g. Green 2001; Guild/Carrera 2009; Joppke/Morawska 2003; 
Koopmans/Giugni/Passy 2005; Sainsbury 2006; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). Until 
recently, quantitative comparisons including larger numbers of countries were limited at 
least due to the lack of comparable data. With the introduction of the European Civic 
Inclusion and Citizenship Index in 2005 and the Immigrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) in 2007 the lack-of-data problem became less significant. The aim of my master 
thesis is then to challenge the idea of idiosyncratic national integration policies via cross-
country quantitative empirical analysis.  
Once different configurations of integration policies were described, we can raise questions 
of how to explain differences and similarities of national models of integration policy. One 
possible explanation lies in effects of welfare systems and redistribution. There are many 
contradicting arguments on this relation: First, immigration and diversity are argued to 
threaten a country’s ability to develop a redistributive welfare state or to undermine public 
support for redistribution, because they undermine social solidarity (e.g. Alesina/Glaeser 
2004). In a similar vein, Koopmans argues that generous welfare states counter 
immigrant’s integration, because social rights make them less efficient in finding 
employment (Koopmans 2010). This might be countered by a second line of arguments 
that inclusive models of integration involving social rights are vital to generous welfare 
systems because they prevent an ethnic or racial segregation of society (e.g. 
Banting/Kymlicka 2006; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). Third, different welfare systems 
contain different conceptions of state intervention and social equality. This might entail 
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different normative conceptions of the state’s role in immigrant integration and different 
objectives of integration (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006; Sainsbury 2006). Furthermore, 
immigrant integration and welfare system restructuring in Western European countries can 
be argued as a double dilemma of inclusion and exclusion, involving both socio-economic 
as well as socio-cultural marginalisation (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). In this context 
integration and welfare systems do not necessarily have a causal relationship, but are 
interdependent issues that need to be dealt with simultaneously. Since Will Kymlicka 
noted on the issue of causal effects of welfare systems and immigrant integration policy 
that “there has been much armchair speculation on this question, but remarkably little 
evidence” some progress has been made (Kymlicka 2002: 367). Still, the results on causal 
relationships of welfare systems and immigrant integration and integration policy are 
highly contradicting and thus provide space for further analysis (Alesina/Glaeser 2004; 
Banting et al. 2006; Fleischmann/Dronkers 2010; Koopmans 2010; Mau/Burkhardt 2009; 
Morrisens/Sainsbury 2005; Sainsbury 2006). In this context, I suggest to analyse effects of 
welfare systems on integration policy by comparing indicators on welfare systems with the 
results of the MIPEX indices. Noteworthy, unlike some of the literature I cited above, I 
will focus on integration policies only, making no argument on integration outcomes.  
 
1. The research question  
My research is basically guided by two questions, which will both be specified and 
attributed with arguments, but this will follow in the two theoretical chapters of the master 
thesis: 
• To which extent do countries diverge in respect to integration policy and if so, can 
different types of integration policy be identified?  
• Do countries apply different integration policies based on different conceptions of 
welfare provision?  
 
2. Case selection  
In short, the argument that immigrant integration policy can be explained by welfare 
systems crucially depends on two independent variables: First, there needs to be a 
considerable number of people immigrating for a country in order to develop specific 
policies towards integration. Second, the immigration countries need to have a developed 
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welfare system upon which they can build their integration policies on. To confirm existing 
theories Seawright and Gerring recommend applying the “most similar” case selection 
technique (Seawright/Gerring 2008: 298). For this method of case selection cases should 
be characterised by as many similarities as possible, except for the dependent variable. Of 
course, there needs to be some variation in the independent variable too in order to explain 
different outcomes on the dependent variable. Hence, I chose to analyse the EU-15 
countries, because they are arguably similar in their experience of immigration and welfare 
provision. Of course, there is some divergence, but comparatively little with respect to 
other countries like the US, Canada, or Eastern European countries. EU membership might 
be a factor of similarity too. Still, in order to achieve a balanced variation of different 
welfare systems I decided to include Norway and Switzerland to raise the number of 
representatives of the social democratic and liberal welfare regimes. In sum, 17 countries 
will be analysed.  
 
3. Methodology and outline of the master thesis 
In the second chapter, I will provide an introduction on the meaning of integration and 
describe different philosophies and analytic concepts of immigrant integration, based on a 
review of recent literature. In the end of the chapter I will explain the structure of the 
MIPEX framework, whose results I will analyse eventually. The third chapter then 
includes a description of national integration policies in the selected countries, followed by 
a bivariate correlation analysis of the variables of the 2007 and 2011 indices and a cluster 
analysis based on the 2011 index. Hence, in this chapter I analyse the MIPEX results in a 
quantitative way. The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer for the first research 
question, showing that national integration policies resemble another only to a very limited 
extent.  
After describing integration policy variations and answering the first research question, in 
the fourth chapter I will focus on theories explaining why integration policies and 
integration outcomes vary. These include the timing of migration, political parties of the 
right influencing integration policy, the Europeanisation of integration policy and most 
notably, welfare systems as an explaining factor of integration policy. In the fifth chapter, I 
will turn to empirical analysis again, conducting bivariate analyses on welfare system 
indicators (mostly provided by the OECD), welfare regime types, and MIPEX results. The 
results of the analysis then allow me to answer the second research question of causal 
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relationships between welfare systems and integration policy. Eventually, I will summarise 
my findings in chapter six and make some proposals on other possible explanations.  
II. Making sense of immigrant integration policy 
In this theoretical chapter I will provide a basis for analysing the MIPEX results on 
integration policy of 17 countries. After some comments on the terminology and meaning 
of immigrant integration the focus on the chapter turns to different historical and national 
models of immigrant integration. We will see that the configuration of integration policy 
depends on notions of national belonging as well as on specific domestic needs, for 
example needs of labour markets.  
 
1. The terminology of immigrant integration 
In the literature on immigrant integration there are many terms being used for 
“integration”, for example “incorporation”, “inclusion”, “accommodation”, or 
“assimilation”. While the term “assimilation” requires some special attention – I will refer 
to that below – the remaining terms are mostly used synonymously. Boswell and Geddes 
argue that the term “integration” is used most frequently and being deeply contested 
(Ager/Strang 2008: 167; Boswell/Geddes 2011: 206). Since my analysis tries to capture 
many different areas of immigrant “integration” the use of this rather broad term appears 
appropriate. Additionally, for practical reasons I use the same terminology as the authors 
of the MIPEX-Indices do. In the 2005 report, they referred to “inclusion”, but in the later 
reports of 2007 and 2011 they used the term “integration” too.  
 
2. What are the objectives of immigrant integration policy? 
Analysing immigrant integration necessarily puts up at least two important questions: 
What is the objective of immigrant integration and how can we measure its achievement? 
Since the focus of this text is not on actual outcomes or immigrant integration 
performances, the question how to measure immigrant integration can be left aside. The 
questions then are: What is the objective of immigrant integration and what can 
governments do about it? 
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The objectives of immigrant integration can involve cultural monism, the adoption of the 
majority’s lifestyle, cultural, and religious practices, the sharing of one language, equal 
rights, and/or equal social opportunities. The focus of integration can further be oriented on 
the needs of the receiving country or on the needs of the immigrants. For example, 
integration can mean the customisation of immigrant’s to labour market needs alone. 
Alternatively, integration can include assistance for immigrants to maintain their cultural 
heritage in the receiving country. Hence there is a variety of different purposes and goals 
of immigrant integration we need to be aware of.  
Additionally, integration can be understood as a process leading to the acquisition of 
citizenship. Citizenship then may be an endpoint of integration, but it may be located in the 
middle of an integration process as well. Citizenship commonly refers to a sense of 
belonging to a community. Different conceptions of this belonging influence access to 
citizenship to a great extent. If citizenship is, for example, based on ethnicity (ius 
sanguinis), one might seriously question an immigrant’s perspective of access, since he or 
she cannot absorb the ethnicity of the majority population. Of course, citizenship might not 
be part of immigrant integration at all: Especially if immigrants are not wanted to stay in 
the “host”-country for the rest of their lives, citizenship can be deliberately excluded from 
the integration process. However, citizenship and naturalisation are important tools for 
immigrant integration that can be designed to include or exclude immigrants (see e.g. 
Guild/Groenendijk/Carrera 2009).  
Alastair Ager and Alison Strang provide an insightful framework for identifying and 
analysing “successful” integration. According to them integration can be split up into ten 
basic domains: 
Core domains of integration 
Markers and means Employment Housing Education Health 
Social connection Social bridges Social bonds Social links 
Facilitators Language and cultural knowledge Safety and stability 
Foundation Rights and citizenship 
(Ager/Strang 2008: 170) 
In a bottom-up fashion, all domains are crucial for integration. Immigrants need rights, 
usually including citizenship after some time, in order to achieve a notion of belonging to a 
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community and, of course, to be able to find employment and housing and access public 
services. Facilitators provide necessary skills for interaction, say being able to 
communicate with others, foster a feeling of being welcome, and prospects for the future. 
If an immigrant has some linguistic and cultural knowledge and safety and stability in her 
or his status and accommodation, he or she is able to build social connections with peers, 
other groups, and public institutions. This in turn fosters the ability to find suiting 
employment, education, and housing and promotes health, or if being sick, access to health 
care. These markers and means can then indicate the successfulness of an integration 
process. Public policies can affect most of these domains, most notably access to rights, 
citizenship, and security, to employment, health services, housing, and education. The 
extent to which a government encourages immigrants to learn about language and culture 
also affects the integration process. Hence, even if we do not analyse integration outcomes, 
but policies, the framework of Ager and Strang provides useful insights about areas in 
which public policy may affect immigrant integration.  
 
3. Assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism 
Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller summarize three main strategies for the integration of 
immigrants: assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism (Castles 2002: 1154-
7; Castles/Miller 2009: 245-50). In this section I will describe these strategies in detail and 
show how they might be criticised. 
The term assimilation means the full adoption of the social and cultural practices of the 
majority population by immigrants. Thus the goal of this approach is that immigrants 
become indistinguishable from the receiving society. It should be accompanied by a shift 
of loyalty from the country of origin to the host country. Immigrants then adopt the 
national identity of this country. Typically, assimilation involves easy access to citizenship, 
the use of birthright citizenship (ius soli), strict definitions of anti-discrimination, and a 
distinction between public and private life that defines cultural and religious diversity as a 
purely private matter. The example for assimilationist immigrant integration most referred 
to is France (Castles/Miller 2009: 247; 256-7). In his article on the debate on 
republicanism and multiculturalism in the French citizenship model Jeremy Jennings gives 
a good overview of the elements of French integration policy (Jennings 2000). He 
describes the classical approach to French citizenship as based on a strong political 
national identity and the principle of laicité:  
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“National identity is not a biological but a political fact: one is French trough the practice 
of a language, through the learning of a culture, trough the wish to participate in an 
economic and political life” (Schnapper, in: Jennings 2000: 577).  
“Raised to the level of a constitutional principle ... [laicité] postulates the existence of a 
secular ethic, grounded in science and philosophy, that would not act only as a civil 
religion and social bond but also as the means of educating the free and tolerant citizens 
required by the new democratic order” (Jennings 2000: 578). 
This implies for immigration policy that on one hand the French state appears very 
inclusive, since all immigrants can learn the French way of life and respect the secular 
principles, on the other hand this essentially means that immigrants are not accepted as 
who they are: They have to adopt French culture and national past to be integrated (ibidem: 
580-2). Jennings then summarises French philosophy of integration to four principles:  
• accordance to the secular principle: religions are tolerated, but do not receive 
special support; 
• prevention of the constitution of structured communities, immigrants integrate as 
individuals, not as groups; 
• respect for the French law, in return the law respects immigrant’s culture and 
traditions; 
• French nationals and immigrants must be treated equally, hence neither positive nor 
negative discriminations are permissible (ibidem 583);  
An important feature of this approach is the support of one language within a country only. 
Contrarily to the French example provided above, assimilation can involve affirmative 
action programmes too. This can be imagined as an instruction how to be a proper citizen. 
Susan Gordon provides an insightful example on that, referring to the US at the end of the 
19th century (Gordon 2007: 372-80). In the United States, however, assimilation is viewed 
somewhat differently, as an inevitable consequence of immigration and settlement 
(Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 162; Castles 2002: 1155; Reinprecht/Weiss 2011: 
24-8). Rogers Brubaker importantly notes that conceptions of assimilation changed over 
time (Brubaker 2003). According to him, the version I described above refers to an old 
conception of assimilation. I will refer to the new conception later. Thus, in this sense, 
assimilation captures the objective of integration as becoming indistinguishable from the 
native majority population, no matter which policies it entails.  
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The differential-exclusion-approach typically refers to the treatment of guestworkers in 
post-war Europe. Not expected to stay longer than a few years, these immigrants were only 
enabled to participate in public life as far as labour market participation was concerned 
(Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 41; Però/Solomos 2010). From all other spheres of 
integration, say education, political, social, and cultural participation guestworkers were 
typically excluded. Hence, this approach clearly differs from the assimilation and 
multiculturalism approaches in its goal: Immigrants are not seen as a part of the national 
society and are neither expected to shift their loyalty. Despite the rather temporary 
character of this approach, differential exclusion was – and is – a long-lasting model of 
immigrant integration, as Simon Green shows on the case of Germany (Green 2001). Carl-
Ulrik Schierup and others argue that this approach can also be applied to the present 
treatment of undocumented migrant workers, especially in southern Europe 
(Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 41-2). In its pure type, the differential-exclusion-approach 
involves no political rights, very limited social rights, and separated schooling for 
immigrant children. In the first place, it only involves affirmative action programmes 
concerning the teaching of working-skills. Often the differential exclusion approach to 
immigrant integration coincides with an ethnic notion of citizenship. This means that 
citizenship is based on descent (ius sanguinis) instead of the place of birth (ius soli) 
(Heater 2004: 252-5).  
Multicultural integration of immigrants does primarily not refer to the multicultural 
character of a society say diverse ethnicities living together or diverse religions being 
practiced. Instead, it abandons “the myth of homogenous and monocultural nation-states” 
(Castles 2002: 1156): All members of a community should be able to maintain their own 
cultural heritage and have access to equal opportunities in society at the same time. Hence, 
multiculturalism is a whole citizenship model (e.g. Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008; 
Kymlicka 1995). Immigrants are not expected to waive their cultural and social practices 
or native languages when planning to settle in a new country. Instead, they can maintain 
their distinctiveness via group rights and legal exemptions (Kymlicka 1995). According to 
Keith Banting and others multiculturalism towards immigrants ideally entails  
(a) a public affirmation of multiculturalism, 
(b) an adaption in school curricula, 
(c) sensitivity towards minorities in public media, 
(d) exemptions from dress codes etc., 
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(e) the possibility of dual citizenship,  
(f) funding of ethnic group organisations, 
(g) funding of bilingual education, and 
(h) affirmative action for disadvantaged minorities (Banting et al. 2006: 56-7). 
Canada is usually the provided example for countries pursuing this approach. Since 
multicultural integration policies claim to enable immigrants to participate in society more 
effectively, a shift of loyalty to the host country is a part of this approach too. The 
normative difference to assimilation, however, lies in acceptance of diversity as a public 
matter and of group rights as a way of meeting immigrants’ needs. 
 
4. Criticisms to the heterogeneity of immigrant integration models 
Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska criticise both the categorisation of integration policy 
models as well as the view of distinct national models of integration that differ from each 
other (Joppke/Morawska 2003: 3-8; Joppke 2007): First, the discussion about the 
terminology of integration, assimilation, or multiculturalism, rather reflects the politicised 
debate than actual policies. Second, neither do many states differ in their choice of policies 
that much that one could ascribe them clearly to one model or the other, nor they purely 
rely on one model of integration policy. Third, states might change their policy models 
over time. These arguments can be illustrated by the example of Germany:  
Post-war Germany experienced three major flows of immigration: war refugees, ethnic 
Germans, and German Democratic Republic (GDR) citizens that fled or returned to the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the years following World War II, Mediterranean 
(mainly Turkish) guestworkers that were recruited by German companies to make up for 
labour shortages, and asylum seekers that fled from the war in former Yugoslavia in the 
1990ies (Green 2001; Hansen 2003: 90-7; Castles/Miller 2009: 96-103). Since German 
nationality law was based on ius sanguinis, ethnic Germans arriving in the FRG were 
technically no foreigners and – compared to other immigrant groups – they were not 
treated as foreigners. Simon Green notes that they were quickly taken seriously by German 
parties and subject to generous financial provisions to improve their livelihoods (Green 
2001: 85). The belonging of these people to the FRG was – at least by government officials 
– not questioned, because they were ethnic Germans. About 20 years later the (non-) 
integration of guestworkers had very different objectives: Labour force shortages in the 
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industry caused the FRG to sign recruitment treaties for foreign workers with many 
Mediterranean countries, most famously Turkey. These workers should be trained and 
employed by German companies and return after a few years with their skills back to their 
countries of origin. Hence, these new immigrants were solely integrated in the labour 
market without any perspective of long-term residence and full incorporation in German 
society (the ideal-case of differential exclusion). Due to changes in the guestworkers life-
plans and due to the interest of the companies not to train employees in too short circles 
their residence permits were renewed and large-scale family reunion took place.  When the 
government decided to stop recruitment and impose restrictive eligibility rules on family 
reunion asylum applications rose to almost 450.000 per year in 1992 due to the war in 
former Yugoslavia (Green 2001: 93). Thus, Germany experienced an inability to control 
the numbers of immigrant inflows. In reaction to restrictive German citizenship laws 
naturalisation rates remained low and many former guestworkers lived in Germany for 
decades without access to German citizenship. Despite the resulting high numbers of 
foreign residents - 7.2 million in 1995 (see Castles/Miller 2009: 118) – Germany still 
claimed to be a non-immigration-country (Green 2001: 83). This entails that the 
perspective of Germans/citizens and foreigners/guestworkers as two different groups 
which cannot merge prevailed. As Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove note, public opinion on 
proper immigrant integration became an important area of party politics already in the 
1980ies. Due to the centre-right party government the official position remained one of 
non-immigration and differential exclusion (Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 181-9). 
Following the SPD-victory in the 1998 Bundestag elections a long debate on the widely 
perceived policy-failure of the guestworker-system led to a far-reaching reform of German 
nationality and immigration law in 2000. This reform included the possibility of dual 
citizenship, the adaptation of ius soli, a reform of naturalisation requirements, a 
reintroduction of labour-recruitment, and a commitment to increase integration efforts 
(Hansen 2003: 94-7). On that development Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove note:  
“Yet, what was “unthinkable” in 1992 has, in large measure, come to pass. The SPD-Green 
coalition elected in 1998 passed a revised citizenship law that includes provisions for 
attributing citizenship to children of qualified foreign residence via the principle of ius 
soli” (Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 173).  
Using the data of the 2011 Multiculturalism Policy Index, by 2000 Germany can be said to 
have multicultural elements in its integration policy due to the funding of ethnic groups, 
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some support for bilingual education, and the partial allowing of dual citizenship (Tolley 
2011: 43-8). As the results of the MIPEX data analysis will show, German integration 
policy contains a number of elements contradicting the differential-exclusion approach 
nowadays. However, Germany adopted various elements of different integration models, 
intended on inclusion or exclusion, depending on time and circumstances.  
 
5. Historical development of integration policy 
Alternatively, one could also argue that different models of immigrant integration rather 
appear in different historical contexts than in different countries. Due to a limit of space I 
will refer to European countries only. In the second half of the 19th century, migrants from 
Ireland and the colonies came to industrialise Britain to work in the industrial sector. 
Similar to that, Poles migrated to Germany. These workers were mostly segregated from 
the main population and disadvantaged in the labour market. Usually, there were strict 
connections between labour contracts and legal residence. In sum, these countries were 
following the differential-exclusion approach at this time. France states a different 
example, where migrant from its neighbouring countries where assimilated and granted 
citizenship especially due to the fact that France needed soldiers for its military 
(Castles/Miller 2009: 87-90). Contrary to that the US and Australia had a clearly different 
objective: Since they were countries that mainly consisted of immigrants, the focus was to 
assimilate all immigrants into a common nation. Exclusionary politics appeared mostly in 
the decision about whom to grant access: Typically, Europeans were permitted and Asians 
were not (Castles/Miller 2009: 83-7; Gordon 2007). Of course, slavery constituted an 
example of exclusion in the US. Multicultural policies only occurred in the Ottoman 
Empire at this time (Kymlicka 1995). In the interwar period among European countries 
only France experienced major immigrant inflows. At this time, France relied on some sort 
of differential exclusion to labour immigrants too, like Germany and Great Britain before 
(Castles/Miller 2009: 92).  
In the postwar period many European counties - most notably Great Britain, France, 
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands - recruited workers to fill labour 
shortages. This development went hand-in-hand with strong economic growth. The 
workers mainly immigrated from former colonies and Mediterranean countries. Apart from 
France, most countries tried to limit immigration to specific labour market needs and 
discouraged family reunion. Immigrants were not seen as future citizens and were expected 
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to return to their countries of origin after the fulfilment of their work contracts. Especially 
in the cases of Great Britain and the Netherlands immigrants from former colonies often 
held the citizenship of these countries (Castles/Miller 2009: 97-103). Hence, their 
residence did not depend on a labour contract, as in the remaining countries. Apart from 
that, the main policy of immigrant treatment was characterised by the differential-
exclusion model.  
The immigration policy towards guestworkers was marked by an obvious policy failure. 
As I have shown on the example of Germany above, many guestworkers did not return to 
their countries of origin. Instead they became permanent settlers and brought their families 
over. The resulting diversification of society was at least partially ignored (e.g. Germany, 
Green 2001). Nevertheless, European countries had to accept that they were countries of 
immigration at some point and thus had to amend their policies towards foreign residents. 
Between 1970 and 1990 especially Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden started 
recognising group-based demands by immigrant minorities and thus adapted a 
multicultural model of integration (Castles/Miller 2009: 247-50; Tolley 2011). As noted 
above, Germany changed its integration model towards multiculturalism too. France did 
not include multicultural elements in its integration policy, but the appropriateness of the 
assimilation model was seriously questioned in public debate (Jennings 2000).  
From 2000 on, multiculturalism was blamed of creating segregated societies that did not 
alter immigrant’s chances to participate economically and socially on an equal level 
compared to non-immigrants (Joppke 2004). Additionally, the appearance of illiberal 
practices like, for example, forced marriage brought multiculturalism into question. Joppke 
identifies a movement away from multiculturalism both in the theoretical debate as well as 
in actual policies especially in those countries that adopted multicultural policies in 
reaction to growing diversity (ibidem). This perceived failure pushed policy makers to 
develop new approaches to immigrant integration (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 207; 
Joppke/Morawska 2003). One concept of integration policy is presented by Rodgers 
Brubaker’s “new assimilation”: This concept shifts the focus of integration away from 
what he calls a holistic approach of assimilation that was driven by the question of “how 
much” immigrants need to assimilate towards a disaggregated approach that asks in what 
respect and in reference to which ideal immigrants need to be integrated (Brubaker 2003: 
51-3).  Among others, he notes that there is a clear emphasis on the socio-economic, 
linguistic, and political integration of immigrants that replaced to emphasis on cultural 
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diversity or monism of the multicultural or “old” assimilation model (Boswell/Geddes 
2011: 202; Brubaker 2003: 53; Joppke 2004). The concept of post-assimilation and post-
multiculturalism integration is mostly referred to as “civic integration” (e.g. 
Carrera/Wiesbrock 2009; Joppke 2007). Therefore the concept underlying the MIPEX-
Index presents a well-developed example. Below I will describe this approach in detail. I 
am sceptical whether it is appropriate to call this development a “return of assimilation” 
(cited from Brubaker 2003), since it does not exclude culture and group-based demands per 
se.  
 
6. Summary 
In sum, integration policies vary in respect to different countries, time periods, and forms 
of migration. The assimilation, differential exclusion, and multicultural models do merely 
describe reactions of national governments to specific situations than constitute holistic 
models that can be applied under any circumstance. Cross-national differences of 
integration policies, however, can show different normative conceptions, but we need to be 
aware of their relativity in respect to various challenges to nation-states. Policy responses 
to perceived failures and specific domestic challenges can vary much from what is 
expected to be the national stereotype model. Returning to the first research question, for 
the analysis of the country results of the MIPEX indices I do not expect countries do 
embody clear-cut holistic models of the three integration “philosophies”. Neither can be 
expected that all integration policies resemble another across countries. Most likely 
countries face some similar and some specific challenges of policy failure, political 
constraints, and labour market and social integration to which they might respond different 
due to different national legacies. Thus integration policies are expected to be highly 
individual in each country.  
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III. The MIPEX Index: Areas and dimensions of immigrant 
integration 
 
1. Integration policy areas 
So far I did not discuss the content of immigrant integration policy in detail. Contrarily to 
the work of Ager and Strang, the discussion of different policy ideals or models does not 
provide a systematic overview of policy areas affected by immigrant integration. A fairly 
sophisticated systematisation of integration policy is provided by the MIPEX-index, which 
is one strong reason why the index is the subject of my analysis. In this chapter, I will give 
an overview of the components of integration policy using the data of the MIPEX report of 
2011. The examples below are compiled by policies from all 31 countries scrutinised by 
MIPEX.  
 
Labour Market Mobility 
The participation of immigrants in the labour market can be promoted or prohibited in 
various ways. Access can be provided immediately or after waiting periods up to five 
years. Then, immigrants might have access to all kinds of public and private employment 
and start businesses under equal conditions as citizens or face restrictions, like being 
banned from public employment or self-employment. Qualifications from abroad can be 
fully recognised or not.  When trying to amend her or his qualifications an immigrant can 
either by treated equally to a citizen, or he or she can receive targeted support, like 
vocational training or study grants. There might be some specific focus on certain groups 
of immigrants too, like women or immigrant youth. Of course citizens might be favoured 
in the granting of training and study grants too. Working immigrants can either have the 
same rights as their colleagues or not. Policy might also vary in the extent immigrants 
receive information about their rights associated with employment. This concerns rights to 
social security, legal protections of employment, and political rights to join unions 
(MIPEX 2011: 12).  
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Family Reunion 
Family Reunion policies vary in their definitions, eligibility conditions, and rights 
associated. Definitions of families eligible for reunion range from the narrow core family 
to broad conceptions including partners or spouses, adult children, and dependent parents 
or grandparents. These definitions also include different age limits for eligible family 
members. Conditions can include high incomes, stable employment, suitable 
accommodation, waiting periods, and/or high level language and integration tests for the 
sponsor and integration and language pre-tests for family members. The application 
procedures vary in their costs and length. Applications can be rejected because of security 
threats only or discretionarily. If a family is reunited, family member can have immediate 
labour market access and equal social rights or remain dependent on the sponsor. A 
withdrawal of the status might be caused by serious crimes only or by many reasons 
evaluated discretionarily. As well, the conditions for an autonomous residence permit for 
family members vary. Some countries actively support families to find work, schools, or 
social assistance (MIPEX 2011: 14).  
 
Education 
In this area of integration policy immigrant children are either discriminated against their 
peers, treated equally, or being supported actively. In some countries, immigrants do not 
have a right to full Education. Countries vary in their capacity to assess and accept a 
pupil’s skills learned abroad. When immigrant pupils are being treated equal officially, 
teachers are often not in contact with the children’s parents and language support is poor or 
absent. Active support can entail language training (mother tongue and public languages), 
teachers trained to be sensitive towards special needs, and a commitment to cultural 
diversity. This includes intercultural approaches in the curriculum, textbooks, and hiring of 
staff. Hence diversity is understood as a potential asset to all pupils (MIPEX 2011: 16).  
 
Political Participation 
Immigrants can have equal civil liberties as citizens and have a right to vote and run for 
offices on the local and regional level after few years. Participation on national elections is 
not included. Some countries restrict civil liberties in ways that immigrants for example 
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cannot work as journalists. Immigrants further can be consulted via consultative bodies on 
the national, regional, and local level with varying significance. These bodies might be run 
by immigrants and might be state-organised or private, but state-funded. Additionally, the 
state might inform immigrants about their political rights and provide funding for 
immigrant organisations and thus support the development of an immigrant civil society. 
However, most countries refrain from providing immigrants political opportunities 
(MIPEX 2011: 18).  
 
Long-term Residence 
Ideally all immigrants can decide freely to settle in a country at some point and receive a 
permanent residence permit. Usually holders of certain residence permits are banned from 
applying permanent residence and waiting periods vary for different categories of 
immigrants. For example, migrant students can count their time studying in some 
countries, but not in others. Similar to Family Reunion, conditions can involve high 
income and employment requirements, language and integration testing, which might be 
expansive. Duration and costs of the application process vary as well as the discretion 
decisions are based on and the possibility of an appeal against a rejection. Long-term 
residents can have equal rights concerning most areas of life than citizens, except political 
rights. In some cases visiting the home country is only possible for a very short period 
without losing the right of permanent residence (MIPEX 2011: 18). 
 
Access to Nationality 
Access to citizenship is partly a substitute to other areas of integration policy. For example, 
if an immigrant had immediate access to citizenship and dual citizenship were allowed, 
issues like voting rights for long-term residents would not matter. Thus a liberalised access 
to citizenship can make up for restrictions in other areas, and vice versa.  
Access to citizenship can be based on ius soli or ius sanguinis, which might lead to second- 
or third-generation immigrants without national citizenship. Both ways can be applied 
automatically or based on an application. Naturalisation requirements involve waiting 
periods from three to twelve years, varying income levels, fees, having no criminal record, 
being “a good character”, and language and citizenship testing, which might be expensive. 
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Decisions might be highly discretional and without judicial oversight. Some countries 
accept dual citizenship generally, some accept it only for second-generation immigrants 
and some do not accept it at all. Once citizenship is granted, most countries have rules that 
allow them to revoke it but under varying conditions, sometimes even leading to 
statelessness (MIPEX 2011: 22).  
 
Anti-discrimination 
Anti-discrimination policies vary in their definitions of discrimination and application 
areas. Some countries have a broader conception of discrimination, including more 
dimensions (e.g. race, nationality, gender) of discrimination than others. These definitions 
then are applied to all areas of public life or only applied to few, for example, employment 
and schooling. If brought to court, procedural settings vary in the placement of the burden 
of proof, the funding of legal aid and interpreters, and in the range and effect of sanctions. 
There might be public support for victims to enable a trial. NGO’s can play important roles 
in supporting victims before, during, and after the procedure. Equality bodies might assist 
victims of discrimination and instigate investigations and/or promote equality via positive 
action. Furthermore, funding and power of these bodies might vary.  
 
2. The scope of MIPEX data 
These seven areas capture public policy of immigrant integration in a very broad use of the 
term, but do not capture all domains identified by Ager and Strang. Often issues like 
family reunion or access to long-term residence are not included in integration policy, but 
kept as separate policy fields themselves (e.g. Boswell/Geddes 2011; Freeman 2006). This 
broad approach allows specifying on effects on a single area later on. For example, we 
might say that public social expenditure does not correlate with integration policy per se, 
but with Labour Market Mobility. Of course the areas included in the index are hardly 
exhaustive. Important issues that are only receive limited attention in the MIPEX areas are 
housing and health services. Non-citizens might face disadvantages in the access to public 
housing as well as they can be actively supported to find accommodation. The same counts 
for access to health services, which might be supported by providing information and 
interpreters as well as there might be subject to restrictions. However, the framework of the 
MIPEX index does not provide us with systematised information on these issues.  
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In a nutshell, we see that integration policy is a cross-issue, being a subject of many policy 
areas. This explains partially why the policy models described above do not fit under all 
circumstances. Causes and explanations of integration policy development can hardly 
explain all areas simultaneously. If integration policy can be explained in reference to one 
or two of areas only, this still might be a valuable insight.  
 
3. Development and structure of MIPEX 
The MIPEX Immigrant Integration Policy Index is managed by the British Council 
Brussels, the Foreign Policy Centre, and the Migration Policy Group, three think-tanks 
located in Brussels and London. The index tries to provide comparative data that allows for 
comparison and monitoring of integration policies of the member states and to identify 
examples of good practice. In 2011 33 countries are part of the index: the EU-27, 
Australia, Canada, Norway, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. So far, three index 
reports were being published (2005, 2007, and 2011). While the first index of 2005 only 
included five areas, the structure of the index was increasingly expanded, leading to the 
seven areas of immigrant integration policy described above. Additionally, the 
methodology was subject to amendments, with the consequence that the data of the 2005 
index cannot be compared to the data of the following indices in a quantitative fashion. 
Here I will only refer to the methodology of the 2011 index.  
The normative framework of the index is focused on inclusion, which means that 100% 
scores indicate maximum inclusion and 0% scores indicate maximum exclusion of 
immigrants (Geddes et al. 2005: x). The formulations of ideal policy conditions for 
immigrant inclusion are built on EU legislation, international conventions and NGO 
proposals (MIPEX 2005: 15). Based on the conclusions of the Tampere European Council 
in 1999, long-term resident immigrants should benefit from “civic citizenship”, a concept 
that provides immigrants with a legal status as similar as possible to EU citizenship. 
According to the 2005 index this includes:  
• “Right of residence, 
• Protection against expulsion 
• Access to employment and self-employment 
• Access to family reunification 
• Access to education, vocational training and recognition of qualifications. 
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• Access to social security and social assistance 
• Right of association and membership including trade unions 
• Right of participation in political life (at least local level). 
• Right to vote in European Parliament elections. 
• Right of movement for work and study purposes to any state in the EU.” (MIPEX 
2005: 4) 
These objectives are clearly judged as desirable in the index reports and a lot of effort is 
put into legitimising this approach (see MIPEX 2005: 1-19). In the following reports a 
commitment to civic citizenship is not mentioned. Instead, Council of Europe Conventions 
and EU Directives are argued to be the normative basis for the index framework (MIPEX 
2011: 7). However, a change in the normative concept of the index is not evident to me: 
The main difference is that in the 2005 index the concept is sufficiently explained, while in 
the 2007 and 2011 index it is used implicitly. For the context of my analysis a judgement 
about the desirability of civic citizenship for immigrants is not necessary. What matters is 
that compliance with the objectives is regarded as ideally inclusive hence non-compliance 
can be regarded as exclusive. Thus, the index can function as a measure for immigrant 
integration policy inclusiveness. Noteworthy, there is no clear objective of distinguishing 
between multicultural, differential-exclusionist, and assimilationist integration models. 
These strategies might shape policies, but are not measured explicitly. Hence, I may only 
analyse whether countries have different approaches towards civic inclusion or citizenship, 
but I cannot measure approaches towards multiculturalism or assimilation.  
For the 2011 index 148 policy indicators were used to measure immigrant integration 
policy (see Annex 1 or MIPEX 2011: 211-2 for a full list of indicators). For each indicator 
values from one to three representing total, halfway, or non-compliance with the normative 
concept are given based on the judgement of national experts. These scores are then being 
summarised to the dimensions of the policy areas (see below) and converted into 
percentages. 100 per cent are indicating total compliance within a dimension. The 
dimensions are then summarised into policy areas, which in turn can be summarised to get 
a total score. 
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MIPEX 2011 country profile structure: policy areas and dimensions 
 
 
• Access
•Access to general support
• Targeted support
•Workers’ rights
Labour Market Mobility
• Eligibility
•Acquisition conditions
•Security of status
•Rights associated
Family Reunion
• Access
•Targeting needs
•New opportunities
• Intercultural education for all
Education
• Electoral rights
•Political liberties
•Consultative bodies
• Implementation policies
Political Participation
• Eligibility
•Acquisition conditions
•Security of status
•Associated rights
Long-term Residence
• Eligibility
•Acquisition conditions
•Security of status
•Dual nationality
Access to Nationality
•Definitions and concepts
• Fields of application
•Enforcement mechanisms
•Equality policies
Anti-discrimination
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For the 2007 index the authors used a slightly different conception of Labour Market 
Mobility and the Education area was not part of the index yet (MIPEX 2007). To allow for 
a comparison over time, the scores for Labour Market Mobility for 2007 were recalculated 
using the 2011 index structure. The results are part of the 2011 index (MIPEX 2011: 11-
25). The policies analysed in the indices date in October 2004 for the 2005 index, March 
2007 for the 2007 index, and May 2010 for the 2011 index (MIPEX 2005: 22; MIPEX 
2011: 7).  
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IV. Analysing MIPEX results 2004-2010: Commonalities 
and divergence 
In this section, I will provide detailed information on MIPEX indicators for the selected 
countries and eventually answer the first research question: Therefore I will first describe 
the results for all countries separately, summarising results of the different areas of 
integration policy explained above. As a second step, I will compare averaged scores of the 
countries across areas and standard deviations and apply a bivariate data analysis in order 
to see whether national policies are consistent in their inclusive- or exclusiveness across 
different areas. Third, two models of cluster analysis will be adapted to analyse to which 
extent there are groups of countries that apply similar integration models. Finally, I will 
focus on index score changes to see whether policies are becoming more inclusive or 
exclusive over time. This methodology in sum allows for arguing to which extent 
integration policies are similar across countries and whether different types of integration 
policies exist. Thus, I will answer the first research question eventually.  
Unless specifically mentioned, the information presented below is taken from the 2007 and 
2011 indices and the tables on foreign born as part of the population and third country 
nationals (TCN) employment in the annex. The referred scores are all taken from the 2011 
index. 
 
1. Country results 
Austria 
In 2009 15.5 per cent of Austrian population were foreign-born, which is the fourth highest 
rate among the selected countries. TCNs are more likely to be employed than in most 
central or northern European countries and unemployment figures indicate that 
unemployment rates for TCNs in total and compared to nationals are rather low. Austria 
scores last in the overall performance as well as in Access to Nationality and Political 
Participation. Long-term Residence can be argued to be the strength of Austrian integration 
policy being average, with all other areas performing below average compared to the other 
countries selected. In the time period captured by the three indices Labour Market Mobility 
tended to become more inclusive, while Access to Nationality and Family Reunion became 
more exclusive.  
25 
 
Austrian Labour Market Mobility polices does not provide equal access to immigrants to 
the labour market and general support: Depending on their status, foreign workers can be 
tied to one employer or one sector. Family member are banned from the labour market for 
a year after arrival. There are specific obstacles to self-employment, training and study 
grants. If employed, immigrants are secure in their employment status and have full access 
to the rights employment involves. Eligibility for Family Reunion is exclusive due to 
waiting periods and age limits for spouses. Further, high income, housing, and integration 
requirements have to be met. Pre-departure measures are currently being debated. If 
Family Reunion is granted, the status involves fewer rights and is less secure than in many 
other countries and needs to be renewed after a year.  Immigrant pupils have full access to 
compulsory Education and general support. Specific needs are met in the case of funding 
and provision for quality German language courses. Teaching of mother tongue languages, 
specific training for teachers, and approaches to intercultural Education for all are subject 
to discretion of schools and Länder and thus vary, but exist at some level. TCNs have no 
electoral rights but full political liberties. There is some funding for immigrant 
organisations, but only with specific conditions. Consultative bodies are not structurally 
implemented and consulted only on an ad-hoc basis on the regional level. In sum, Political 
Participation as integration policy is almost absent in Austria. Although eligibility was 
expanded since 2007 temporary workers do usually not have access to Long-term 
Residence. There are many conditions, including health insurance, integration 
requirements, and economic autonomy, to becoming a long-term resident. Once it is 
granted, in contains comparatively many rights, but can be withdrawn for a number of 
unspecific reasons. Most immigrants are eligible for naturalisation after ten years. There 
are exclusive conditions like tests on Austrian history and politics and high income 
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requirements plus discretionary decision-making and high fees. Additionally citizenship is 
a comparatively insecure status in Austria. Dual nationality is allowed only exceptionally. 
While the performance in definition and enforcement mechanisms for Anti-
discrimination is about average in Austria, it crucially lacks fields of application, for 
example schools and housing. There is only limited dialogue and policy of promoting 
equality (MIPEX 2007: 20-5; 2011: 26-31).  
 
Belgium 
Belgium provides policies above average in all areas except Labour Market Mobility and 
Political Participation. Its non-native population is with 9.1-12.1 per cent of the total 
population about European average. TCNs are only half as likely to be employed as 
citizens and face the lowest employment and the highest unemployment rates of the 
selected countries. Immigrant integration – except citizenship – falls under the competence 
of the three regions. Thus, a validation of Belgium’s integration policy appears to be 
difficult (MIPEX 2005; 2007: 26). Integration policy was subject to changes on a number 
of occasions in recent years. This led to some policies becoming more exclusive, but most 
policies becoming more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 27; 2011: 32-3). 
 
It is somewhat unclear whether policy changes or changes in the concept of the index led 
to serious divergence in the scores of Belgian Labour Market Mobility policy: In the 
2005 index Belgium scores far above average with security of employment status meeting 
best-practice. In the 2011 index, Labour Market Mobility states the major weakness of 
Belgian integration policy, without any reference to policy changes in that area. Using the 
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2011 data and scores, immigrants do not have access to many careers after arrival, for 
example permanent public sector jobs. They can profit from general support and some 
targeted measures. Belgium’s complex Family Reunion policy is generally inclusive, but 
becoming more exclusive due to stricter age and housing requirements. If the conditions 
are met, Family Reunion is usually granted. Noteworthy, family member only have limited 
access to the labour market. Education is an area of particular inclusiveness of Belgian 
integration policy. Pupils can learn about immigrant languages and culture and targeted 
support should be available. Still, economically disadvantaged pupils might not receive 
this support in underperforming schools. In the area of Political Participation Belgium 
scores very low in electoral rights and - scarcely consulted - consultative bodies. To be 
able to vote in regional elections, one has to be a resident for five years (MIPEX 2011: 34-
7). This deficit is being made up for by high scores in implementation policies, 
representing specific public support and funding for immigrant associations (MIPEX 2007: 
29). Long-term Residence policy is being exclusive as far as tough eligibility rules are 
concerned. Despite that the system is very clear to applicants about how long they are 
allowed to stay, how long the procedure takes etc. Thus there is no discretion in the 
decision-making by the authority. In sum, Belgian Long-term Residence policy scores 
highest among the countries of the 2011 index. Access to Nationality on the contrary is 
characterised by a highly discretionary element and per se inclusive eligibility rules and 
acquisition conditions. Two thirds of the applicants are being rejected without being given 
a reason or a chance to appeal. Dual citizenship is allowed. Anti-discrimination policy 
was subject to amendments in all dimensions and became to be fairly inclusive. Belgium is 
ranked fourth among the selected countries in this area (MIPEX 2007: 26-31; 2011: 32-
37).  
 
Denmark 
In 2009 7.5 per cent of the Danish population were not born in Denmark, which is below 
the European average. TCNs are about ten per cent less likely to be employed than 
citizens, but higher unemployment rates lead them to be more likely to receive training in 
order to find a job (MIPEX 2005: 61-3). In Family Reunion, Access to Nationality, and 
Anti-discrimination Denmark scores below average, in Political Participation and 
Education about average, and in Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence above 
28 
average. Integration policy was subject to various changes between 2007 and 2010, leading 
to a result indicating slightly more inclusion than 2007.  
 
Labour Market Mobility is characterised by access to all areas of employment for 
residents and family members, targeted support, but unequal access to resulting social 
rights than citizens. For example, there is a ten-year waiting period to receive old-age 
pensions for immigrants. Hence, immigrants can participate, but under unequal 
circumstances. Family Reunion policy is extraordinarily restrictive, scoring second-last 
after Ireland. Eligibility requirements like the definition of eligible family members, 
residence requirements, or tests are all about the most restrictive among the selected 
countries. Additionally, family member can hardly get a residence permit independent 
from their sponsor. Education policy strongly focuses on the inclusion of immigrant 
pupils, providing extra support and language courses for pupils and special training for 
teachers. A concept of taking diversity as an asset of education or intercultural education is 
not part of Danish Education policy. This fact reduces the score to average (MIPEX 2011: 
64-6). Immigrants have electoral rights after four years and full political liberties, but are 
hardly encouraged to participate via immigrant organisations or consultative bodies, which 
lack public affirmation and funding since a budget cut in 2002. This results in an average 
score in Political Participation. Participation in associations appears crucial for 
integration into Danish society, with 73 per cent of the population serving in at least one 
association (MIPEX 2007: 53). To be granted Long-term Residence immigrants face 
many conditions composed to a points system, which is considered to be one of the most 
restrictive systems in Europe. Eligibility is still considered inclusive, because Long-term 
Residence can be applied for after four years. To get Access to Nationality first generation 
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immigrants have to wait nine years and meet high language requirements. Additionally, 
applicants must not have received social benefits for most of their residence period. Dual 
nationality is accepted only exceptionally and once citizenship is granted, it is averagely 
secure in its status. Anti-discrimination policy lacks nationality as a reason for 
discrimination in its definition and equality policies. This results in the third lowest score 
after Switzerland and Austria (MIPEX 2007: 50-5; 2011: 62-7).  
 
Finland 
Finland’s integration policy has particular strengths in the areas of Political Participation 
and Anti-discrimination. All other areas are slightly above average, except Long-term 
Residence, which is just below average. Changes in integration policy in recent years were 
scare and lead only to little changes in the MIPEX-scoring. Being a newer country of 
immigration, the percentage of foreign-born residents rose slightly to 4.4 per cent in 2009, 
which is the lowest score of the analysed countries. Employment rates of TCNs are 22 per 
cent below the rates of citizens, which is a comparatively large gap. Finnish unemployment 
rates for TCNs are the second-highest after Belgium.  
 
Despite the performance above average, Finnish Labour Market Mobility policy does 
only provide limited access to public sector employment for immigrants because of tough 
language requirements. Additionally, targeted support to improve qualifications, the 
recognition of skills, and limited access to study grants are weaknesses of the policy. While 
eligibility rules and acquisition conditions of Family Reunion are very inclusive, the 
security of the status and the rights it involves are rather not: It can be withdrawn on 
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several reasons and it is very difficult to get a residence permit independent from the 
sponsor. The Education system provides immigrant pupils favourable access to education 
and targets special needs: Teachers are instructed specifically, Finnish language courses 
are of high quality, and it is possible to learn the mother tongue. But integration policy 
does hardly go beyond, for example in making diversity an issue for all pupils. In terms of 
Political Participation, Finland is only outranked by Norway. This entails full political 
liberties and electoral rights at the local and regional level and far-reaching implementation 
policies fostering immigrants to participate. Consultative bodies are relevant at national 
and regional level. Long-term Residence comes with equal rights in most areas of society, 
but is difficult to attain: Temporary worker have no access, students cannot count their 
time studying, but waiting time during an asylum application counts for application 
requirements for Long-term Residence. Additionally, the status can be withdrawn on a 
number of reasons. Access to Nationality is available after six years of residence, but the 
procedure is long and costly and involves high language requirements (MIPEX 2011: 76-
9). Dual nationality is available to naturalising immigrants, but not to children born in 
Finland, which applies ius soli (MIPEX 2007: 66). Anti-discrimination policy has a broad 
definition of discrimination and wide areas of application. Although victims cannot rely on 
NGO-support, enforcement of sanctions is facilitated by the Ombudsman for Minorities 
and Discrimination Tribunal. This leads to Finland being ranked fourth in this area 
(MIPEX 2007: 62-7; 2011: 74-9).  
 
France 
France is host to 11.6 per cent of foreign born residents in its population, which is average 
among the selected countries. Similar to Finland and Germany, employment rates for 
TCNs are about 20 percent below the rates for citizens. Moreover, TCNs are 2.8 times 
more likely to be unemployed, which is about average among the selected countries. 
French integration policy scores below average in most areas, particularly in the area of 
Education. Access to Nationality and especially Anti-discrimination are strengths of the 
French approach to immigrant integration. Between 2004 and 2007 integration policy was 
subject to significant changes, making it more restrictive in terms of Long-term Residence, 
Family Reunion, and Access to Nationality and more inclusive in the area of Anti-
discrimination. Between 2007 and 2010 MIPEX scores do not indicate significant change.  
31 
 
French Labour Market Mobility policy involves legal access to fewer careers than any 
other MIPEX country. Additionally, access to trade unions is denied. Despite this 
exclusion, France provides targeted support for immigrants to find jobs, but this does not 
match the recognition of immigrant’s skills. Mostly, it is designed to assign immigrants to 
jobs with manpower shortages. In sum, France has the fourth least favourable Labour 
Market Mobility policy among the selected countries. Family Reunion is subject to a large 
number of conditions, making it very restrictive, together with Denmark, Austria, and 
Switzerland. Additionally, the status can be withdrawn due to several reasons and getting 
an autonomous permit is only possible after three years and subject to further conditions. 
Education as a part of integration policy is subject to some pilot projects. Apart from that, 
immigrant pupils have access to education, but receive hardly any specific support. 
Diversity is not a part of French education curriculum. Granting electoral rights to TCNs is 
under public debate, but not agreed yet. Political liberties are limited, because many media 
professions are not available to immigrants. Consultative bodies are in place, but not led or 
elected by TCNs. Implementation polices receive high scores because immigrant 
organisations are funded equally like other organisations. In sum, Political Participation 
scores halfway to best practice. Eligibility and acquisition conditions for Long-term 
Residence include high income requirements, the fulfilment of an integration contract and 
health insurance, making it extraordinarily restrictive. Additionally, it is not being renewed 
automatically and does not involve as many rights as in other European countries. Access 
to Nationality is per se inclusive, including naturalisation after five years, the use of ius 
soli, and acceptance of dual citizenship. Still, the decision about the application is subject 
to great discretion and made on the local level, providing divergent practices in different 
regions. Anti-discrimination is a clear strength on French integration policy, including 
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wide definitions and areas of application. Equality policies and enforcement mechanisms 
could be improved, but are both above average (MIPEX 2007: 68-73; 2011: 80-5).  
 
Germany 
With 12.9 per cent of its population being foreign-born, Germany is slightly above 
average. There is a gap of about 20 per cent between employment rates for nationals and 
TCNs, similar to France and Finland. High overall unemployment leads to a comparatively 
little gap between nationals and TCNs, with TCNs being 2.4 times more unemployed than 
nationals. MIPEX data reveals some changes in German integration policy, in sum making 
it more inclusive over time. This concerns Access to Nationality especially. The total score 
indicates that Germany is performing about average compared to the selected countries, 
with some areas above and below average.  
 
German Labour Market Mobility policy is generally inclusive, granting equal access and 
rights to most immigrants on the labour market. Targeted support scores high too. There 
are some issues about Germany not using its immigrants’ potential effectively: This entails 
limited access to study grants, banning from public sector jobs and difficult qualification 
recognition procedures. An amendment of the latter is on the reform plan of the current 
government. Family Reunion policy appears to be average in all dimensions. Specific 
elements are language tests that need to be taken abroad prior to reunion and a system of 
different waiting periods for different family members.  With this development, Family 
Reunion policy became more restrictive since 2007. The federal character of the 
Education system makes it difficult to assess regarding integration policy. Targeting needs 
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and general access to education varies. Children of undocumented immigrants have a right 
to education in five Länder only. Pupils do not get recognised all they have learned abroad. 
Diversity is a matter to all pupils in the German education system and there are campaigns 
to diversify teaching staff. TCNs have no electoral rights and full political liberties in 
Germany. Political Participation includes strong implementation policies. The role and 
structure of consultative bodies varies in the Länder. Long-term Residence is more 
difficult to attain in Germany than in no other selected country including high income 
requirements and language and civil society testing. If Long-term Residence is granted it is 
more secure and involves more rights than in most other countries.  Access to Nationality 
was subject to many reforms since 1999, but becoming easier to attain over time. By 2010, 
second generation immigrants are entitled to citizenship by birth. First generation 
immigrant can naturalise at least after eight years. With some exceptions dual nationality is 
not permitted. Naturalisation requires linguistic and economic integration. After five years, 
citizenship cannot be withdrawn. In sum, Germany scores slightly above average in this 
area. Racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination are prohibited in most areas of life, but 
nationality discrimination only in some. Anti-discrimination policy further lacks efficient 
enforcement mechanisms and equality policies compared to other countries (MIPEX 2007: 
74-9; 2011: 86-91).  
 
Greece 
Despite being a newer country of immigration, rates of foreign-born residents show a 
decrease to 8.3 per cent of the population in 2009. This might be explained by Greece 
being a transit country for immigrants (MIPEX 2011: 92). Similar to other new countries 
of immigration, employment rates of TCNs are about 10 per cent higher than those of 
Greek citizens, which is the largest gap among the selected countries. Additionally, TCNs 
are less likely to be unemployed, which in the case in Greece only. Having a highly 
exclusive integration policy in the 2005 and 2007 indices, policies became much more 
inclusive in recent years. The 2011 index rates Greek integration policy below average in 
all areas, except Access to Nationality, which was subject to reform in 2010.  
34 
 
In Greece, immigrants have only limited access to the labour market because of additional 
conditions to self-employment and a banning of public sector employment. Legally, TCNs 
enjoy equal rights and access to general support with few exceptions, but there is no 
targeted support meeting specific needs at all. Hence Labour Market Mobility scores are 
far below average. Family Reunion procedures take a long time and include long waiting 
periods and high income requirements and exclude adult children and parents. If a family 
is reunited it is averagely secure in its status. Immigrant pupils have full access to 
Education, but receive little targeted support. There are some policies towards teaching of 
immigrants’ languages and intercultural educations, which result in Greek performance 
little below average. Immigrants have full political liberties and since 2010 long-term 
residents have electoral rights on the local level. Consultative bodies are not significant and 
immigrant civil society receives no funding. Despite the progress, Greece scores far from 
average in the area of Political Participation. After five years immigrants can become 
long-term residents under restrictive conditions: application fees cost 600€ (900€ before 
2010), income requirements are high, and one has to pass a language and integration test. 
Once granted Long-term Residence provides average security and many rights (for 
example electoral rights). Access to Nationality does not make up for the restrictive 
acquisition conditions of Long-term Residence: Naturalisation in Greece is expensive too 
(700€, before 2010: 1500€) and based on a language and integration test, but immigrants 
are eligible after five to seven years. Since 2010, second generation immigrants become 
dual citizens at birth. Noteworthy, Greek citizenship is a particularly insecure status and 
can be withdrawn even when leading to statelessness. Anti-discrimination policy is 
halfway to best practice, lacking a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
(MIPEX 2007: 80-5; 2011: 92-97).  
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
LA
B
O
U
R
 M
A
R
K
E
T
 M
O
B
IL
IT
Y
A
cc
e
ss
G
e
n
e
ra
l s
u
p
p
o
rt
T
a
rg
e
te
d
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
W
o
rk
e
r'
s 
ri
g
h
ts
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
F
A
M
IL
Y
 R
E
U
N
IO
N
E
lib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
A
cc
e
ss
T
a
rg
e
ti
n
g
 n
e
e
d
s
N
e
w
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
In
te
rc
u
lt
u
ra
l e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
a
ll
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
P
O
LI
T
IC
A
L 
P
A
R
T
IC
IP
A
T
IO
N
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
ri
g
h
ts
P
o
li
ca
l 
Li
b
e
rt
ie
s
C
o
n
su
lt
a
ti
v
e
 b
o
d
ie
s
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 p
o
li
ci
e
s
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
LO
N
G
-T
E
R
M
 R
E
S
ID
E
N
C
E
E
lig
ib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
A
C
C
E
S
S
 T
O
 N
A
T
IO
N
A
LI
T
Y
E
lig
ib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
q
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
D
u
a
l n
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
A
N
T
I-
D
IS
C
R
IM
IN
A
T
IO
N
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
F
ie
ld
s 
o
f 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
m
e
ch
a
n
is
m
s
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
o
li
ci
e
s
50 49
42 40
56 57
50
39 34
25
33 31
22
31
66 61
51
63 59 56
62
100
91
77
94
79 82
88
40
83
0
75
30
50 50
67
50
33
44 42
33
100
15 10
58
22
57
88
75
45
7
100
50 50 54 44
MIPEX 2011 scores by country: Greece
Greece Minimum (n=17) Average (n=17) Maximum (n=17) Greece: subdimensions
35 
 
Ireland 
Being a newer country of immigration, the share of foreign-born residents increased 
rapidly in the past ten years, being 17.2 per cent, which is the highest rate after 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. Employment rates for TCNs are equal to nationals and 
unemployment rates for TCNs are the second-lowest, after Greece. Except for Access to 
Nationality and Anti-discrimination, which are about average, and Political Participation, 
which is above average, Ireland receives low scores in the 2011 Index. Comparison with 
the earlier indices reveal than Irish integration policy is becoming more exclusive over 
time, except Anti-discrimination.  
 
Temporary workers cannot access new jobs, start their own businesses, or benefit from 
general support. Some targeted support measures were withdrawn funding in 2008. If 
regularly employed, immigrants enjoy associated rights. In sum, Labour Market Mobility 
scores lowest among the selected countries. Ireland opted out on the EU directive on 
Family Reunion and limits access to reunion to Irish nationals and EU-citizens only. 
Family Reunion for TCNs has unclear legal standards, involves high fees, hardly any 
rights, and no judicial oversight, making it the most exclusive policy among the selected 
countries. Family members further cannot get an autonomous permit and are banned from 
regular access to employment. Access to compulsory Education and general support is 
granted to immigrant children. Programmes that meet specific needs or provide language 
support were mostly cut due to the economic crisis. In 2010 and new program for 
intercultural education was launched, still, Irish education policy received the lowest 
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36 
scores in sum. In contrast to the integration areas described above, Ireland provides the 
most inclusive local electoral rights among all MIPEX countries. Further, immigrants 
enjoy full political liberties and elaborated implementation policies, including funding and 
consultation of immigrant organisations. National Councils on Integration are not elected 
or led by immigrants, which constitutes a weakness in the area of Political Participation. 
Long-term Residence is composed of two different statuses in Ireland, permanent 
residence after eight years and renewable residence contracts for five years after five years. 
Both are marked by average eligibility rules, high administrative discretion, no judicial 
oversight and unclear rights involved. Access to Nationality is based on inclusive rules 
containing short residence requirement, dual citizenship, and some application of ius soli. 
Still, procedures are expensive (up to 950€), long, and discretionary (one must, for 
example proof ‘good character’) and the provided status is as insecure as only in Greece. 
Irish Anti-discrimination policy has wide fields of application, but rather exclusive 
definitions. Irish equality and human rights bodies were further subject to large budget cuts 
which makes their effectiveness questionable (MIPEX 2007: 92-97; 2011: 104-9).  
 
Italy 
According to the 2011 index 6.5 per cent of Italy’s population was foreign-born, which is 
significantly below average. TCNs are only little less likely to be employed than Italian 
nationals. On unemployment differences there is no data available. Integration policy 
scores slightly above average in all areas except Education and Political Participation. Data 
from the indices reveal that integration policy became more inclusive until 2007 and 
slightly more exclusive from then on especially with respect to the 2009 Security Law.  
37 
 
Labour Market Mobility policy is characterised by equal access, general support, and 
rights for immigrants. Immigrants face problems getting their skill recognised and receive 
hardly any targeted support. This might indicate why TCNs are employed below their skill 
levels or on the illegal labour market. Legally eligibility for Family Reunion is inclusive, 
but disproportional income and accommodation requirements and high procedure costs 
limit access to Family Reunion. Once it is granted, reunited family are generally secure in 
their status and have equal rights as their sponsor. Italian Education system provides equal 
access to all immigrants under 18 to education and general support despite a law that 
prohibits the number of immigrant pupils in a class to 30 per cent. There is some risk being 
placed on the wrong level. Programmes targeting immigrant pupil’s needs are in place, but 
appear somehow to have a stigmatising effect. New opportunities and intercultural 
education for all do not receive much support, which makes education policy score below 
average. Political Participation policy does not provide electoral rights for TCNs, but all 
political liberties except the right to run a company publishing newspapers. 
Implementation policies are in place. Rome’s immigrant consultative bodies are influential 
an immigrant-organised and becoming a model for other regions. However Political 
Participation scores are below average due to the absence of electoral rights. Language and 
integration conditions make Long-term Residence policy comparatively difficult to 
achieve. Therefore a test might be introduced. The status is generally secure and contains 
equal rights to citizens in many respects, leading to a favourable score for Italy’s Long-
term Residence policy. TCNs are eligible for naturalisation only after ten years of 
residence. Conditions are little more demanding than for Long-term Residence. For 
immigrants born in Italy, ius soli is applied when they are 18 years old and have stayed in 
Italy without interruption. Before that they are treated as foreigners. Dual citizenship is 
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38 
permitted. Despite the long waiting period Access to Nationality scores are above average 
in sum. After an EU infringement procedure Italy adopted inclusive Anti-discrimination 
definitions, fields of application, and enforcement mechanisms. Still, equality is not being 
promoted by public discourse or policy (MIPEX 2007: 98-103; 2011: 110-5).  
 
Luxembourg 
In 2009, 36.9 per cent of Luxembourg’s population was foreign-born, which is by far the 
highest rate among the selected countries. TCNs are less likely to be employed than 
citizens, but the gap is smaller than in its neighbouring countries. While nationals face to 
lowest unemployment among the selected countries, unemployment rates for TCNs are 
above average. Hence there is a ratio of nationals being 6.8 times less likely to be 
unemployed than TCNs. The 2011 index shows an average overall performance with 
strengths in terms of inclusion in Political Participation and Access to Nationality and 
weaknesses in Labour Market Mobility and Anti-discrimination. Score changes reveal 
strong trends towards more inclusion in recent years.  
 
While immigrants generally enjoy equal rights and general support that comes with 
employment, access to the labour market is particularly exclusive: TCNs are excluded 
from the public sector, few areas of the private sector, and from self-employment. A 
reform in 2008 encourages immigrants better to have their skills recognised. With only few 
targeted programmes to improve immigrant’s Labour Market Mobility, it scores 
significantly below average, despite recent amendments. Prior to the transposition of EU 
law in 2008, Luxembourg did not have Family Reunion legislation. It turned out to be 
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39 
rather inclusive with eligibility after one year, average acquisition conditions and equal 
opportunities for family member as their sponsor. To get an autonomous permit is rather 
difficult in Luxembourg. Access to Education is provided for all immigrant pupils and a 
specific introduction programme explains parents the education system and makes sure 
that pupils are placed on the right level. Moreover, there is intercultural education provided 
for all. There are some difficulties for immigrants to receive language training and 
Luxembourg does not diversify its teaching staff. Political Participation is a clear strength 
of Luxembourg’s integration policy with high scores on political liberties, implementation 
policies, and consultative bodies, which were reformed in 2008. Electoral rights do allow 
immigrants to vote in local elections, but not to run as a candidate. Eligibility for Long-
term Residence rests on five years of residence, but not all types of permits count: While 
refugees and students usually can apply, migrant workers cannot. Rights associated and 
acquisition conditions are above average, but the status can be withdrawn quite easily and 
rejections do not always include a right for appeal. Access to Nationality was subject to 
reform in 2008 too, bringing both inclusive elements (dual nationality) and exclusive 
elements (longer waiting period, testing). After seven years of residence immigrants can 
apply for citizenship under recently restricted conditions that include a free citizenship 
course and Luxembourgish language testing. The language requirement cannot be met in 
German or French, although these are official languages. Ius soli is applied to third 
generation immigrants only. Anti-discrimination policy is rather exclusive on all 
dimensions. Nationality as a reason of discrimination is not part of Luxembourg’s Anti-
discrimination policy and there are very few commitments to equality. In sum, scores for 
Anti-discrimination are significantly below average.  
 
Netherlands 
In 2009 11.1 per cent of the Dutch population are foreign born, which is average for the 
selected countries. In the Netherlands employment rates of TCNs are almost 30 per cent 
lower than those of nationals, which is one of the largest differences. Still, generally low 
unemployment rates include TCNs, which are less likely to be unemployed than in many 
other countries. Integration policy scores above average in all areas and proved to be fairly 
consistent in the three indices, except Family Reunion, which is slightly below average and 
tends to become more restrictive. However, the overall score did not change between 2007 
and 2010.  
40 
 
Dutch inclusive Labour Larket Mobility policy provides immigrants with equal access 
and rights in the labour market as natives. Its targeted support programmes specifically 
support young immigrants and immigrant women in improving skills and finding a job or 
setting up a business. Among the analysed countries only Sweden and Portugal receive 
higher scores. Although eligibility and acquisition conditions were more inclusive in 2010 
than in 2007 Family Reunion remains a weakness of Dutch integration policy. Its pre-
departure integration and language test is distinctly difficult and expensive. The status of a 
family member involves equal access to work, study, and benefits as the sponsor, but can 
be withdrawn on many grounds. Still, the score is almost average among the selected 
countries. Dutch Education system provides access to compulsory education for 
immigrant pupils. Its targeting programmes are average in Europe. There is a strong 
account for intercultural education for all pupils, but the teaching of immigrant cultures 
and languages does not receive much support. Except from the dimension of consultative 
bodies, which occur on an ad-hoc basis, the Netherlands receive high scores in all 
dimensions of Political Participation. This represents electoral rights on the local level 
after five years of legal residence, full political liberties, and state support for immigrant 
organisations. Long-term Residence is not eligible to many categories of temporary 
migrants and based on high fees (400€), integration and language tests and a steady 
income. The status can only be withdrawn on few grounds and involves many rights. 
Access to Nationality is available already after five years residence and based on the same 
test as Long-term Residence. For second generation immigrants ius soli is being applied. 
Dual nationality is usually allowed and the citizenship status is more secure than in most 
countries. With regard to Anti-discrimination Dutch policy provides broad definitions and 
a particularly strong enforcement mechanism, but limited fields of application. 
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Additionally, there is only little commitment to promote equality trough information and 
dialogue, reflected by a lower score on equality policies (MIPEX 2007: 128-33; 2011: 140-
5).  
 
Norway 
In 2009 10.9 per cent of the population was foreign-born, which is average. TCN 
employment rates are below those of Norwegian citizens and the gap between is almost 20 
per cent. Unemployment for nationals is fairly low and still below average for TCNs. 
Integration policy scores are above average in all areas except from Access to Nationality 
and Anti-discrimination. In the area of Political Participation Norway receives the highest 
score of all MIPEX countries. There is some evidence that Norwegian integration policy is 
becoming more restrictive over time, which results in a marginal decrease of the overall 
score from 2007 to 2011.  
 
Generally immigrants have equal access to the labour market, training programmes and 
study grants in Norway, but there is an obstacle of insufficient recognition of skills. Access 
to general support and rights are per se equal too, but using social assistance can lead to a 
permit withdrawal for migrant workers or family members. Thus Labour Market 
Mobility policy does not effectively include equal social rights. Since 2010 a sponsor 
needs an employment history for up to four years to be eligible for Family Reunion. 
Acquisition procedures were restricted too, being average in Europe. After arrival family 
members can benefit from an introduction and language programme, have equal rights than 
their sponsor and can get an autonomous contract after three years. Since 2010 
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42 
unaccompanied minors over 16 have reduced access to secondary or higher Education. 
Apart from that the Norwegian education system scores strong in three sub-categories, 
especially concerning mother tongue and Norwegian language teaching and intercultural 
education for all. Political Participation policy is particularly inclusive in all dimensions 
in Norway. Immigrants have full electoral rights, except for the national level, after three 
years. The national consultative body KIM is in place since 1984 and plays an influential 
role in Norwegian politics. After three years some immigrants are eligible for Long-term 
Residence, but there are many categories of immigrants that cannot. Acquisition 
conditions include integration courses but o testing and the application process takes about 
eleven months. Once Long-term Residence is granted, immigrants are secure in their status 
and had the most rights associated in the 2007 index. Access to Nationality is based on 
seven years of residence and ius soli is not applied for most second generation immigrants. 
Acquisition conditions are more inclusive than in most countries, but include long 
language courses. The status is averagely secure. Dual citizenship is only permitted for 
those who cannot renounce their previous citizenship. Nationality is not explicitly included 
as a potential ground of discrimination in Norway’s conception of Anti-discrimination. 
Additionally, enforcement mechanism could be improved by greater sanctions and legal 
aid. Norway has a particularly strong approach to equality policies, ranked fourth among 
the selected countries (MIPEX 2007: 134-8; 2011: 146-51). 
 
Portugal 
Portugal scores above average in all areas of integration policy and ranks second, after 
Sweden, in the overall scores. Although Portugal scored above average already in the 2005 
index, policies were further amended up to the 2011 index (MIPEX 2007: 147; 2011: 158-
9). Being a newer country of immigration, the share of foreign-born people in the 
population is fairly low. Similar to Spain and Greece, employment rates of TCNs exceed 
rates for citizens. Additionally, the unemployment ratio between TCNs and nationals is 
comparatively small. 
43 
 
Labour Market Mobility received maximum scores in three of four dimensions with 
targeted support as a comparative weakness. Still, the recognition of qualifications of 
immigrants was amended in 2007, limiting this weakness. In general terms, Labour Market 
Mobility is achieving lots of attention in Portuguese policy-making with its 2007-9 
National Plan for Immigrant Integration that strongly focuses on labour market integration 
(MIPEX 2011: 160). Due to the economic crisis income requirements for Family Reunion 
were lowered, making Portugal the most inclusive country concerning Family Reunion. 
Eligibility is broad and family member have the same rights as their sponsor and can get 
autonomous contracts after two years (MIPEX 2007: 148). The area of Education 
constitutes a weakness of Portuguese integration policy. While access to education and 
intercultural education scores are high, Portugal could improve targeting immigrant pupils’ 
needs. For example, teaching of immigrant languages and interaction with parents are 
issues of possible improvement. Political Participation lacks electoral rights for most 
TCNs (based on reciprocal agreements, see Spain) and a more frequent and systematic 
cooperation with consultative bodies. The fact that immigrant organisations are publicly 
funded and incorporated into decision making provides Portugal with a maximum score in 
implementation policies and political liberties. Long-term Residence was an area of 
amendment in all dimensions since 2007. In sum, Long-term Residence scores are slightly 
above European average. Access to Nationality is most inclusive among all MIPEX-
countries in Portugal. This means that residence requirements are short, basic knowledge in 
Portuguese are required, the status for naturalised citizens is almost as secure as the status 
for citizens who always had Portuguese citizenship, and dual citizenship is permitted. 
While enforcement mechanisms and fields of application of Anti-discrimination are 
scoring very high, definitions of Portuguese Anti-discrimination policy lack racial profiling 
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
LA
B
O
U
R
 M
A
R
K
E
T
 M
O
B
IL
IT
Y
A
cc
e
ss
G
e
n
e
ra
l s
u
p
p
o
rt
T
a
rg
e
te
d
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
W
o
rk
e
r'
s 
ri
g
h
ts
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
F
A
M
IL
Y
 R
E
U
N
IO
N
E
lib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
A
cc
e
ss
T
a
rg
e
ti
n
g
 n
e
e
d
s
N
e
w
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
In
te
rc
u
lt
u
ra
l e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
a
ll
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
P
O
LI
T
IC
A
L 
P
A
R
T
IC
IP
A
T
IO
N
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
ri
g
h
ts
P
o
li
ca
l 
Li
b
e
rt
ie
s
C
o
n
su
lt
a
ti
v
e
 b
o
d
ie
s
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 p
o
li
ci
e
s
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
LO
N
G
-T
E
R
M
 R
E
S
ID
E
N
C
E
E
lig
ib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
A
C
C
E
S
S
 T
O
 N
A
T
IO
N
A
LI
T
Y
E
lig
ib
il
it
y
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
q
u
is
it
io
n
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s
D
u
a
l n
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
M
IN
/A
V
/M
A
X
A
N
T
I-
D
IS
C
R
IM
IN
A
T
IO
N
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
F
ie
ld
s 
o
f 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
m
e
ch
a
n
is
m
s
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
o
li
ci
e
s
94 91
63
70 69
82 84
39 34
25
33 31
22
31
66 61
51
63 59 56
62
100
91
77
94
79 82
88
100100
75
100 100
83 88
92 86
50 50
67
33
100
48
100
50 53
71
100
90
81
57
100
64
100
88 83
MIPEX 2011 scores by country: Portugal
Portugal Minimum (n=17) Average (n=17) Maximum (n=17) Portugal: subdimensions
44 
and equality bodies cannot represent victims under all circumstances. Still, Portugal 
performs third, behind Sweden and the UK (MIPEX 2007: 146-51; 2011: 158-3).  
 
Spain 
Spanish integration policy is characterised by consistently high scores in the areas of 
Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence, and Family Reunion. Although scores 
were high before, these areas were subject to amendments between 2007 and 2010, which 
led to even higher scores. In 2009, adult children and spouses granted the right of Family 
Reunion became entitled to immediate full access to the labour market when arriving. All 
other areas are characterised by scores below average, in particular Access to Nationality. 
In these areas there was no recent policy change. Noteworthy, employment rates for TCNs 
are above the rates for nationals and unemployment rates are comparatively equal, with 
TCNs being 1.5 times more likely to be unemployed. Although Spain only recently 
became a country of immigration, immigration rates are the highest in Europe and the 
quote of foreign born residents is above average (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 24-6; MIPEX 
2007: 164).  
 
Spanish Labour Market Mobility policy constitutes an ideal case of inclusion except its 
reluctance of providing targeted support. Apart from that, all legal residents have legally 
equal opportunities in the labour market than nationals and labour market participation 
provides them with equal rights. Recognition of qualifications and labour market training 
are average. After Portugal, Spain is the most favourable European country for Family 
Reunion, with eligibility for adult children and spouses/partners, a very secure status 
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45 
including labour market access and the possibility of getting an independent residence 
permit. Procedures are free and short. Education constitutes a weakness of Spanish policy 
with immigrant pupils being able to benefit from general support and language courses. 
There are only very few approaches to diversify schools, except the provision of mother-
tongue language courses for Moroccans and Romanians. Political Participation is another 
weakness with electoral rights being based on reciprocal agreements. Hence, voting rights 
are granted if the country of origin grants voting rights for Spanish residents vis-a-vis, 
which is the case for Norway and five Latin American countries. Consultative bodies have 
powers, but are neither directly elected by immigrants, nor led by them. After five years of 
residence, immigrants are entitled to Long-term Residence permits. Waiting for asylum 
application decisions or studying time does not fully count, although there are incentives to 
convince former students to settle. Procedures are short and simple. The status provides 
many rights and is comparatively secure. Access to Nationality is characterised by strict 
eligibility requests for up to ten years of residence and time-consuming and discretionary 
procedures. Dual nationality is not allowed for most immigrants and citizenship at birth is 
only applied after two generations. Anti-discrimination policy lacks the inclusion of 
discrimination based on nationality in its definitions. Equality policies and enforcement 
mechanisms are below average as well (MIPEX 2007: 164-9; 2011: 182-7).  
 
Sweden 
In 2009 there were 14.4 per cent of the population foreign-born, which is about three per 
cent above average. Swedish employment rates reveal a difference of 30 per cent in TCN 
and national employment, which is the largest gap with Belgium and the Netherlands.  The 
ratio of TCNs being 2.9 times more likely to be in unemployment is average. Swedish 
immigrant integration policy scores very high across all areas. Political Participation could 
be argued as a weakness of Swedish policy, but the scores still are significantly above 
average. Policy only changed little from 2004 to 2010. The scores from the 2007 and 2011 
indices indicate that Swedish integration policy became somewhat more exclusive in the 
area of Family Reunion. However, Sweden scored first in all indices’ overall rankings.  
46 
 
Labour Market Mobility shows maximum scores on all dimensions. This entails full 
access to employment, workers’ rights, and general support for all immigrants with 
residence permits for at least a year. There are many efficient targeted support programmes 
that especially focus on teaching Swedish, assessing and improving newcomers’ skills. In 
2009 legislation on Family Reunion became to be more restrictive than in the past with 
new income and housing requirements. These measures are argued not to restrict Family 
Reunion, but to create incentives for labour market participation. However, with the other 
dimensions scoring very high, Sweden has an inclusive Family Reunion policy. Swedish 
Education system includes full access to education, general support and specific 
programmes for immigrants supporting school entry and language teaching, both mother-
tongue and Swedish. There are intercultural curricula and campaigns to diversify teaching 
staff, but there is some discretion of the municipalities on these issues. In sum, Sweden 
received the highest scores of all MIPEX-countries. Political Participation policy 
includes full electoral rights on the local and regional level, full political liberties, and 
support for immigrant organisations. There are no formal consultative bodies on the 
national level, but on the regional level. This causes Sweden’s comparative weakness in 
the area of Political Participation. Long-term Residence is characterised by inclusive 
eligibility rules and high levels of security and associated rights. Migrant workers, get 
Long-term Residence permit after four years if they can prove that they were working. 
Families can get the status of Long-term Residence after two years and refugees 
immediately. Acquisition conditions score halfway because immigrants may not have left 
Sweden for a longer period and need to pay a considerable fee when applying for Long-
term Residence. After five years immigrants have a right to citizenship and dual 
nationality. Immigrant children do not have Access to Nationality via ius soli, but face 
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favourable acquisition conditions than first generation immigrants. To naturalise, 
immigrants do not need to prove language skills. Swedish Anti-discrimination policy 
scores high in all dimensions. Noteworthy, a 2009 reform made Anti-discrimination law 
simpler and four equality bodies were replaced by a equality ombudsman, which made 
procedures and monitoring more efficient (MIPEX 2007: 170-5; 2011: 188-193).  
 
Switzerland 
In 2009 26.3 per cent of Switzerland’s population were foreign-born, which is the second-
highest value for the selected countries. For northern and central European countries, 
Switzerland’s employment gap between nationals and TCNs is rather small, similar to 
Austria and Denmark. Unemployment rates for TCNs of 14.1 per cent are about average, 
but compared to the rate for nationals (3.1 per cent) fairly high. Integration policy is 
marked by scores below average in all areas, with Education and Political Participation 
being close to average and Access to Nationality receiving scores as low as in Austria only. 
The evaluation of Switzerland’s integration policy faces some difficulty due to the federal 
organisation of the country. In the 2007 index there is an argument that integration policy 
was subject to restrictions in 2006 in the areas of Long-term Residence and Family 
Reunion. Despite some reforms the scores from 2007 and 2011 do not indicate any further 
change.  
 
In Switzerland there is no equal access to the labour market and associated support for 
immigrants. Many public sector jobs are not available for immigrant and self-employment 
is possible for long-term residents only. Additionally, there are limitations concerning 
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access to study grants and social assistance for immigrants. There are some targeted 
programmes that focus on immigrants’ language skills and working skills. In sum, Labour 
Market Mobility scores are significantly below average. Family Reunion conditions vary 
in the Cantons, but include a narrow definition of eligible family members, receiving no 
social assistance, and appropriate housing and might include high income requirements, 
integration contracts, and long and expensive procedures.  Once a family is reunited, 
family members have limited access to employment and Education and fade difficulties in 
attaining an autonomous contract. All immigrant pupils have access to compulsory 
schooling and can receive specific training and language courses, including mother-tongue 
and cultures of origin under better conditions than in many countries. Intercultural 
education for all is not included in all Canton’s education system. TCNs have electoral 
rights in many Cantons and full political liberties in all. Immigrant organisations can 
receive public funding, but only under conditions. Consultative bodies are in place on the 
national and on the Canton level, but are not fully elected by immigrants and lack coherent 
representation of different nationalities or gender. However, scores for Political 
Participation come close to average. Long-term Residence is difficult to achieve and can 
be withdrawn comparatively easy. Immigrants face waiting periods up to ten years before 
being eligible and the time studying does not count. Acquisition conditions include a 
discretionary element when officials determine the “degree of integration” the applicant 
has achieved. If the status is granted, it is not secure but involves many rights, coming 
close to those of nationals. Since 2009, there are some limits to the Canton’s discretion 
over judging applications for naturalisation and there is a chance to appeal against negative 
decisions. Requirements and procedures still include waiting periods of up to twelve years, 
fees about 1.500€, and language and integration assessment. Access to Nationality is not 
provided on an ius soli-basis, but once naturalising, one does not need to renounce the 
previous citizenship. Anti-discrimination scores are the lowest among the selected 
countries by far. This entails limited definitions that are not applicable under many 
circumstances, weak enforcement mechanisms and little equality policies (MIPEX 2007: 
176-80; 2011: 194-99).  
 
United Kingdom 
In 2009 11.3 per cent of the United Kingdom’s population was foreign born, which is 
exactly at average of the selected countries. Similar to Ireland, employment and 
49 
unemployment rates of TCNs and nationals are comparatively close. This means that 
TCNs are almost twice as likely to be unemployed than citizens and employment rates 
share a gap of less than ten per cent. The performance of the United Kingdom in the 2011 
index reveals a unique integration policy: While scores are below average in Labour 
Market Mobility, Family Reunion, Political Participation, and Long-term Residence and 
slightly above average in Education and Access to Nationality, scores in Anti-
discrimination are almost the highest. Further, those areas receiving lower scores 
experienced a significant shift towards exclusion in recent years, in return, Anti-
discrimination was subject to changes making it more inclusive over time.  
 
Immigrants have equal access to employment than citizens, but do not enjoy general 
support and social security equally. Hence they participate under unequal conditions. 
Moreover, targeted support programmes that might make up for that are scarce. This 
results in scores around halfway to best practice in Labour Market Mobility. Since 2008, 
the United Kingdom uses tight regulations on Family Reunion to prevent forced marriage. 
This results in a ban of spouses under the age of 21 to be eligible for Family Reunion. 
While other conditions are argued to be average for Europe, the family member status 
involves only limited access to public benefits. Education policy promotes intercultural 
education for all best among the selected countries. This includes the diversification of 
teachers and an accommodation of different cultural and religious needs. Apart from that 
all immigrants have access to education and receive targeted some programmes. Language 
and introduction programmes differ greatly among different schools and municipalities. 
While electoral rights are limited to EU and commonwealth citizens, all immigrants enjoy 
basic political liberties. There is governmental support for immigrant organisations, but no 
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structured consultative body representing immigrants. In sum, Political Participation 
scores are below average. Long-term Residence and Access to Nationality policies were 
changed significantly with the 2009 Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act, which 
entered into force in 2011: The new system involves waiting periods for up to eight years 
for most immigrants, while students and certain labour migrants are generally excluded. 
Applying for Long-term Residence or citizenship then leads to a probationary period of 
three to five years, in which future citizens have to be in employment for a specific period 
and collect points doing voluntary work for an assessment whether they get granted 
citizenship. In the meantime they do not have access to public benefits. Long-term 
Residence then can be an alternative for those whom were granted citizenship. Dual 
nationality is permitted. This system aims to add value to citizenship. The United 
Kingdom’s Anti-discrimination policy provides broad definitions that include many 
forms of discrimination and are applied in most areas of life. Equality policies were 
reformed in 2006 and 2010 leading to improved scores in the 2011 index. Enforcement 
mechanisms are argued to have average effects and should include NGO-work in a more 
efficient way (MIPEX 2007: 182-87; 2011: 200-5).  
 
2. Are policies consistent? A bivariate data analysis 
The policy profiles presented above lead to an impression of high divergence and countries 
pursuing individual approaches to integration policy. As the following chapters will show, 
there are some limitations to that observation. Before putting countries into clusters, I want 
show to which extent performances across areas are consistent in the selected countries. 
Consistency would indicate that policies in the different areas are equally inclusive or 
exclusive. For example, if a country had inclusive regulations on naturalisation, it also had 
inclusive Labour Market Mobility and Family Reunion policies. Hence policy consistency 
would allow us to make meaningful statements on integration policy inclusive- and 
exclusiveness in general terms.  
Integration policy consistence 
 Average score across policy areas, 2010 Standard deviation 
Sweden 83 7 
Portugal 79 10 
Finland 69 8 
Netherlands 68 8 
Belgium 67 7 
Norway 66 11 
51 
Spain 63 17 
Italy 60 9 
Average 60 10 
Luxembourg 59 10 
Germany 57 9 
United Kingdom 57 10 
Denmark 53 12 
France 51 10 
Greece 49 5 
Ireland 49 15 
Switzerland 43 7 
Austria 42 9 
(MIPEX 2011; own calculations) 
We can see that there is some tendency that countries with high average scores are more 
likely to score consistently across areas, or in other words, score high in most areas. 
Notable exceptions are Switzerland and Greece, which score consistently low. The authors 
of the MIPEX 2011 index claim that they found strong positive correlations among the 
scores of different areas (MIPEX 2011: 10). The figures on standard deviation presented 
above raise some doubt to that claim: If scores did correlate highly, countries would score 
more consistently, no matter whether they have high or low scores. A bivariate data 
analysis for the scores of the 2007 and 2011 indices give proof to that doubt.  
Correlations of MIPEX policy areas, 2007 
  LMM FR PP LTR AN AD 
Labour Market Mobility 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,752** 0,482 ,576* 0,478 0,454 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0,001 0,05 0,016 0,052 0,067 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Family Reunion 
Pearson Correlation ,752** 1 0,292 ,568* ,594* ,661** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,001 
 
0,256 0,017 0,012 0,004 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Political Participation 
Pearson Correlation 0,482 0,292 1 0,103 0,353 0,261 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,05 0,256 
 
0,695 0,164 0,311 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Long-term Residence 
Pearson Correlation ,576* ,568* 0,103 1 0,336 0,449 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,016 0,017 0,695 
 
0,188 0,07 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Access to Nationality 
Pearson Correlation 0,478 ,594* 0,353 0,336 1 ,844** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,052 0,012 0,164 0,188 
 
0 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Anti-discrimination 
Pearson Correlation 0,454 ,661** 0,261 0,449 ,844** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,067 0,004 0,311 0,07 0 
 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations of MIPEX policy areas, 2010 
  
 
LMM FR EDU PP LTR AN AD 
Labour Market Mobility 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,684** ,601* 0,339 ,630** 0,27 0,296 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0,002 0,011 0,183 0,007 0,294 0,249 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Family Reunion 
Pearson Correlation ,684** 1 ,619** 0,297 ,631** ,563* ,486* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,002 
 
0,008 0,248 0,007 0,019 0,048 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Education 
Pearson Correlation ,601* ,619** 1 0,417 ,526* 0,32 0,461 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,011 0,008 
 
0,096 0,03 0,211 0,063 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Political Participation 
Pearson Correlation 0,339 0,297 0,417 1 0,152 0,311 0,256 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,183 0,248 0,096 
 
0,561 0,225 0,321 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Long-term Residence 
Pearson Correlation ,630** ,631** ,526* 0,152 1 0,196 0,154 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,007 0,007 0,03 0,561 
 
0,45 0,555 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Access to Nationality 
Pearson Correlation 0,27 ,563* 0,32 0,311 0,196 1 ,731** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,294 0,019 0,211 0,225 0,45 
 
0,001 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Anti-discrimination 
Pearson Correlation 0,296 ,486* 0,461 0,256 0,154 ,731** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,249 0,048 0,063 0,321 0,555 0,001 
 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Both models show very similar correlation patterns: Correlations among the variables 
Long-term Residence, Family Reunion, Labour Market Mobility, and - for the 2010 scores 
- Education are high and significant. The same can be said about the correlation of the 
variables Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. Hence there are two groups of 
variable that correlate internally, but not with respect to other variables. Political 
Participation appears to be an issue separated from other areas of immigrant integration. 
Hence, whether a country generally has an inclusive or exclusive approach to integration 
does not matter for the policy of immigrant Political Participation. However, the countries 
I have selected do not score entirely consistent. For an explanation of integration policy 
divergence, we need to acknowledge that some variables of the MIPEX index structure are 
independent from another. For Political Participation this might entail that we leave it aside 
when trying to find explanations for integration policy divergence.  
As the country profiles might have indicated already there is no clear-cut relation between 
the labour market participation of TCNs and integration policy. Comparing the data of 
immigrant and citizen employment and unemployment in 2006 and the index results for 
2007 reveals that there are no significant correlations except one: Unemployment of TCNs 
in countries with inclusive Family Reunion policies tends to be higher than in countries 
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with exclusive policies. It is important to note that we cannot derive a causal argument 
form this correlation: There is no evidence of what constitutes the independent and the 
dependent variable. I suggest interpreting the result of scarce correlations between (un-) 
employment and integration policy as an indication that there are intervening variables 
influencing both the employment of TCNs and integration policy.  
Correlations of labour market participation data and integration policy, 2006/2007 
  
LMM FR PP LTR AN AD Overall 
Employment of TCNs 
Pearson Correlation -0,044 -0,153 -0,279 -0,057 -0,346 -0,313 -0,28 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,866 0,559 0,277 0,828 0,174 0,221 0,276 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Employment of citizens 
Pearson Correlation 0,408 -0,072 0,312 0,119 -0,039 -0,047 0,149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,104 0,783 0,223 0,65 0,882 0,857 0,567 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Employment ratio 
Pearson Correlation -0,202 -0,104 -0,401 -0,092 -0,313 -0,271 -0,322 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,436 0,692 0,111 0,726 0,222 0,292 0,207 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Unemployment of TCNs 
Pearson Correlation 0,133 0,355 0,244 0,055 0,275 0,3 0,312 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,625 0,178 0,362 0,84 0,302 0,259 0,239 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Unemployment of citizens 
Pearson Correlation 0,272 ,504* -0,264 0,093 0,234 0,406 0,272 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,307 0,047 0,322 0,732 0,383 0,119 0,309 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Unemployment ratio 
Pearson Correlation -0,175 -0,124 0,388 -0,081 -0,132 -0,22 -0,067 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,516 0,646 0,138 0,767 0,626 0,413 0,805 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
3. Cluster analysis 
For the cluster analysis I provide two models using SPSS quick cluster analysis with three 
and four cluster solutions applied to the seven areas of the 2010 data. The results indicate 
that most countries have idiosyncratic approaches to immigrant integration policy. In other 
words, countries within one cluster have only limited commonalities and thus clusters 
differ from each other only to a limited extent. The standard deviation scores of the four-
cluster model are significantly lower than those of the three-cluster model, and it appears 
to provide more distinctive information on cluster differences. For an analysis of causes 
underlying different integration policies I hence suggest using the four-cluster model.  
3.1. 4-cluster solution 
The first cluster contains France, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom and is 
characterised by consistently exclusive Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and 
Long-term Residence policies and a slightly inclusive Access to Nationality. The 
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remaining areas show a high deviation: Education scores are very low except for the 
United Kingdom and Political Participation scores are low except for Ireland. Anti-
discrimination scores are high, but show a large variation.  
 Inclusive Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies and exclusive 
Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Long-term Residence policies.  
Countries in the second cluster (Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway) have moderately inclusive policies in all areas and an inclusive policy of Political 
Participation. They score consistently and above average in the areas of Family Reunion, 
Education, Long-term Residence, and Access to Nationality. Labour Market Mobility is 
averagely inclusive in sum, but reveals some deviations in the cases of Belgium and 
Luxembourg, which have rather exclusive policies. The same can be said for Anti-
discrimination, with the exclusive exception of Luxembourg. Political Participation scores 
are very high in most countries, but Belgium and Italy. 
 Moderately inclusive policies throughout and most inclusive Political Participation 
policies. 
Countries in the third cluster (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Switzerland) often 
have policies with adverted effects than countries in cluster one. This means that these 
countries have inclusive labour market policies but exclusive policies of Access to 
Nationality and Anti-discrimination. Family Reunion scores vary very much, including 
scores of 37 (Denmark) to 85 (Spain). The same can be said about Long-term Residence 
with the outliers of Spain (78) and Switzerland (41). Education policies are consistent and 
slightly exclusive. Except for Austria’s exclusive policy, Political Participation scores are 
about average. Access to Nationality is very exclusive, with the exception for Germany 
that scores averagely.  
 Restrictive Access to Nationality, but inclusive Labour Market Mobility and large 
variations. 
The fourth cluster only contains two countries, Sweden and Portugal. They share highly 
inclusive policies throughout, with the slight exception of cluster two scoring higher in 
Political Participation. 
 Most inclusive policies, except for Political Participation.  
55 
4-cluster solution, MIPEX 2011 Index 
 
Labour Market 
Mobility 
Family 
Reunion 
Education 
Political 
Participation 
Long-term 
Residence 
Access to 
Nationality 
Anti-
discrimination 
Cluster 1 (mean) 48 47 38 54 44 58 69 
standard deviation 5 8 12 13 7 1 13 
• France 49 52 29 44 46 59 77 
• Greece 50 49 42 40 56 57 50 
• Ireland 39 34 25 79 43 58 63 
• United Kingdom 55 54 58 53 31 59 86 
        
Cluster 2 (mean) 66 67 56 74 65 60 65 
standard deviation 11 3 8 13 6 8 9 
• Belgium 53 68 66 59 79 69 79 
• Finland 71 70 63 87 58 57 78 
• Italy 69 74 41 50 66 63 62 
• Luxembourg 48 67 52 78 56 66 48 
• Netherlands 85 58 51 79 68 66 68 
• Norway 73 68 63 94 61 41 59 
        
Cluster 3 (mean) 69 52 46 55 59 38 43 
standard deviation 11 16 3 9 10 9 6 
• Austria 56 41 44 33 58 22 40 
• Denmark 73 37 51 62 66 33 47 
• Germany 77 60 43 64 50 59 48 
• Spain 84 85 48 56 78 39 49 
• Switzerland 53 40 45 59 41 36 31 
        
Cluster 4 (mean) 97 88 70 73 73 81 86 
standard deviation 3 3 7 2 5 1 2 
• Portugal 94 91 63 70 69 82 84 
• Sweden 100 84 77 75 78 79 88 
 
3.2. 3-cluster solution 
Countries in the first cluster (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Switzerland) generally 
have rather exclusive integration policies, except for Labour Market Mobility, where 
scores vary, but tend to be rather inclusive. Typically countries in this cluster have the 
most exclusive policies in Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality. Additionally, 
Education policies are consistently exclusive. With the exception of Switzerland Long-
term Residence policies are moderate. Family Reunion policies are restrictive, except in 
Spain, which scores second in this area. In the area of Political Participation countries in 
cluster one reveal low (Austria and Greece) and almost average (Denmark, Spain, and 
Switzerland) scores. 
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 Countries in the first cluster combine restrictive Anti-discrimination, Education and 
Access to Nationality policies with moderate Labour Market Mobility and Long-
term Residence policies.  
The second cluster (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom) contains countries with rather restrictive Labour Market Mobility, Long-term 
Residence and Education policies and inclusive Anti-discrimination and Access to 
Nationality regulations. Political Participation and Family Reunion policies are about 
average. Access to Nationality scores are highly consistent and above average. For the 
other areas there are notable exceptions: Germany and Italy have inclusive labour market 
regulations, Belgium and Italy have favourable policies towards Family Reunion and 
Long-term Residence and Ireland and Luxembourg towards Political Participation. The 
favourable scores on Anti-discrimination of the second cluster do further not include 
Germy and Luxembourg. 
 Countries in the second cluster have inclusive Anti-discrimination and Access to 
Nationality policies and exclusive policies towards Labour Market Mobility, 
Education and Long-term Residence. 
The third cluster includes countries that have inclusive policies in all areas (Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden). Unlike countries in cluster one or two, these 
countries tend to score consistent across most areas. For example, Sweden has – compared 
to countries of cluster one and two – a fairly balanced approach to immigrant integration. 
The same can be said about Finland, which received lower scores than Sweden, but still 
has no exclusive policies across all areas. There are only two exceptions: Dutch Family 
Reunion and Education policies and Norwegian Access to Nationality and Anti-
discrimination policies are not as inclusive as their other policies.  
 Countries in cluster three have consistently inclusive policies across all areas.  
3-cluster solution, MIPEX 2011 Index 
 
Labour Market 
Mobility 
Family 
Reunion 
Education 
Political 
Participation 
Long-term 
Residence 
Access to 
Nationality 
Anti-
discrimination 
Cluster 1 (mean) 63 50 46 50 60 37 43 
standard deviation 12 14 3 11 9 8 6 
• Austria 56 41 44 33 58 22 40 
• Denmark 73 37 51 62 66 33 47 
• Greece 50 49 42 40 56 57 50 
• Spain 84 85 48 56 78 39 49 
• Switzerland 53 40 45 59 41 36 31 
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Cluster 2 (mean) 56 58 45 61 53 62 66 
standard deviation 10 10 12 11 12 3 13 
• Belgium 53 68 66 59 79 69 79 
• France 49 52 29 44 46 59 77 
• Germany 77 60 43 64 50 59 48 
• Ireland 39 34 25 79 43 58 63 
• Italy 69 74 41 50 66 63 62 
• Luxembourg 48 67 52 78 56 66 48 
• United Kingdom 55 54 58 53 31 59 86 
        
Cluster 3 (mean) 85 74 64 81 67 65 75 
standard deviation 10 11 6 7 6 13 9 
• Finland 71 70 63 87 58 57 78 
• Netherlands 85 58 51 79 68 66 68 
• Norway 73 68 63 94 61 41 59 
• Portugal 94 91 63 70 69 82 84 
• Sweden 100 84 77 75 78 79 88 
 
 
4. MIPEX score change 
As indicated already in the country profiles integration policy was a subject to change in 
many countries in recent years. Due to the different scoring system of the 2005 index a 
systematic comparison of the index scores in possible for the 2007 and 2011 indices only. 
Policy changes prior to 2007 are that are mentioned in the country profiles of the 2007 
index show that almost all countries introduced changes in their integration policy. These 
changes date in 2005 and 2006 and can be summarised as follows:  
• Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands introduced almost exclusively tougher 
regulations on integration issues. This concerns the introduction of a new Aliens 
Law in Switzerland and changes in Long-term Residence and Family Reunion 
acquisition conditions in France and the Netherlands. France additionally amended 
its Anti-discrimination policy, making it more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 69, 129, 
177).  
• Luxembourg, Germany, and the United Kingdom did not change their policy 
significantly, except for Anti-discrimination, for which policy became more 
inclusive. There are further no implications that Spain changed its policies (MIPEX 
2007: 75, 117, 165, 183). 
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• Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway show changes towards inclusion and 
exclusion in this period. This concerns less inclusive Family Reunion regulations 
(except Ireland) and Access to Nationality (except Norway) and more inclusive 
regulations on Labour Market Mobility (except Belgium) (MIPEX 2007: 21, 26, 
93, 135). 
• The remaining countries changed their policy towards inclusion only. This 
concerns Greek and Italian policy towards Long-term Residence. In Denmark, 
Finland, Portugal, and Norway Family Reunion, Access to Nationality and Political 
Participation policies became more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 51, 63, 147, 171).  
 
For the period from 2007 to 2010 we can see that all countries changed their policy in at 
least one area in a way that led to changes in the index scores, but to a very different 
extent: 
• Greece, Portugal, and Spain changed their policy exclusively towards inclusion 
leading to significant index changes. Except for a minor change in the area of 
Long-term Residence, the same can be said about Luxembourg.  
• Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland changed policies significantly in both 
directions. 
• Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland changed policies 
leading to minor score changes only.  
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• Italy, Norway, and Sweden became little more exclusive. The United Kingdom is 
the only country that changed its policy significantly towards exclusion, except for 
amendments in Anti-discrimination policy. 
• Anti-discrimination is the only area the received changes towards inclusion only. 
All other areas show changes in both directions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Clearly, the structure of the indices focuses on integration following a conception of civic 
inclusion. Hence, the national approaches towards cultural integration, which many 
multiculturalists argue to be crucial, do not receive much attention. Governing diversity 
only comes into play in the area of Education. In this area, Sweden, Belgium, Finland, 
Norway, Portugal, and the UK scored considerably higher than the remaining countries. 
However, this is clearly to the emphasis of the index structure. Instead, the index draws a 
clear picture on the complex policies of regulating access to civic, political, and social 
rights and their inclusive or exclusive effects.  
Answering the first research question I showed that national approaches to integration 
policy provide a highly complex picture. Although different bivariate variable analysis 
shows that performances correlate highly across some policy areas the case-by-case 
analysis provided before indicates that national policy models present unique approaches, 
hence differ surprisingly much. Despite some general policy trends towards improving 
access to the labour market, liberalising waiting periods for naturalisation, citizenship 
testing, or imposing restrictions and testing on Long-term Residence or Family Reunion 
there is no evidence that national integration policy models and their inclusive- or 
exclusiveness are very similar across countries. Focusing on the policy change between 
2007 and 2010 some countries with previously low scores caught up (Greece, 
Luxembourg) and others with previously high scores fell behind (most notably the United 
Kingdom). These observations are too scarce to argue that integration policies become 
harmonised across Europe. Both cluster models show high standard deviation values in 
many areas, because countries do not often score similarly. However, with all the 
exceptions mentioned above we can hardly argue that the provided clusters are consistent 
across all areas. Four observations need to be kept in mind for a further analysis of possible 
explanations underlying integration policy divergence:  
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First, if countries do not score consistent across different areas, they often have inclusive 
Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies and exclusive Labour Market 
Mobility and Long-term Residence policies, or vice versa. This is the case for France, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, and adversely for Austria, Spain, and to some degree 
Switzerland and Denmark.  
Second, countries with higher scores across all areas mostly have consistent scores, in 
other terms they do not score high in one area and low in another. Sweden and Finland 
provide useful examples for that observation. Countries with low overall scores then tend 
to perform inconsistently across areas. Notable exceptions for this argument are Greece 
and Denmark. The table on policy consistency provides average scores and standard 
deviations of the seven areas of integration policy, underlining this observation.  
Third, if there are changes in Anti-discrimination policy, they always lead towards 
inclusion. There are still countries with low scores in this area (cluster three of the first 
model), but none of these countries recently changed its Anti-discrimination policy 
towards more exclusion. However, the clusters are not useless for the integration policy 
research since they represent commonalities and divergence in some, although not all 
areas. Hence, turning to possible explanations of integration policy divergence now, we 
need to keep these clusters in mind. 
Fourth, policies of Political Participation do not correlate with other policies of immigrant 
integration. They neither led to the identification of a country cluster. Hence it might be 
fruitful to omit this variable when turning to explanations of immigrant integration policy 
and keep it a separated issue.  
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V. Explaining divergence and convergence of immigrant 
integration policy 
Apart from the distinction of assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism 
there are few theories describing national differences of immigration and integration 
policies. Boswell and Geddes identify a list of causes that can explain policy development 
and divergence. First, different national narratives of migration can lead to different policy 
outcomes. Second, the timing and size of migration flows and settlement might matter. 
Third, party politics, especially by right-wing parties, is expected to influence integration 
policy. Fourth, EU membership might be a reason for convergence due to supranational 
policy-making. Fifth, integration policy might be based on certain welfare and labour 
market structures (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 201-24). In this chapter, I will give an overview 
of recent comparative explanations of integration policy divergence. Since it is the goal of 
my analysis, I will put an emphasis on theories, typologies, and measurement on welfare 
system divergence before focusing on welfare systems as a cause of integration policy 
divergence. Of course, immigrant integration is closely linked to immigration policy. Thus 
some articles I am citing below do not focus exclusively on integration and try to explain 
immigration policy in broader terms. Most authors focus on a small number of 
cases/countries and analyse integration policies and their causes in depth. Quantitative 
comparative analyses – as I am aiming to – are rather scarce.  
 
1. The nature of immigrants determining integration outcomes 
Before I turn to explanations that focus on state-level independent variables (e.g. welfare 
systems, political parties, European Integration) that might explain integration policy 
divergence, I want to note that integration outcomes can be applied to attributes of 
immigrants too. Of course this only accounts for integration outcomes and not for 
integration policies. For example, we might say that religion, the country of origin, or 
gender determines successful integration. There is some literature proposing that this is the 
case, focusing on Western European countries (Bisin and others 2011; Dronkers/Vink 
2010; Fleischmann/Dronkers 2007; 2010). In this context, successful integration can be 
measured in citizenship acquisition, or labour market participation. In terms of citizenship 
acquisition, Dronkers and Vink conclude that immigrants from poor and politically instable 
countries are less, while immigrants from former colonies are more likely to naturalise 
(Dronkers/Vink 2010). Second, long residence, having a parent born in the host country, 
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retirement, and speaking the host country language make naturalisation more likely. 
Interestingly Dronkers and Vink claim that being a Muslim does not influence the 
acquisition of citizenship for first-generation immigrants, but for second-generation 
immigrants it does (ibidem). This sounds rather confusing, but might have a simple cause: 
Countries with restrictive naturalisation policies towards second-generation immigrants 
might also oppose religious diversity, making it more difficult for Muslims to naturalise. 
Employment, education, and gender seem not to have effects on immigrant naturalisation 
(ibidem). In terms of employment, immigrants from politically unstable, poor, or majority-
Muslim countries are more likely to be unemployed (Fleischmann/Dronkers 2010). The 
same can be said about migrant women and immigrants with strong identity in terms 
speaking a different language at home than the majority and having a strong attachment to 
religion (Bisin and others 2011). This mostly applies to first-generation immigrants, while 
second-generation immigrants are statistically indifferent to natives. Education influences 
employment less among immigrants than among natives (ibidem). Keeping in mind that 
immigrant attributes do influence integration outcomes, I now turn to state and society 
attributes influencing integration policy.  
 
2. Timing of migration and settlement 
Among others, Gary P. Freeman notes that policy outcomes and public debate on 
immigration policy are not necessarily coherent (Freeman 1995; see also Boswell/Geddes 
2011: 39-50). He assumes that immigration inflows are generally favoured by elites and 
employer interest groups and opposed by public opinion, since immigrants constitute 
potential competitors in the labour market. Hence, the model Freeman applies is one of the 
political economy of employer – employee negotiations.  
Freeman’s typology of immigration politics 
English-speaking settler societies Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States; 
European states with postcolonial and 
guestworker migrations 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, (Austria, Denmark, 
Luxembourg); 
New countries of immigration Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece (Finland, Ireland, 
Norway); 
(Freeman 1995: 882; I added the countries in brackets based on information from the MIPEX policy profiles 
described above) 
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Freeman identifies three different types of countries of immigration: English-speaking 
settler societies, European states with postcolonial and guestworker migrations, and new 
countries of immigration (Freeman 1995). The English-speaking settler societies are 
characterised by a long history of immigration, a positive folklore of immigration that 
“provides opportunities for proponents of larger intakes to shape decisions”, little party-
competition on the issue of immigration, hence limited public debate despite a rather 
restrictive public opinion (ibidem: 887-9). European states with postcolonial and 
guestworker migrations on the contrary were fully developed national states at the time 
immigration became a mass phenomenon. In the first place, employer-interest groups were 
not challenged by public debate on the regulation of immigration. Since the guestworker 
system had the unintended effect that it led to permanent settlement there is a widespread 
“scepticism about state capacity to master immigration, control borders, and manage 
migration in the national interest” (ibidem: 890). This legacy caused an implicit 
understanding of immigration as an issue of domestic political debate, an intensifying 
multilateral cooperation (especially at the EU level), and empowered parties of the far right 
to shape politics and policy in a restrictive way.  (ibidem: 890-3). The third type, new 
countries of immigration, are characterised by the absence of administrative experience, 
“ineffective attempts to organize legal entry, curtail illegal entry, and regularize those 
already inside the country without authorization”, and pressures from the European Union 
to Europeanise immigration. At the same time, the need for migrant workers is broadly 
acknowledged at least in Spain and Portugal. Thus Freeman notes that the picture of the 
new countries of immigration resembles that of the guestworker-receiving countries at the 
upheaval of the guestworker system (ibidem: 893-6). Although Freeman’s analysis appears 
oversimplified there are some valuable insights on different pressures and narratives of 
immigrant-receiving countries. However, he shows that notions of immigration history and 
perceived failure of previous policies can be included in a rather formal political economy 
model of policymaking.  
 
3. National narratives and party politics 
Ruud Koopmans and others analyse cross-national differences of the politics and policy of 
immigration and cultural diversity in France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland (Koopmans et al. 2005). In order to understand national differences, their 
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argument goes, one has to bear in mind “the different conceptions of national identity and 
their cristallization in nation-specific integration and citizenship policies. These national 
self-understandings and policies act as institutional and discursive opportunities and 
constraints” (ibidem: 6). I already mentioned these differences in chapter two.  According 
to Koopmans and others citizenship models can be distinguished best by their approaches 
towards individual equality and cultural difference. They argue then, built on these national 
differences, institutional and discursive opportunity structures can explain different ways 
of handling immigration and diversity. The method applied here is Political Claims 
Analysis: Claims making is defined “as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that 
consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, 
proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests 
or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (ibidem: 24, emphasis in 
original). The authors analyse daily newspapers in these countries.  
Their findings point out some essential national differences: First, they state that Great 
Britain and the Netherlands allow for the most group-based rights towards minorities and 
cultural diversity. While Germany did move away from its “ethnic cultural monism”, 
Switzerland and France steadily refuse to respond to group-based cultural demands. These 
national differences are argued to be more pronounced today than in the past (ibidem: 
235). Second, a shift to postnationalism within immigrant group tends to be more visible in 
countries that do not intend to grant citizenship to immigrants like Germany or 
Switzerland. If immigrants had easier access to citizenship, they are more likely to use 
their political opportunities within the boundaries of the (guest-) country: “Failure to grant 
citizenship to migrants and to provide opportunities for political inclusion actually seem to 
be factors that lead them to invest their political energies outside of the place where they 
are settled and live” (ibidem: 239). Third, the argument of multiculturalists that the 
recognition of group based rights is crucial for successful immigration appears to be 
overrated in this context as the authors show that France migrants do participate politically 
despite France’s hostility towards group-based rights. Only in the context of Islam group-
based rights appear relevant (ibidem: 240-3). Extreme-right mobilization is also a subject 
of their research, but they analysed immigration and cultural diversity as a cause of 
extreme-right mobilization. Hence we gain no insights whether it influences integration 
policy (ibidem: 180-204).  
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The observation of Freeman that central parties try not to politicise immigration by 
entering informal agreements on it might be a cause why party politics was not being 
analysed in detail as a cause of certain forms of integration policy yet (Freeman 1995; 
Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 171). In a similar way, Virginie Guiraudon suggests that 
an expansion of immigrant rights – unlike other historically disadvantaged groups – was 
not caused by mass mobilization and public debates. Instead they were subject to 
bargaining behind closed doors only (Guiraudon 1998). Boswell and Geddes note that 
there is some evidence that centre-left parties are more favourable to multicultural 
approaches than right-wing parties (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 209-10). Triadafilopoulos and 
Zaslove convincingly show on the examples of Austria and Italy that government presence 
of right-wing parties lead to restrictive policies of immigrant integration 
(Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006). The same can be said about the influence of the Green 
Party in Germany liberalising integration policy (ibidem; Green 2001). When not in 
government right-wing parties have the ability to influence policy by channelling public 
discourse (ibidem: 176). Importantly, Guiraudon notes that we need to take “venues” like 
political opportunities and conjunctures into account, if we want to analyse influence of 
certain political forces on immigration issues (Guiraudon 1998; 2000). However, the 
influence of party politics on integration policy constitutes a fairly untouched area of cross-
country empirical analysis.  
 
4. Europeanization of immigrant integration 
According to Guiraudon the Europeanization of immigration policy is essentially driven by 
“venue shopping” on the EU level. In this context, EU-level meetings provide 
opportunities to negotiate solutions to perceived problems with less parliamentary, judicial, 
or public constraints than at the national level (Guiraudon 2000). Of course EU-level 
harmonisation can rather explain convergence of integration policy, than its divergence. 
Taking the Europeanization of immigration policy into account, we need to question 
domestic party politics as a source of integration policy development: If national 
politicians can meet their allies in Brussels, with whom they share similar conceptions of 
their problems, to deliberate on immigrant integration without public scrutiny and debate, 
then national political parties would not matter. I will show that this would be a clear 
overestimation of EU influence on immigrant integration.  
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Prior to the intergovernmental conference of Amsterdam in 1997 migration and integration 
policy issues were Europeanized mainly outside the EU-framework. In the 1980ies 
ministries of Justice and Home Affairs began to collaborate in the elaboration of policies 
concerning security and migration outside public scrutiny. This development is referred to 
as “intensive transgovernmentalism” and included the coordination of controls within EU 
countries and managing access to EU-territory as Sandra Lavenex shows on the case of 
Asylum policy (Lavenex 2001). The Schengen agreement provides an example par 
excellence for transgovernmentally developed institutions that were later included in the 
EU aquis (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 58-61). As Kerstin Rosenow notes, the Council of 
Europe was the primary actor in fostering immigrants’ rights (Rosenow 2009). For 
example, the 1992 “Convention on the participation of foreigners in public life at the local 
level (ETS 144)” provides immigrants with a range of political rights that reduce the legal 
difference between denizens and citizens (ibidem: 135; 140).  
What output did EU institutions provide so far for immigrant integration? A detailed 
description of EU policy on immigrant integration up to date would need lots of space and 
is not necessary for my work. However, Carrera provides a detailed description of EU 
policy (Carrera 2009: 61-144). In a nutshell, the Amsterdam Treaty and the following 
Tampere summit in 1999 set the basis for EU policy making regarding immigrant 
integration. After the Tampere summit a number of Directives defining anti-discrimination 
towards TCNs were concluded in 2000. In 2003 the family reunification and long-term-
residents Directives led to a fostering of TCN-rights on the EU-level. The Tampere 
programme was followed by the The Hague programme (2005-9) and the Stockholm 
programme (2010-4), which again emphasise on immigrant integration policy amendment. 
In 2007, an EU fund for TCN integration programmes was concluded. Apart from these 
Directives the EU institutions provide a number of non-binding recommendations, 
projects, and reports (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 52-3, 210-7; Rosenow 2009: 135-6). Notably, 
the MIPEX index as a source for benchmarking EU member states’ polices is part of the 
EU framework too (Carrera 2009: 118-26). We see that as far as binding legislation is 
concerned, mainly Amsterdam and its succeeding Directives appear relevant. Arne 
Niemann explains the progress of the Amsterdam Treaty and the decrease of further 
development in the succeeding intergovernmental conferences by differences in functional 
pressures for Europeanisation, the role of supranational actors, the socialisation and 
learning of the negotiating ministers, and domestic countervailing forces (Niemann 2008: 
583).  
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Apart from “venue shopping” as a potential cause for EU immigration and integration 
policy development a number of factors appear relevant: Most references are made to the 
point that the discrimination of TCNs is bad for the economic development of the single 
European market and thus a legitimate EU issue. The Amsterdam Treaty then introduced a 
legal provision for EU action to fight discrimination against TCNs (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 
210-7; Rosenow 2009; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 50-3). In this sense, EU-fight 
against discrimination does not exclusively focus on EU citizens only.  
Another reason for EU policy-making might be policy failure at the national level: As 
noted above, integration policy in European countries carries a notion of failure. A 
relocation of the issue on the EU agenda thus might be a reaction to this perceived failure.  
Following functionalist spill-over theory the development of EU-policy on integration 
issues can be argued as a simple consequence of asylum and immigration policy 
harmonisation. Rosenow states the argument this way: “It is widely known that Europe is 
characterised by a multitude of integration schemes ... [which] led to decades of stand-still 
regarding the harmonisation of integration policies. But the emergence of a common EU 
immigration and asylum policy changed this blockade” (Rosenow 2009: 137).  
She additionally notes that the Commission tried to link the economic argument of anti-
discrimination with an argument of social cohesion (ibidem: 151). Immigrant integration is 
thus not only relevant for a functioning single market, but also for social cohesion or 
solidarity within the EU. Schierup and others devote attention to this argument, critically 
highlighting how immigrant integration and anti-discrimination are incorporated into the 
European Social Model: “On the whole, the primacy of market requirements that 
permeates EU policy discussion on new labour immigration leaves very little room for the 
type of ‘civic citizenship’ and rights dimension that, despite its flaws, is still endorsed in 
policies addressing the situation of the EU’s ‘legally’ and permanently settled TCNs” 
(Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 76). Welfare state restructuring and the ambivalence of 
temporary labour migration are argued to be contradicting attempts to immigrant 
integration. However, the point is made that economic needs and social integration and 
cohesion are interacting variables in the EU framework. It is not the subject of my analysis 
to argue whether the EU policies on welfare restructuring and immigrant integration are 
sound or not, hence I will not go into detail.  
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5. The welfare state 
Before describing theories of welfare states as an explaining factor for integration policy I 
will give an introduction on the development and different models of welfare states, 
putting an emphasis on different ways to analyse welfare systems in a comparative way. 
Eventually I will turn to the operationalisation of welfare systems as an independent 
variable.  
 
5.1. Welfare state theory 
According to Xaver Kaufmann welfare states can be described as a specific form of 
societal organisation that combines democratic institutions and capitalism with a well-
developed state-organised social sector that provides benefits to citizens according to legal 
entitlements based on defined needs (Kaufmann 1989, in: Lessenich 2008: 23). To achieve 
a definition that is more precise, we would need to define the scope of the social sector, the 
nature of the entitlements for benefits and the nature of the benefits themselves. This 
cannot be done without making reference to different types of welfare states and their 
underlying logics (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi/Palme 1998). Nevertheless a few notes 
on the intention of welfare programmes need to be made: Welfare systems redistribute 
goods within society for two reasons (Goudswaard/Caminada 2010: 3-4): First, life-cycle 
or intrapersonal redistribution should protect people from some risks they face in their 
lives. This may be sickness, disability, unemployment, or the death of a spouse. Life-cycle-
redistribution of course also includes benefits for children and old-age pensions. In this 
context a welfare system basically functions as an insurance. Second, welfare systems can 
reduce possibly unfair outcomes of the market distribution of the capitalist economy. This 
we may call inter-personal redistribution. Since market distribution appears to lead to 
inequalities that might be unjust and undeserved the welfare system should balance that 
out. This objective of welfare systems might be based on a simple wish for fairness, but 
might also be necessary to the sustainment of democracy. As Kaufmann argues, welfare-
statism is both a result of and a condition to democracy and societal peace (Kaufmann 
2003: 30-5). I will refer to democracy as a driving factor for welfare state development 
later. The issue of being a condition for democratic government lies in the fostering of 
societal integration and solidarity through welfare programmes. There is a variety of 
arguments of how and why welfare programmes promote societal integration: From a Neo-
marxist logics-of-capitalism perspective, one might argue that capitalism cannot function 
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without the bourgeoisie providing some social programmes for the proletariat (O’Connor 
1973, in: Esping-Andersen 1998: 25). According to this argument, there is a class conflict 
within society that can be mitigated and maintained by social programmes at the same time 
(ibidem: 19-31). Contrary to that argument Kaufmann argues that social programmes and 
the resulting redistribution are not a matter of conflict but rather a means of belonging to a 
reciprocal community (Kaufmann 30-31). In a reciprocal community people are not equals 
in all respects, but fulfilling different societal needs and dependent on another. This notion 
of solidarity is based on Durkheim’s organic solidarity: In contrast to mechanical solidarity 
people do not have a feeling of belonging together because they are equal-minded or equal-
built, but because they live in a functionally differentiating society (Ottmann 2009: 41-6). 
Hence, solidarity might not only entail equality, but also functional difference. Especially 
with respect to immigrants potentially threatening social solidarity we need to keep this 
distinction in mind.  
 
Explanations for welfare state development 
There are three major theories explaining welfare state development that are rather 
complementary than contradicting. Functionalism basically explains welfare statism as a 
logical consequence of capitalism. Power-resources Theory proposes that welfare states 
were caused by democratic class struggle. Institutionalism also presumes some form a 
democratic government as a basis for welfare statism. From this perspective, institutions of 
political participation and path-dependency determine the development of welfare 
programmes.  
 
Functionalism 
This theory argues that mass industrialisation and capitalist markets led to an erosion of 
traditional structures of society, which in turn lost its function of welfare provision. Pre-
industrial forms of societal reproduction like big families, influential churches or guilds got 
replaced by modern society’s mobility, urbanisation, individualism, secularity, and market 
dependency (Esping-Andersen 1998: 24). Since capitalist markets do not replace the loss 
of pre-industrial welfare per se, states need to step in through the provision of public 
welfare services. From this perspective welfare states are a logical consequence of 
modernity and industrialism. This can explain the emergence and expansion of public 
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welfare services, but not their divergence. Wilensky provides an insightful example for 
that: He argues that sinking birth rates and a subsequently ageing population were caused 
by industrialism and need to be compensated by expansive welfare services (Wilensky 
1975, in: Schmid 1996: 51). According to this argument, more industrialised countries 
would have a faster ageing population and would then have larger welfare systems. Hence, 
functionalism may explain the “how much” quality of welfare systems, but not how 
welfare states are organised of how they redistribute among society (Kaufmann 2003: 27-
8). The two other theories essentially focus on these questions.  
 
Institutionalism 
The theory of Institutionalism presumes that economy and politics are necessarily 
interwoven and that capitalist markets need some form of social embedding (Polanyi 1944, 
in: Esping-Andersen 1998: 26). This comes close to the argument of T. H. Marshall that 
equality in citizenship necessarily involves social rights (1950).  Democratic institutions 
respond to majority claims of redistribution at some point. The crucial point for 
Institutionalism is then under which circumstances welfare programmes were first debated 
and subsequently introduced. This may happen prior to or past industrialisation and 
democratisation and demands may rest on specific needs of certain groups among society 
(Manow 2009). As path- dependency theory suggests, introduction points determine the 
structure of welfare systems in so far as welfare system principles are not likely to change 
over time (Manow 2009; Pierson 1998). Starke and other’s empirical analysis provides 
proof for the argument as welfare states tend to converge only slowly 
(Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). Institutionalism hence presumes some findings of 
Functionalism, but focuses primarily on the divergence of welfare systems, or, in other 
terms, on “how” welfare systems work.  
 
Power-resources Theory 
Power-resources Theory presumes similar to Institutionalism that there are groups – often 
the majority – among society that favour redistribution. Assuming parties reflect a capital – 
labour cleavage Power-resources Theory suggests that people in favour of redistribution 
vote in favour of parties representing labour interests, for example social-democrats. The 
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better these parties are organised and the more votes they get, and in turn government 
positions they recieve, the larger are welfare-systems (Korpi 1998). This is being 
operationalised in social-democratic parliamentary power and government. The longer 
social-democratic governments were or are in power, the larger are social budgets in 
relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ibidem). If not in government, or having 
shared governmental power social-democrats might further push other parties to introduce 
social programmes they would not introduce otherwise. Among others, Philip Manow 
specified Power-resources Theory focusing on class and party coalitions and religious 
cleavages to explain different welfare regimes (Manow 2008; 2009). Different coalitions 
and religions then cause different welfare systems, answering the “how” question.  
In sum, the arguments of Institutionalism and Power-resources Theory then are that 
different structures of welfare systems and not solely the size of social budgets were 
caused by different introduction points, societal cleavages, and party coalitions. In the next 
chapter I will show how these different regimes look like and how they can be analysed.  
 
Categorising welfare states 
There are a number of different typologies explaining or describing different welfare 
systems with different measures (Arts/Gelissen 2002). Since it is not the focus of this text I 
will not describe different typologies separately. Instead, I will present different variables 
underlying welfare state typologies and show that they lead to only slightly diverging 
results concerning the placement of countries in different welfare types or clusters.   
The most famous typology on welfare states is provided by Esping-Andersen’s “Three 
Worlds of Welfare” (1990). By analysing pension systems, unemployment, and sickness 
benefits in 18 countries Esping-Andersen argues that outcomes regarding 
decommodification and social stratification lead to three groups of similar countries: The 
Liberal, Conservative, and Social-democratic welfare types. In this context welfare 
systems are expected to break or maintain social stratification. Decommodification 
constitutes a measure for the extent to which people can refrain from “selling” their labour 
on the market via social benefits in order to maintain their income (Esping-Andersen 1998: 
36-43). Decommodification is a matter of social rights, eligibility and the scope of social 
benefits. In terms of unemployment benefits, for example, a welfare system has a higher 
decommodifying effect if a person can stay unemployed longer without losing the 
entitlement to unemployment benefits. Although Epsing-Andersen’s methodology received 
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a lot of reasonable critiques, his ideal types are part of most typologies on welfare systems 
(Bambra 2006; Arts/Gelissen 2002).  
Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme identify five ideal types of welfare states, of which three 
reflect Esping-Andersen’s types closely: the Basic Security (=Liberal), Corporatist 
(=Conservative), and Encompassing (=Social-democratic) model (Korpi/Palme 1998). At 
least as far as the 17 selected countries are concerned the types that are not included in the 
Three Worlds of Welfare are not relevant. This typology rests on the variables of the basis 
of entitlement for benefits, the benefit level principle, and on the governance of 
benefits. Entitlements may involve a means test, membership in organisations, labour 
force participation, previous contributions or citizenship. Benefit level principles may 
either be minimal, flat rate, or earnings-related. The governance of benefits may be state-
controlled or based on employer-employee co-operations (ibidem: 666). Additionally 
Korpi and Palme show that different types of welfare systems have varying effects on 
poverty reduction and income redistribution (ibidem).  
In a similar way Giuliano Bonoli tries to place the focus not only on “how much”, but also 
on “how”: He argues that social benefits are either focused on income-maintenance and 
based on social insurances and thus contributions- or income-related (the Bismarckian 
logic), or focused on poverty reduction and prevention and based on residence and/or need, 
flat-rate and financed through general taxation (the Beveridgean logic) (Bonoli 1997: 357). 
For the measurement of this variable Bonoli uses the share of social expenditure 
financed through contributions out of total social expenditure. Combined with a “how 
much” variable of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP he identifies four clusters 
of welfare systems, of which three represent Esping-Andersen’s typology and one 
representing southern European countries (ibidem: 361).  
Alan Siaroff specifically focuses on the situation of women and families in the welfare 
state, measuring employment and income differences of men and women (“female work 
desirability”), size and eligibility of benefits for families (towards the mother, the father, 
or the head of the family), and the orientation of the welfare state towards women’s 
needs (Siaroff 1994). He identifies four groups of countries which he labels according to 
different religious majorities, which are presumed to cause different family policies within 
welfare systems. Again, three of these groups reflect Esping-Andersens typology and one 
basically represents southern European countries (ibidem).  
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Country classifications in four typologies 
Esping-Andersen 
(1998: 44) 
Liberal Conservative Social-democratic  
Denmark 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Norway 
Sweden 
Finland 
Denmark 
 
Esping-Andersen, 
decommodification 
only, (Arts/Gelissen 
2002: 149) 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
France 
Germany 
Finland 
Switzerland 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
 
Korpi/Palme (1998: 
675) 
Basic Security Corporatist Encompassing  
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden  
Bonoli( 1997: 361) British Continental Nordic Southern 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
France 
Belgium 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Denmark 
Italy 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
Siaroff 1994 (in: 
Arts/Gelissen 2002: 
149) 
Protestant Liberal 
Advanced 
Christian-
democratic 
Protestant Social-
democratic 
Late Female 
Mobilization 
United Kingdom Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
(Arts/Gelissen 2002: 149-50) 
 
As the table shows most countries are classified similarly across different typologies. If 
there is a fourth category, it usually includes those countries that were not part of Esping-
Andersen’s analysis and thus not included in his classification. Below I will summarise 
what the authors of the described typologies attribute to their identified types of welfare 
systems. 
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The Liberal type 
The Liberal or Basic Security type is characterised by benefits for the “deserving poor” 
that are based on a means-test, in other words, one has to prove the need and deservingness 
for assistance. The basic logic is that payments to the poor help only those who really need 
it and reduce poverty among the population without stressing public spending much 
(Bonoli 1997). Universal or contributions-related benefits are rather scarce in this type. As 
many authors argue this logic does not reduce poverty and income inequality much, 
because it favours market-based insurances, has a stigmatising effect and its low benefits 
do not reduce the market-dependency of the poor (Goudswaard/Caminada 2010; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Korpi/Palme 1998). Although it partially accounts for the same countries 
Korpi’s and Palme’s Basic Security model relies on low-level universal flat-rate benefits 
(ibidem: 666). Liberal and Basic Security welfare states are argued to be residual insofar as 
market solutions are preferred over state-organised social security. Low 
decommodification scores do not allow for long periods of absence from the labour market 
and thus push people to find employment. Market solutions for insurance are further 
promoted by the absence of state programmes and/or by subsidies for private insurance 
schemes (Esping-Andersen 1998: 43). Employer – employee co-operations governing 
social programmes are only of a private nature, for example within one firm, and not 
required by law. Hence accessing public assistance is not supported, instead it rather 
constitutes a very last option to labour market participation and reliance on forms of 
privately organised social security. There is only limited support for families, but women 
are relatively little disadvantaged in the labour market (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 143). With 
regard to theories explaining welfare state development Liberal welfare programmes were 
introduced in countries with majority voting systems, a middle class that did not favour 
high redistribution within society, and at a time when industrialisation and democratisation 
took already place in the country (Manow 2009).  
 
The Conservative type 
The Conservative, Corporatist, Continental, or Advanced Christian-democratic type is 
based on social insurances. Hence benefits based on universal principles or means-tests are 
rather scarce (Korpi/Palme 1998: 666-8). Following a Bismarckian logic, social 
insurance’s objective is income maintenance for employees who are out of work for 
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reasons beyond their control: Benefits are earnings-related and an entitlement for benefits 
depends on the scope of previous contributions. Social benefits are further based on 
employer-employee co-operation and contributions and to a lower extent on general tax 
revenues (Bonoli 1997: 357-67). Additionally, benefits are mostly of a financial nature and 
only scarcely contain services (like childcare, active labour market programmes, etc.) 
(Jensen 2008; 2010). Since public insurance schemes cover most aspects of welfare, 
private insurance schemes and subsidies for private social investments play only a 
marginal role (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Using the term of Korpi and Palme, public 
institutions are “crowding out” private welfare programmes (Korpi/Palme 1998: 664). 
Differences in the size of private social expenditures and the effects of subsidies and tax 
breaks on those can be nicely illustrated by the net social expenditure measurement of the 
OECD (OECD 2009:  44-51). According to these calculations social expenditure figures of 
Conservative welfare regimes remain rather steady, while those of Social-democratic 
regimes decrease due to the taxation of social benefits and those of Liberal regimes 
increase due to private investments (ibidem: 48). Esping-Andersen argues that 
Conservative welfare regimes focus on the maintenance of status differences with rights 
based on class and status. This involves considerable decommodification scores, but only 
little redistributive effects (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Siaroff argues that this welfare 
type provides strong incentives for women not to work, but to stay at home (Siaroff, in: 
Arts/Gelissen 2002: 143). Among others, Manow and Esping-Andersen see churches 
influencing Conservative welfare states that perpetuate traditional forms of families and 
care. This might be called a subsidiary principle of the state only stepping in as a welfare 
provider if the family cannot help itself (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Conservative welfare 
states typically were a result of coalitions of conservative and social-democratic parties in 
Christian-catholic dominated countries (Manow 2008; 2009).  
 
The Social-democratic type 
The Social-democratic, Encompassing, or Nordic welfare state differs it the objective of 
welfare provision. Unlike in the Liberal and Conservative type the objective lies in the 
promotion of equality in the society. Hence welfare benefits are provided at a universal 
basis of residence and/or citizenship. Independently from class or social status benefits are 
thus open to all. These benefits are most likely flat-rate and on a comparatively high level. 
Unlike in Conservative welfare states the governance of benefits obliges to one state-
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governed insurance system (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44-5). Unlike in Liberal welfare states 
the better-off are not excluded from public benefits. While Esping-Andersen does not 
ascribe earnings-related benefits to this welfare type, Korpi and Palme argue that the 
Encompassing welfare system combines universal benefits with conditional earnings-
related benefits in order to keep the better-off in the public welfare system and hence 
crowd out private insurance programmes (Korpi/Palme 1998: 669). As Bonoli shows 
Nordic welfare states have in sum rather low shares of social insurance contributions 
financing welfare programmes. Instead welfare expenditures are mostly financed through 
general taxation (Bonoli 1997: 361). However, these welfare states reduce poverty and 
income inequality to a larger extent than other types and have the highest 
decommodification scores (Esping-Andersen 1998: 45; Korpi/Palme 1998). High-level 
benefits and expenditures of course require high employment rates and high taxes. In order 
to keep the budgets balanced, Social-democratic welfare states need to make sure that 
employment rates remain high. Hence care for children, elderly, and people in need are 
directly covered by the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1998: 45-6). This allows for 
individual independence in finding employment, which relates especially to the labour 
market performance of women. Siaroff argues that women have a true work – welfare 
choice, because benefits for families are high and paid to the mother (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 
143). The Social-democratic welfare type was typically introduced by coalitions of 
agrarian and social-democratic parties in countries with protestant influences and a strong 
urban – rural cleavage when welfare systems were introduced (Manow 2008; 2009).  
 
The Southern type 
Criticisms to Esping-Andersen’s typology often focus on the omission of distinctive 
characteristics of southern European welfare states (Arts/Gelissen 2002; Bonoli 1997; 
Siaroff 1994). Southern European states are argued to lack an explicit social minimum that 
is guaranteed by the state and relatively limited state intervention in welfare systems 
(Arts/Gelissen 2002: 144-6). Hence, families and churches are the most important welfare 
providers in these countries. The residual character of state welfare provision has 
exceptions: Health care is provided as a citizenship right and pension systems are often 
very generous. In contrast, care for children and the elderly is often not a part of public 
welfare (ibidem). Compared with the ideal types of Esping-Andersens typology Southern 
welfare systems are mostly similar to Corporatist/Conservative types, especially 
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concerning their focus on cash-benefits instead of services and their contributions-
relatedness (ibidem; Jensen 2008). In the work of Bonoli they differ from Conservative 
systems only insofar as their social expenditure levels are lower (Bonoli 1997: 361). 
Focusing on gender differences embedded in the welfare system the Southern type shows 
similarities to the Conservative type too, but is more extreme in its residual character, not 
offering alternatives to family based care for children and the elderly and not accounting 
domestic labour (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 147). In a nutshell, we can summarise the Southern 
welfare state as an emerging, to some degree still rudimental, Conservative welfare type.  
 
Debates on welfare system categorisation and development 
There are many different forms of criticisms to welfare system typologies. They include 
arguments about the correct placement of countries, methodological misconceptions, or 
general doubts about the idea of ideal types of welfare states and the commensurability of 
summarising different national welfare systems into common welfare types (Bambra 2006; 
Castles/Obinger 2008; Kasza 2002; Schubert/Hegelich/Bazant 2008: 14-9). Another area 
of academic discourse is whether certain types of welfare states respond to various 
challenges, most notably financial crises, retrenchment, deregulation, societal changes and 
globalisation in similar ways (Bonoli 2007; Pierson 1998; Schubert/Hegelich/Bazant 2008; 
Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). I think it is necessary to add a few notes on methodological 
and analytical discourses: Gregory J. Kasza offers a number of arguments why we should 
not categorise welfare states into ideal types (Kasza 2002). These involve the influence of 
national legacies, the diversity of policy actor influencing welfare systems, idiosyncratic 
meanings of certain welfare areas and the singularity of different welfare areas (ibidem). 
He recommends that for a comparative analysis we should focus on specific elements of 
welfare systems and not on the welfare system as a whole (ibidem: 284). A reaction to that 
critique can be to refrain from analysing typologies and use indicators and data on specific 
welfare programmes and effects instead. Of course there is still an inherent neglect of 
specific national legacies and idiosyncrasies, but one can avoid some troubles of 
oversimplifying welfare typologies. Therefore Peter Starke and others provide a suiting 
example, analysing convergence of welfare states via various indicators and neglecting 
welfare typologies (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008).  
For a short description of welfare system reactions to challenges of globalisation, financial 
problems and social and economic development I want to focus on the work of Bonoli 
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(2007), Pierson (1998) and Starke and others (2008). Paul Pierson argues that challenges to 
welfare systems are not to be understood as challenges of globalisation. Instead, challenges 
of slowing productivity growth, an inherent tendency of social expenditure growing faster 
than the GDP and population ageing are argued to put the welfare state under pressure 
(Pierson 1998). As a scholar of path-dependency theory he argues that welfare state 
retrenchment and reform are limited by political constraints of “institutional stickiness” 
and a “negativity bias” of voter reacting stronger to potential losses than potential gains 
(ibidem: 552). Hence retrenchment and reform are preferably avoided by policy-makers. 
This comes close to the analysis of Starke and others, who analyse to what extent and how 
countries came to converge with respect to their welfare systems (Starke/Obinger/Castles 
2008). By analysing various indicators (social expenditure across different areas as 
percentage of the GDP, cash vs. service expenditure, welfare state financing, 
decommodification, net replacement rates) over a period from 1980 to 2003 they show that 
welfare systems did not converge much.  Most countries further did not downsize their 
welfare programmes although there are many arguments that they should. In other words, 
empirically they cannot determine an “Americanisation” of social policy (ibidem: 994-6). 
Giuliano Bonoli focuses on deindustrialisation and the tertiarisation of employment, 
changing family structures, increasing rates of women in the labour market, and the 
destandardisation of employment, which he summarises as “new social risks” as challenges 
for welfare systems (Bonoli 2007: 498). He argues that Nordic welfare systems faced these 
challenges at an earlier stage when their welfare states were not as mature as Continental 
welfare states now facing these challenges are. Thus he constitutes that especially the large 
Continental welfare systems need to adapt to new challenges, but, for the reasons presented 
by Pierson, they are not likely to do so: “...the findings presented ... are not good news for 
those who are hit by new social risks in continental and southern Europe. These countries 
have missed a window of opportunity to reorient their welfare states.” (ibidem: 518).  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, we see that challenges to welfare systems can be analysed by using typologies and 
theories of welfare state development I described above, but we do not necessarily need to. 
Instead, we might also look at indicators to identify change and stability of welfare systems 
and refrain from typologies. I suggest understanding typologies not as ideal pictures of 
welfare states, but as indicators of distinctive logics underlying welfare states. Turning to 
the second research question of the welfare system as an underlying factor, or independent 
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variable, of immigrant integration policies I suggest using indicators like social 
expenditure as percentage of the GDP and others and welfare types in a complementary 
way: Both might tell us something about the relation of welfare systems and integration 
policy.  
 
5.2. Welfare states and immigrant integration, and vice versa 
In this section I will present a number of different, partly contradicting, theories on causal 
relationships of welfare systems, immigration, and immigrant integration. These involve 
arguments of immigration and diversity as a threat to welfare systems, the rejection of 
these arguments, and welfare systems as causal factors for divergent integration policies 
and outcomes.  
 
Is immigration threatening the welfare state? 
Contrary to the literature I cited above, Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser do not try 
to explain or differentiate integration policy. Instead they use it as an independent variable 
explaining differences between the welfare systems of Europe and the US. They try to 
explain why European welfare systems have greater redistributive effects and hence reduce 
poverty to a greater extent than the US (Alesina/Glaeser 2004: 2). One of their arguments 
is “that the United States is a much more racially fragmented society than anywhere in 
Europe” (ibidem: 10): The authors presume that intra-group generosity is greater than 
generosity towards members of other groups and that ethnicity or race constitute group 
identification. They assume the US to be much more culturally, ethnically, and racially 
diverse than European countries, because European countries put a lot of effort in 
maintaining their homogeneity:  
“Moreover, while European governments strove to eradicate ethnic and cultural differences 
over the past four centuries [...], American governments put much less effort into this task, 
which would have surely impossible in such a diverse country. As a result, it is much 
easier to convince a white middle class person in the United States to think that the poor 
are ‘different’ (read black) than to convince a white middle class person, say, in Sweden” 
(ibidem).  
This argument concerns integration policy so far as managing diversity is an important 
feature of integration policy. For Alesinas and Glaesers argument, a country that tries to 
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assimilate immigrants in a way that they waive their cultural and linguistic heritage is very 
different to a country that implements multicultural policies. The authors go on and argue 
“that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be 
used to challenge the welfare state” (ibidem: 11). Brian Barry essentially puts the focus not 
on immigration per se, but on models of integration: He claims that the emphasis on 
cultural difference of multicultural integration models puts solidarity and willingness for 
redistribution under pressure (Barry 2001). Hence, both the level of immigration rates and 
the choice of integration models influence the welfare state. 
By analysing racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalisation in the US and Europe 
Alesina and Glaeser find proof for their argument. Essentially they show that countries 
with little ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities have a larger share of their GDP spent 
on welfare expenditures (ibidem: 133-54). Although there is no point made to the impact 
of immigrant integration policies per se, the implication is obvious: Countries with less 
societal diversity have bigger (I suppose this equals higher redistribution rates and lower 
poverty rates) welfare systems. Thus the control of diversity must be a target of immigrant 
integration. 
In a nutshell, the argument provided by Barry, Alesina, and Glaeser “is that a viable 
welfare state, which commits substantial resources to health care, income transfers, and 
social services, depends on achieving and maintaining a high level of solidarity among 
citizens, and that this in turn rests on feelings of commonality among citizens” 
(Banting/Kymlicka 2006a: 282). Hence ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity and 
multicultural integration policies endanger the welfare state. Banting and Kymlicka refer to 
that as the “heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off” and “recognition/redistribution trade-
off” (ibidem: 283). The latter can be distinguished in three sub-arguments: First, 
multiculturalism policies are said to “weaken pro-redistribution coalitions by diverting 
time, energy, and money from redistribution to recognition” (Banting/Kymlicka 2006b: 
10). Second, multiculturalism policies are said to erode solidarity among citizens, because 
of the emphasis on differences among citizens instead of their commonalities. Banting and 
Kymlicka call that the “corroding effect” (ibidem: 11). Third, multiculturalism policies 
“misdiagnose” minority problems by presuming that problems of minorities are rooted in 
cultural discrimination and not, say, in economic marginalisation or class difference 
(ibidem: 12-3). 
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Empirical rejections 
One way to measure effects of multiculturalism on solidarity and attitudes towards 
redistribution is by analysing public opinion via surveys. Christoph Burkhardt and Steffen 
Mau show that immigration and ethnic diversity have slightly negative effects on public 
opinion towards redistribution and immigrant inclusion, although this effect might be 
explained by other factors too (Mau/Burkhardt 2009: 224-6). Markus Crepaz analysed 
effects of immigrant multiculturalism on public opinion towards redistribution and found a 
positive relation: People in countries that adapted multicultural integration policies are 
slightly more favourable towards redistribution (Crepaz 2006). However, there is no reason 
to believe that public policy is somehow congruent to public opinion. Thus we need to 
analyse integration policy and its effects on social policy or vice versa. In their analysis of 
multiculturalism and welfare state change Banting and others reject the argument that 
multicultural integration policies reduce the redistributive power of welfare states (Banting 
et al. 2006). They show that changes in government’s social expenditures, redistribution 
and poverty reduction rates do not correspond to the introduction of multicultural 
integration policies. They neither lead to more, nor to less government social expenditure 
and redistribution (ibidem: 78-87).  
Much of this dispute lies in disagreements on the value and importance of cultural rights. 
Since it is not my subject of analysis and the MIPEX index does not measure a cultural 
dimension of integration these arguments appear not relevant at a first glance. 
Nevertheless, I suggest these arguments underline the potential threat of immigration and 
malintegration to social solidarity and welfare systems. Thus, the dispute on 
multiculturalism and redistribution fosters the claim that immigrant integration especially 
matters to countries with larger welfare systems.  
 
Welfare systems determining integration policy 
Boswell and Geddes argue that immigrant integration policy might be less a cause of 
immigration and (non)-integration, but a consequence of broader labour market and 
welfare system processes. In other words, the configuration of integration policy is defined 
by labour market and welfare state characteristics (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21). Thus 
different types of welfare organisation might be a source of different integration policies: 
Social-democratic, conservative, and liberal welfare systems would then be characterised 
by distinct integration policy configurations. Boswell and Geddes suggest that welfare 
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systems not only influence integration policy, but also outcomes, for example employment 
and unemployment rates of TCNs in EU member states (ibidem: 220). This argument is 
being specified by the research of Schierup and others (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006):  
Contrary to Koopmans, who argues that generous welfare systems essentially endanger 
successful immigrant integration, Schierup and others do not state a clear causal relation of 
welfare states and immigrant integration in their analysis (Koopmans 2010). Instead, they 
picture a dual crisis of European countries, wherein immigration and integration are 
intervening variables, being influenced by welfare systems and influencing them vice versa 
(Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 1-6): Labour market participation and strong welfare 
services were successful forces promoting equality of people of different classes. Since the 
1970ies, ages of economic growth providing strong welfare systems and social inclusion 
(not necessarily focused on immigrants) are over and leave the countries with new 
challenges of integration. The absence of this integrative power led to an ethnicised 
exclusion of (a growing number of) immigrants. At the same time, national identities are 
being transformed and result in a growing politicisation cultural difference and the 
emergence of nationalist-populist parties and eventually their inclusion in political 
decision-making. Immigration and cultural diversity thus became issues of politicisation. 
Hence, immigrant integration is troubled by a restructuring of welfare and labour market 
systems and by a changing notion of national belonging: 
“[T]he heart of present dilemmas of race, class, and democracy, and the focus of this book, 
is whether a sustainable policy targeted at equal opportunities can actually succeed without 
the precondition that some form of broad social compact on citizenship and social welfare 
is still valid in terms of normative consensus and strong institutions beyond and 
complementary to the market” (ibidem 18-19).  
Schierup and others provide an in-depth analysis of cases representing different welfare 
system types: the UK, Sweden, Germany, and Italy. They note that they omitted other 
countries in the belief that “much of what is said about the cases discussed” does apply to 
them too (ibidem: 19-20). This belief thus provides a good source of arguments for 
quantitative comparative analysis:  
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The Liberal case 
The United Kingdom combined Social-democratic universalism with liberal thoughts of 
market orientation. Since Margret Thatcher in the 1980ies welfare state restructuring 
according to the “liberal dogma that there is ‘no proper reason for altering the stratification 
outcomes produced in the marketplace’” that was shared by New Labour led to an 
Americanisation of welfare provision (Levitas 1998, in: Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 
135). According to this dogma, the primacy of market distribution should support “effort, 
motivation, adeptness, and self-reliance” (Esping-Andersen 1990, in: ibidem). Hence the 
British welfare system constitutes a residual Liberal type combined with a liberal labour 
market, with the consequences of high wage differences, a casualization of labour, and 
economic growth with an increasing demand for low-skilled labour. This development 
coincided with restrictive policies of migration control and institutional racism despite the 
focus on stringent anti-discrimination policies and multiculturalism as an integration policy 
(ibidem: 134-6). Crucially, liberal non-intervention did not only concern the welfare 
system and labour market, but also the absence of positive-action towards immigrants. 
Consequently, in a mixture of ethnic and class polarisation, Schierup and others argue that 
ethnic minorities are the worst-off (ibidem: 136).  
 
The Conservative case 
The description of the German case by Schierup and others largely does not differ from the 
description of German immigration and integration policy in the second chapter. The 
period of strong economic growth and social stability involved a need of labour support 
that was responded by the guestworker system and differential exclusion. At the same time 
the labour market and welfare system was – and is – characterised by strong state 
intervention and regulation (ibidem: 161). At the time when the ethnic segmentation of 
German society became recognised as a problem and eventually as a subject of policy 
change, it was “too late to prevent the entrenchment of new patterns of ethnic and class 
exclusion” (ibidem: 162). The reform of German integration policy was preceded by a 
development of higher unemployment and a pressing need for a reform of the 
unsustainable welfare state. Although integration became certainly more inclusive over 
time, Schierup and others question Germany’s ability to succeed both in integration and 
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welfare policy reform and describe the German situation as “paradise gained and paradise 
lost” (ibidem: 161).  
 
The Southern case 
In Italy of the last two decades undocumented workers were necessary to make up for 
deficits of welfare services especially for domestic care. This need is caused by the 
residual function of the public welfare system and native women largely participating in 
the labour market. In turn, clandestine immigrants undermine tax revenues necessary to 
sustain welfare programmes. The same can be argued for immigrants employed in other 
low-skill jobs: On one hand, they are crucially important for economic development, but 
on the other hand, the government lacks revenues due to illegal employment (ibidem: 191-
3). As a result, immigrants became scapegoats being blamed for the government’s 
economic crisis by right-wing parties, which push for a politicisation of immigration and 
integration. Integration policy resembles to some degree guestworker models of 
differential exclusion and temporary limitations of immigration. Simultaneously 
immigrants in Italy have allies in their claim for access to social rights and equality: 
Influential churches and NGOs traditionally support immigrant’s claims and many 
employers became that dependent on immigrant labour support that they prefer to support 
their regularisation, settlement, and integration (ibidem: 193-4).  
 
The Social-democratic case 
Swedish Social-democratic universalism is opposed to liberalised labour markets with 
undocumented labour migration or temporary labour migration. Hence immigrants 
generally had access to the labour market and to welfare programmes. Integration policy 
clearly provided access to rights, but immigrants still performed economically unequal to 
natives. The deregulation of labour markets and welfare provision retrenchment that took 
place at least to some extent in Sweden too especially concerned immigrants on the lower 
end of the social ladder, receiving limited wages in low-skill employment and limited 
welfare benefits (ibidem: 227-8). As a result, immigrants as welfare recipients are at a 
large scale opposed to welfare system reform. The mal-performance of immigrants in 
Swedish society was a subject to large debate in the last two decades and led to further 
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attempts of all-area integration instead of social rights only. In sum, growing fears of social 
and ethnic fragmentation appear to provide incentives for inclusive integration policies that 
show some positive results (ibidem: 229-30).  
 
Welfare system effects on integration policy 
Taking these countries as representatives of distinct welfare regimes, we might say that 
liberal states refrain from pursuing strong notions of civic integration policies, but try to 
manage diversity trough elaborate anti-discrimination policies, though not entirely 
successful. Conservative welfare states initially focused less on managing diversity trough 
civic integration and are now facing troubles of welfare state restructuring and growing 
social and ethnic fragmentation. The same counts for southern welfare states with some 
delay. Social democratic welfare states in contrary acknowledged a need for immigrants’ 
civic integration sooner, have elaborate integration programmes and less challenges of 
social and ethnic fragmentation, but face strong opposition to welfare state restructuring. 
Stretching the observations of the cases to other cases having similar welfare systems 
might underestimate national idiosyncrasies of welfare and integration policies. But this we 
can test in the analysis eventually.  
 
Welfare systems determining integration outcomes 
Ann Morrisens and Diane Sainsbury argued in a similar way analysing effects of welfare 
regimes on immigrants’ social rights and decommodification levels (Morrisens/Sainsbury 
2005): First, they expect social democratic and conservative welfare states to restrict 
immigration, but to extend social rights to immigrant residents, while liberal welfare states 
encourage immigration, but limit access to social benefits. Second, conservative welfare 
states are further expected to provide worse outcomes for immigrants than social 
democratic ones, because benefit entitlements are delayed due to the condition of previous 
contributions. Third, countries with high decommodification rates are expected to provide 
better outcomes for immigrants than those with lower rates. Outcomes for immigrants are 
measured in access to social rights, poverty reduction, and household income composition 
relative to citizens. After an analysis of two cases for each welfare regime (United 
Kingdom, United States, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and France) the results show first, 
that there are large disparities of outcomes for migrants and citizens, but different welfare 
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systems appear to have only a limited effect on this relation (ibidem: 654-5). Interestingly, 
household income compositions of immigrants and citizens are most similar in France and 
Germany. The fact that different effects of welfare systems are less clear in regard to 
immigrants than to citizens is attributed to case selection and the proper classification of 
the cases in welfare typologies: Morrisens and Sainsbury question whether Denmark 
constitutes a social democratic welfare state and whether the US and the UK are similar – 
although liberal – welfare states (ibidem). Furthermore, they argue that different 
immigration regimes have to be integrated in the analysis (see Sainsbury 2006). The 
variation of single cases constitutes a striking problem of analysing the effects of welfare 
systems on immigrant integration, as I will show in my analysis. Noteworthy, the use of 
diverse indices for measuring welfare system outcomes and integration policy instead of 
typologies at least avoids the problem of cases not fitting into ideal-type categories. Not 
keeping immigration regimes in mind unfortunately is a problem inherent in the structure 
of the MIPEX index: The MIPEX index captures integration in very broad terms, 
conditions for immigration, hence different immigration regimes – if there actually is such 
a thing – are integrated in the index through the access-dimensions of Labour Market 
Mobility, Family Reunion, Long-term Residence and Access to Nationality policies. Thus I 
may only analyse immigration and integration policy to some extent as a combined 
dependent variable.  
 
6. Hypotheses 
Contrary to the research of Banting, Crepaz, and Kymlicka I suggest focusing on welfare 
systems as a cause of integration policy divergence, and not its feedback. This is mainly 
due to two reasons:  First, path dependency suggests that welfare systems and especially 
their basic configurations are not likely to change (Pierson 1998; Starke/Obinger/Castles 
2008). In contrast, as I have shown above, integration policies are (Joppke/Morawska 
2003; Joppke 2007). Second, different welfare regimes might require specific integration 
policies, especially concerning access to the labour market and social rights 
(Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21; Sainsbury 2006). The counterargument that welfare 
systems are adapted to a country’s approach to immigration appears much less plausible. 
However, my research interest lies in the explanation of integration policy difference, not 
in the likely effect of integration policy.  
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My hypotheses than are that countries with large welfare programmes (hypothesis 1a) and 
high redistributive effects (hypothesis 1b) need to put a greater emphasis on the inclusion 
of immigrants to sustain solidarity and trust than countries that have smaller or less 
redistributive welfare programmes. Countries with smaller welfare programmes or lower 
redistribution rates might refrain from inclusive policies for a variety of reasons. Most 
notably the rhetoric of immigration and integration in public debate is dominantly 
restrictive, hence governments can respond to that by adding tough action to though talk. 
Second, they might share the liberal dogma that state regulation – that integration policy is 
– should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. 
With regard to welfare system typologies I derive following hypotheses from the work of 
Schierup and others (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006):  
Hypothesis 2a: Liberal welfare states try to avoid state regulation and do not need to put 
great emphasis on social solidarity since welfare programmes and redistribution rates are 
small. Hence they have less inclusive integration policies. 
Hypothesis 2b: Social democratic welfare states have large welfare programmes and high 
redistribution rates. Their universalism requires the strongest account of social solidarity 
hence integration policies are inclusive. 
Hypothesis 2c: Conservative welfare states were initially less focused on promoting social 
solidarity with regard to immigrants, because their welfare systems largely rely on 
contributions. The failure of differential-exclusion towards guestworkers led them to 
acknowledge the solidarity towards immigrants needs to be promoted hence their 
integration policies increasingly became more inclusive over time.  
Hypothesis 2d: Southern welfare states, being newer countries of immigration too, are 
expected to act similar than Conservative welfare states, but more extreme, since their 
integration policies and welfare systems do not have the same long-standing history.  
The arguments crucially rest on two presumptions, which do not appear to be questionable 
to me: First, immigration cannot be controlled in a way that countries actually can avoid 
immigration for a long period entirely. If zero-immigration was a possible alternative, 
some countries might prefer that. There are a lot of reasons why this is not the case, say 
economic needs, population shrinking, or simply a government’s inability to control its 
borders entirely (Boswell/Geddes 2011; Castles/Miller 2009). Second, the retrenchment of 
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welfare programmes is not desirable for governments. As I have shown in the section on 
welfare systems, this presumption can be generally supported (Pierson 1998).  
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VI. Analysis: Welfare system foundations of integration 
policy 
In this chapter I will provide bivariate analyses of welfare system indicators and 
typologies. First I need to operationalize the hypothesis of large and redistributive welfare 
systems causing inclusive integration policies in order to analyse the causal relationship via 
bivariate analysis. As a second step, I will analyse whether welfare system types can 
explain divergent integration policies and policy change.  
 
1. Indicators 
For the bivariate analysis of welfare system indicators and MIPEX results I use following 
data provided by the OECD (OECD 2011b; 2011c): 
1. Total public social expenditure: Sum of all expenditure taken by public institutions 
for social purposes, including expenditure for the areas of old-age, survivors, 
incapacity-related benefits, family, health, active labour market policies, 
unemployment, housing, and a residual category of other social expenditure 
(OECD 2011b: 90);  
2. Public pension expenditure (in cash, including the categories pensions and 
survivors); 
3. Public expenditure towards income support to the working age (in cash, not 
including active labour market policy spending); 
4. Public health expenditure; 
5. Summarised other expenditure towards public social services (including services to 
elderly and disabled people, families, housing, active labour market policies etc.; 
OECD 2011b: 21);  
These variables describe the size of public welfare systems compared to the GDP. Thus, 
the higher the score of the variable, the more integration policies are expected to be 
inclusive / show high scores in the MIPEX data. Furthermore, we may distinguish between 
service and in-cash expenditure. While Conservative welfare systems focus rather on in-
cash benefits, Social-democratic welfare systems usually provide larger service-oriented 
benefits (Jensen 2008). Notably health expenditure usually diverge only little in OECD 
countries (ibidem). Thus I do not expect the health variable to reveal differences of 
integration policy.  
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6. Means-tested benefits as percentage of total public social expenditure; 
7. Social expenditure taken and at private and voluntary level (expressed as a 
percentage of GDP); 
8. The percentage of private voluntary and mandatory social expenditure in total 
social expenditure; 
These variables describe self-reliance and the residual function of the public welfare 
system. If large parts of the public welfare system are based on a means-test, self-reliance 
is greater than in a welfare system based on universalism. According to Korpi and Palme 
private social expenditures take place to a larger extent in welfare systems with no 
universal coverage (Korpi/Palme 1998). Thus, I will use private expenditures as a measure 
of residual public welfare provision and expect them to correlate negatively with MIPEX 
scores.  
9. Recalculated decommodification scores for the year 2002, following the 
methodology of Esping-Andersen 1990 (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008); 
10. GINI values on income inequality of market incomes; 
11. GINI values on disposable incomes (market income - taxes + public transfer 
benefits); 
12. The redistributive effect of public redistribution: (10. -11.)/(10.); 
13. Poverty rates based on gross market incomes, at 50 per cent of the median income 
(=pre-redistribution); 
14. Poverty rates based on disposable incomes, at 50 per cent of the median income 
(=post-redistribution);  
15. Poverty reduction effect: (13.-14.)/(13.); 
These variables describe redistributive effects of public welfare and taxation systems. 
Redistribution will be measured as the degree to which a person can refrain from “selling” 
his or her labour power on the market (9.), as a factor changing income inequality (12.), 
and reducing poverty (15.). Furthermore integration might correspond to the post-
redistribution poverty rates and GINI values. The pre-redistribution variables are not 
necessarily expected to correlate with integration policy, since they do not directly involve 
the welfare state.  
All data of the variables on welfare systems date in two or three years before the MIPEX 
data they are compared with. Hence MIPEX scores from 2007 are compared to welfare 
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system data of 2004 or 2005 (variables 6.-8.) and MIPEX scores from 2010 are compared 
to data from 2007. For redistribution and poverty reduction the OECD refers to the date to 
the date as “mid-2000” and “late-2000” (OECD 2011c). Thus the delay is about two to 
three years. The only recent available data on decommodification dates in 2002 and hence 
has a five-year delay and will be compared to the 2007 MIPEX results only. Including a 
delaying effect in the analysis is based on two reasons: First, for these years the OECD 
offers more complete data not based on estimates. Second, since I argue that welfare 
systems are a causal factor of integration policy development, I need to provide a time log 
for the effect to occur. To increase the number of observations I include the 2007 and the 
2010 MIPEX data in one bivariate analysis model, having then 34 instead of 17 
observations (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 221-3).  
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1.1. Welfare system indicators and overall integration policy 
Correlations of welfare system indicators and overall integration policy 
 
Overall score without 
EDU 
LMM/FR/LTR 
combined 
AN/AD combined 
Overall score without 
EDU and PP 
Public social expenditure 
Pearson Correlation 0,185 0,299 0,137 0,261 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,295 0,086 0,438 0,137 
N 34 34 34 34 
Pension 
Pearson Correlation -0,124 0,081 -0,02 0,041 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,484 0,647 0,913 0,819 
N 34 34 34 34 
Income support to the working 
age 
Pearson Correlation 0,165 0,09 -0,012 0,052 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,35 0,612 0,946 0,77 
N 34 34 34 34 
Health 
Pearson Correlation 0,125 0,06 0,292 0,188 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,481 0,735 0,094 0,286 
N 34 34 34 34 
Other services 
Pearson Correlation ,363* 0,325 0,192 0,306 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,035 0,06 0,276 0,078 
N 34 34 34 34 
Means-tested expenditure 
Pearson Correlation -0,085 -0,316 0,187 -0,104 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,634 0,069 0,291 0,559 
N 34 34 34 34 
Voluntary private social 
expenditure 
Pearson Correlation 0,248 0,065 ,445** 0,271 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,157 0,717 0,008 0,121 
N 34 34 34 34 
Percentage of private spending 
in total spending 
Pearson Correlation -0,078 -0,193 0,064 -0,089 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,66 0,274 0,718 0,617 
N 34 34 34 34 
Decommodification 2002 
Pearson Correlation 0,415 0,458 0,042 0,301 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,158 0,116 0,891 0,318 
N 13 13 13 13 
GINI before redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,21 0,192 0,339 0,293 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,265 0,311 0,067 0,116 
N 30 30 30 30 
GINI after redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,085 0,063 0,272 0,18 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,631 0,721 0,12 0,309 
N 34 34 34 34 
Redistributive effect: income 
inequality 
Pearson Correlation 0,088 0,098 -0,072 0,02 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,643 0,606 0,707 0,915 
N 30 30 30 30 
Poverty before redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,276 ,381* 0,285 ,388* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,114 0,026 0,102 0,023 
N 34 34 34 34 
Poverty after redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,016 0,09 0,068 0,092 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,929 0,611 0,701 0,604 
N 34 34 34 34 
Redistributive effect: poverty 
Pearson Correlation 0,247 0,313 0,193 0,298 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,16 0,071 0,274 0,087 
N 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
93 
Applying a bivariate analysis to various forms of average scores of the MIPEX indices and 
welfare system indicators provides surprisingly little evidence for the hypothesis on 
welfare systems influencing integration policy:  
In terms of the size of welfare programmes, only the variable “other services” shows a 
rather weak but significant correlation with the overall score of integration policy. Thus, 
countries with little expenditure towards services except health tend to have rather 
exclusive policies and countries with higher expenditure tend to have rather inclusive 
policies. Noteworthy there is no significant correlation of overall public expenditure and 
integration policy.  
Contrary to my expectation voluntary private expenditure correlate positively with the 
combined score of Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. In other words, in 
countries with little private expenditure Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination 
policies are more likely to be exclusive than in countries with larger private social 
expenditure levels. Apart from that, there a no further significant results of variables 
indicating residual welfare systems.  
The variables representing welfare system effects do not show significant correlations at 
all. This clearly indicates that we cannot confirm the hypothesis of redistribution 
influencing integration policy inclusiveness. Interestingly, poverty rates before 
redistribution correlate significantly and positively with the combined Labour Market 
Mobility, Family Reunion, and Long-term Residence score and with the overall score 
excluding Political Participation and Education. This indicates that integration policy in 
these areas tends to be inclusive in countries with high poverty rates before redistribution. 
Since I did not make an argument on a causal relation of these variables, this result does 
not answer my research question in any way.  
However, integration policy inclusiveness per se – taken as a sum of policies in different 
areas – can neither be explained via total welfare expenditure, nor via income 
redistribution.  
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1.2. Welfare system indicators and integration policy areas 
Correlations of welfare system indicators and integration policy areas 
    LMM FR EDU PP LTR AN AD 
Public social expenditure 
Pearson Correlation 0,248 0,25 0,247 -0,189 0,298 0,048 0,217 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,157 0,154 0,339 0,285 0,087 0,788 0,217 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Pension 
Pearson Correlation -0,051 0,223 -0,212 -,659** 0,032 -0,02 -0,015 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,774 0,205 0,415 0 0,856 0,91 0,933 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Income support to the working age 
Pearson Correlation 0,104 -0,053 0,39 ,483** 0,231 -0,077 0,058 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,56 0,764 0,122 0,004 0,188 0,665 0,747 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Health 
Pearson Correlation 0,002 0,181 -0,012 -0,173 -0,056 0,308 0,243 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,99 0,306 0,964 0,329 0,753 0,077 0,167 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Other services 
Pearson Correlation ,453** 0,08 ,531* ,381* 0,332 0,077 0,292 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,007 0,652 0,028 0,026 0,055 0,665 0,094 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Means-tested expenditure 
Pearson Correlation -0,169 -0,275 -0,469 0,025 -,432* 0,153 0,201 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,339 0,115 0,057 0,89 0,011 0,387 0,255 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Voluntary private social expenditure 
Pearson Correlation 0,094 -0,069 0,21 0,029 0,178 ,399* ,443** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,597 0,698 0,418 0,872 0,313 0,019 0,009 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Percentage of private spending in 
total spending 
Pearson Correlation -0,046 -0,289 0,026 0 -0,18 0,121 -0,005 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,797 0,097 0,922 0,999 0,307 0,496 0,979 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Decommodification 2002 
Pearson Correlation 0,546 0,284 -0,251 ,619* 0,367 -0,058 0,139 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,053 0,346 0,349 0,024 0,218 0,851 0,651 
N 13 13 16 13 13 13 13 
GINI before redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,021 ,478** -0,253 -0,166 -0,073 ,398* 0,237 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,91 0,008 0,327 0,381 0,703 0,03 0,207 
N 30 30 17 30 30 30 30 
GINI after redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,001 0,258 0,147 -0,285 -0,151 0,325 0,186 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,994 0,141 0,588 0,102 0,393 0,061 0,291 
N 34 34 16 34 34 34 34 
Redistributive effect: income 
inequality 
Pearson Correlation 0,039 0,051 0,247 0,264 0,194 -0,089 -0,044 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,837 0,787 0,339 0,159 0,305 0,64 0,818 
N 30 30 17 30 30 30 30 
Poverty before redistribution 
Pearson Correlation 0,222 ,455** 0,335 -0,263 0,321 0,193 ,352* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,207 0,007 0,189 0,132 0,064 0,274 0,041 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Poverty after redistribution 
Pearson Correlation -0,041 0,252 0,003 -0,261 0,01 0,121 0,006 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,819 0,151 0,99 0,136 0,957 0,495 0,974 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Redistributive effect: poverty 
Pearson Correlation 0,25 0,271 0,42 -0,062 0,314 0,092 0,278 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,154 0,121 0,093 0,728 0,071 0,606 0,111 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
95 
The bivariate analysis of single MIPEX policy areas and indicators on welfare systems 
provides similar, although more detailed results: Neither the size of public welfare systems 
nor their redistributive effect may explain integration policy inclusive- or exclusiveness.  
The variables on public spending show a few correlations: First, pension expenditure 
correlate strongly and significant with Political Participation, but in a negative way. Thus, 
the higher pension expenditure are, the more likely Political Participation policy is 
exclusive. Income support to the working age shows an adverse effect, correlating 
positively and significant with Political Participation. As expected health expenditure does 
not affect integration policies. Similar to the model shown above, other service expenditure 
show significant positive correlations with Labour Market Mobility, Education and 
Political Participation policies. In other words, countries with higher public expenditure 
towards services tend to have inclusive policies in these areas and vice versa.  
Confirming the expectations, means-tested programmes reveal a significant negative 
correlation with Long-term Residence: Countries in which benefits are often based on 
means-testing have rather exclusive Long-term Residence policies. As already mentioned 
before, private social expenditure correlate positively and significant with Access to 
Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies.  
Variables on redistribution show only one significant and positive correlation: Countries 
with decommodifying policies are highly likely to have inclusive Political Participation 
policies. Additionally, the positive correlation of Labour Market Mobility and 
decommodification is close to the 0,05 significance threshold. All other correlations are 
weak and not significant. Again, income inequality and poverty before redistribution 
appear to influence integration policy in terms of Family Reunion, Access to Nationality 
and Anti-discrimination. These observations do not relate to my hypotheses.  
1.3. Conclusion 
The hypotheses I tested were: Countries with large welfare programmes and high 
redistributive effects need to put a greater emphasis on the inclusion of immigrants to 
sustain solidarity and trust than countries that have smaller or less redistributive welfare 
programmes. As the analysis showed both hypotheses cannot be confirmed: Neither public 
social expenditure, nor redistribution has effects on integration policy inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness. I think that the observation of “other services” expenditure influencing 
integration policy rather reflects different welfare types and their effects on integration 
policy. Furthermore, Political Participation can be explained better by welfare system 
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indicators than most other areas of integration policy. Thus the general hypothesis on 
integration policy maybe should be replaced by hypotheses specified on different areas of 
integration policy. However, the fact that the hypothesis cannot be confirmed does not 
entail that there is no causal relation between welfare systems and integration policy. 
Instead, it is just evident that the relation is not as clear-cut as expected.  
 
2. Typologies 
For an analysis of different welfare system types we first need to classify countries in 
groups representing regime types. According to the typologies presented above, some 
countries are difficult to classify. Thus, I will count some countries double, representing 
two regime types: 
For the Liberal or Basic Security type only the United Kingdom was classified equally in 
the four presented typologies. Ireland is usually classified as a Liberal welfare system, but 
has catholic imprints that led Siaroff to classify it as a Late Female Mobilization type 
(McCashin/O’Shea 2008; Siaroff 1994). I decided to classify Ireland as the Liberal type 
that it represents according to the work of Bonoli (1997), Esping-Andersen (1990) and 
Korpi/Palme (1998). Albeit similar, I count Switzerland both as a Liberal and as a 
Southern type, because Siaroff (1994) and Bonoli (1997) classify it as a Southern or Late 
Female Mobilisation type. In the typology of Bonoli Switzerland is classified as a Southern 
type because its rather low public social expenditures largely rely on social insurance 
contributions (Bonoli 1997). Denmark is usually considered as a Social-democratic type, 
but its public welfare benefits are rather focused on providing basic security and poverty 
reduction and do not crowd out private insurance schemes (Green-Pedersen/Baggesen 
Klitgaard 2008; Korpi/Palme 1998). Thus I count it as a Liberal and Social-democratic 
type.  
For the Social-democratic or Encompassing type Sweden and Norway are classified 
easily. As noted above I also include Denmark. There are some doubts about Finland 
being a Social-democratic type, because of its comparatively low decommodification rates 
and a comparatively large share of contributions-related benefits (Bonoli 1997; 
Kangas/Saari 2008). Thus I count the borderline case as a Social-democratic and 
Conservative type. Being hybrid welfare systems I count Belgium and the Netherlands as 
both Social-democratic and Conservative types (Cantillon/Marx 2008; van Oorschot 2008).  
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The typologies referred to above cite France, Germany and Luxembourg exclusively as 
Conservative or Corporatist countries. As noted above, I also include Finland, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Austria has some Liberal and Social-democratic elements in its 
welfare system too and comparatively high decommodification rates, but is described by 
Esping-Andersen as an ideal type of a Conservative welfare system (Esping-Andersen 
1998: 44; Heitzmann/Österle 2008). 
Southern welfare types are of course similar to Conservative welfare systems, but treated 
separately in the analysis, since I expect their integration policies to change more 
significantly than in “older” welfare and immigration countries. Typologies usually include 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. As noted above, I decided to include Switzerland too.  
Country classification for bivariate analysis 
Liberal Social-Democratic Conservative Southern 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
 
I include these groups as dummy variables (receiving scores of 0 and 1) into the bivariate 
analysis of integration policy area scores. For this operationalization it does not matter that 
some countries are classified double. Again I include the 2007 and 2010 data in a single 
correlation model. Positive correlation scores indicate that a certain welfare type tends to 
have inclusive policies and negative correlations indicate exclusive policies. After 
comparing welfare system types with integration policy scores I want to show that there 
are strong correlations of welfare system types and TCN employment, suggesting that 
welfare states are an independent variable explaining both integration policy and 
integration outcomes, at least as far as labour market participation is concerned.  
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2.1. Welfare system types and integration policy 
Correlations of welfare system types and overall integration policy 
  
Overall except EDU 
LMM/FR/LTR 
combined 
AN/AD combined 
Overall except EDU 
and PP 
Liberal welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -,389* -,535** -0,198 -,441** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,023 0,001 0,261 0,009 
N 34 34 34 34 
Social-democratic welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation ,485** ,414* 0,243 ,388* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,004 0,015 0,167 0,023 
N 34 34 34 34 
Conservative welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -0,065 -0,133 0,009 -0,079 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,715 0,455 0,959 0,657 
N 34 34 34 34 
Southern welfare system 
Pearson Correlation 0,115 ,343* 0,028 0,231 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,518 0,047 0,877 0,188 
N 34 34 34 34 
Conservative or Southern 
welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -0,153 0,012 -0,157 -0,074 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,389 0,948 0,377 0,679 
N 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Correlations of welfare system types and integration policy areas 
  
LMM FR EDU PP LTR AN AD 
Liberal welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -,353* -,630** -0,256 0,01 -,410* -0,156 -0,223 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,041 0 0,321 0,954 0,016 0,38 0,206 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Social-democratic 
welfare system 
Pearson Correlation ,440** 0,202 ,637** ,569** ,478** 0,142 0,321 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,009 0,251 0,006 0 0,004 0,423 0,064 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Conservative 
welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -0,176 -0,078 -0,058 0,009 -0,084 0,001 0,017 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,321 0,659 0,826 0,96 0,638 0,995 0,926 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation 0,197 ,429* -0,09 -,361* 0,27 0,056 -0,003 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,264 0,011 0,73 0,036 0,123 0,755 0,987 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
Conservative or 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -0,102 0,153 -0,206 -,361* -0,032 -0,08 -0,219 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,568 0,386 0,427 0,036 0,855 0,653 0,214 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Contrary to the model of welfare system indicators, the bivariate analysis of welfare types 
shows that there are some strong significant correlations of welfare types and integration 
policies with the exception of Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality policies: In 
these areas I do not find significant correlations in any welfare type, thus these areas 
cannot be accounted for arguments of welfare systems causing different integration 
policies:  
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Liberal welfare systems correlate in a negative way and significantly with all variables of 
overall integration policy, except for the combined score of Access to Nationality and 
Anti-discrimination. Furthermore, the areas of Labour Market Mobility and Long-term 
Residence show significant and medium-sized negative correlations and Family Reunion a 
strong significant negative correlation. Thus we can conclude that Liberal welfare states 
have exclusive Family Reunion; Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence 
policies and an overall tendency towards exclusion in all areas except Political 
Participation.  
Social-democratic welfare systems show positive correlations in all areas and overall 
scores, although not significant for Anti-discrimination, Access to Nationality and Family 
Reunion. While most correlations are moderate, those for Education and Political 
Participation are fairly strong. In sum, I conclude that Social-democratic welfare systems 
have inclusive integration policies, being a counterpart to Liberal welfare systems.  
As expected Conservative welfare systems lie somewhere in-between and thus show no 
correlations. To identify characteristics of Conservative welfare systems and their 
integration policy a different method needs to be applied. Southern welfare systems show 
significant and moderately positive correlations with the combined Labour Market 
Mobility, Long-term Residence, and Family Reunion score, because of the latter. 
Furthermore Political Participation policy shows a significant moderately negative 
correlation with Southern and Southern or Conservative welfare systems. In order to reveal 
more distinctive information on Conservative and Southern welfare systems I suggest 
measuring the distance to average scores of integration policy variables and MIPEX score 
change. 
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Correlations of welfare system types and average integration policy scores 
 
LMM FR EDU PP LTR AN AD 
Overall 
except 
EDU 
Liberal welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -,174 ,307 -0,024 -,337 ,445** -,012 ,244 -,013 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,326 ,077 0,926 ,051 ,008 ,946 ,165 ,940 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 34 
Social-democratic 
welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -,048 -,092 0,09 ,035 -,186 -,007 -,086 ,092 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,786 ,603 0,73 ,846 ,293 ,970 ,628 ,603 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 34 
Conservative welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -,062 -,618** -0,126 ,104 -,307 -,252 -,047 -,203 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,727 ,000 0,629 ,560 ,077 ,150 ,790 ,249 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 34 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -,002 ,307 -0,145 ,019 -,106 ,172 -,190 ,038 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,991 ,077 0,578 ,916 ,550 ,330 ,283 ,829 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 34 
Conservative or 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -,109 -,282 -0,342 ,006 -,278 -,067 ,013 -,037 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,538 ,106 0,179 ,972 ,112 ,707 ,941 ,834 
N 34 34 17 34 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Looking at distances to average scores of integration policy areas, I expect Conservative 
and Southern welfare states to show strong negative correlations indicating integration 
policy scores close to average. The other welfare systems are expected to show positive 
and low correlation scores. The findings suggest that only with regard to Family Reunion 
Conservative welfare systems have averagely inclusive policies. Furthermore, Liberal 
welfare systems show a moderate and positive significant correlation with Long-term 
Residence. This indicates that they have either very inclusive or very exclusive policies of 
Long-term Residence. Based on the tables above we know that Long-term Residence 
policies in Liberal welfare systems are predominantly exclusive. Surprisingly, all other 
variables show low and/or insignificant correlations.  
 
2.2. Welfare system types and integration policy change 
For an analysis of integration policies changing over the period of 2007 to 2010 with 
respect to different welfare system types I suggest to look first at the figures of integration 
policy change I presented in the third chapter: 
101 
 
We can see clearly that Southern and Conservative welfare systems changed their policies 
mostly towards inclusion, while Social-democratic and Liberal welfare systems do not 
share this trend. The bivariate analysis presented below shows that there are surprisingly 
few significant correlations of welfare systems and integration policy change:  
Correlations of welfare system types and integration policy change 
  
 
LMM 
change 
FR change PP change LTR change AN change AD change 
Overall 
score 
change 
Liberal welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -0,106 -0,131 -0,238 -0,467 -0,359 ,485* -0,425 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,687 0,617 0,357 0,059 0,157 0,048 0,089 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Social-democratic 
welfare system 
Pearson Correlation -0,22 -0,331 -0,359 0,203 -0,185 0,172 -0,115 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,397 0,194 0,157 0,434 0,476 0,508 0,659 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Conservative welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation -0,044 0,115 -0,176 0,212 0,164 0,039 0,188 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,867 0,659 0,5 0,415 0,529 0,883 0,471 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation 0,388 0,265 ,491* 0,211 0,25 -0,354 0,365 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,124 0,305 0,045 0,415 0,334 0,164 0,149 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Conservative or 
Southern welfare 
system 
Pearson Correlation 0,247 0,373 0,267 0,43 0,372 -0,37 ,500* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,338 0,141 0,301 0,085 0,141 0,144 0,041 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The results indicate that Liberal welfare systems changed their policies mostly towards 
exclusion, except for Anti-discrimination, but correlation scores are partly low and only the 
positive correlation of Anti-discrimination policy is below the 0,05 significance threshold. 
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For Long-term Residence and overall policy changes correlations are moderate and 
negative, but slightly above the 0,05 threshold and thus not valid. For Social-democratic 
welfare systems the analysis does not provide noteworthy outcomes. Anyway, my primary 
interest concerns Conservative and Southern welfare systems. As the correlation scores 
show the results are far less clear-cut as one might expect: Correlations for Conservative 
welfare systems and integration policy change are far from significant ant thus not valid. 
Southern welfare systems show a moderate positive and significant correlation only in the 
area of Political Participation, whereas all other areas mostly have positive correlations that 
are not significant. However, these results do not disconfirm the hypothesis of Southern 
and Conservative welfare systems changing their policies towards inclusion, because they 
are mostly not significant. Instead, the strong positive and significant correlation of the 
variable “Southern or Conservative welfare system” and overall policy change suggests 
that exactly this is the case: In general terms, countries that have a Southern or 
Conservative welfare system are more likely to change their integration policy towards 
inclusion than Liberal or Social-democratic welfare systems.  
 
2.3. Welfare system types and TCN labour market participation 
Correlations of welfare system types and TCN labour market participation 
  
Liberal welfare system 
Social-democratic 
welfare system 
Conservative welfare 
system 
Southern welfare 
system 
Employment of TCNs 
Pearson Correlation 0,346 -0,429 -,703** ,573* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,174 0,086 0,002 0,016 
N 17 17 17 17 
Employment of citizens 
Pearson Correlation 0,302 0,469 -0,105 -0,461 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,239 0,057 0,688 0,062 
N 17 17 17 17 
Employment ratio 
Pearson Correlation 0,174 -,612** -,630** ,766** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,504 0,009 0,007 0 
N 17 17 17 17 
Unemployment of TCNs 
Pearson Correlation -0,416 0,404 ,636** -0,414 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,109 0,121 0,008 0,111 
N 16 16 16 16 
Unemployment of citizens 
Pearson Correlation -,506* -0,062 0,13 0,441 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,045 0,818 0,632 0,087 
N 16 16 16 16 
Unemployment ratio 
Pearson Correlation -0,05 0,257 0,466 -,596* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,855 0,337 0,069 0,015 
N 16 16 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The bivariate analysis of labour market participation of TCNs and welfare systems reveals 
high correlation levels, indicating that distinctive elements of welfare systems are closely 
related to TCNs employment: While in Social-democratic and Conservative welfare 
systems TCNs are far less likely to be employed than citizens than in Liberal or Southern 
welfare systems, in the latter they are more likely to be employed, in fact they have higher 
participation rates than citizens. These correlations are strong and significant. Furthermore, 
in Southern welfare systems TCNs are less likely to be unemployed than citizens 
compared to other countries. Liberal welfare systems lie somewhere in-between, showing 
no noteworthy results. In comparison with the bivariate analysis of integration policy and 
labour market participation it appears that welfare systems have a larger impact on TCNs 
employment than integration policy. I do not want to stretch this observation too far, but I 
want to notice that employment statistics can provide strong arguments of the importance 
of welfare systems to immigrant integration (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21).  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Contrarily to the analysis of welfare system indicator the analysis of welfare regimes 
underlying integration policy development provided results that largely confirm my 
hypotheses: 
For Liberal welfare regimes I argued that they have less inclusive integration policies 
because their welfare programmes are small and less redistributive and they avoid state 
intervention if possible (hypothesis 2a).  The result for overall integration policies confirms 
the hypothesis, based on exclusive Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Long-
term Residence policies. While Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination did not 
provide valid results in the bivariate analysis, which was the case for all welfare types, 
Political Participation counters this tendency in Liberal welfare systems: In terms of 
Political Participation Liberal welfare systems tend to have inclusive policies. However, 
integration policy in sum, including all areas analysed by MIPEX tends to be exclusive in 
Liberal welfare regimes, hence hypothesis 2a can be confirmed.  
Social-democratic welfare regimes were expected to have inclusive integration policies 
because of their universalism and their large and redistributive welfare programmes 
(hypothesis 2b). The bivariate analysis showed that integration policies in these countries 
tend to be generally inclusive, especially concerning Labour Market Mobility, Education, 
Political Participation, and Long-term Residence. Contrary to the expectation Family 
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Reunion policies do not contribute to the overall inclusiveness of Social-democratic 
integration policy, at least not much. This does not change the fact, that there is an overall 
tendency towards inclusion in Social-democratic welfare systems, thus hypothesis 2b can 
be confirmed too.  
In hypothesis 2c I argued that integration policy of Conservative welfare regimes was 
initially less inclusive or close to average, but becoming more inclusive over time. The 
bivariate models analysing the correlations of welfare systems and integration policies and 
welfare systems and integration policy change did not provide many valid results for 
Conservative welfare systems: In fact, we only know that Family Reunion policies are 
close to the average of all analysed countries. Furthermore, both Conservative and 
Southern welfare systems together tended to change their policies within the period of 
2007-2010, but this result is rather caused by the Southern welfare systems. All other areas 
of integration policy, and most importantly the overall scores of Conservative welfare 
systems’ integration policy did not provide valid results in the analysis, thus I believe the 
hypothesis should be rejected: If there were a tendency towards inclusion over time, the 
analysis would have provided valid results. Instead, integration policies of Conservative 
welfare systems appear not to be commensurable.  
Hypothesis 2d stated that integration policies of Southern welfare regimes are becoming 
more inclusive over time. The findings suggest that this is the case, but not as clear cut as 
expected: In terms of Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence and especially 
Family Reunion, Southern welfare systems generally tend to have inclusive policies. The 
contrary can be said about Political Participation, which tends to be exclusive. Crucially, it 
is exactly this area in which the policy change model showed a significant result: Political 
Participation policy is becoming inclusive over time, at least for the period of 2007-2010. 
In other words, Southern welfare systems were catching up in exactly that area, where they 
generally had exclusive policies. Furthermore, the combined analysis of Southern and 
Conservative welfare systems showed a tendency of integration policy towards inclusion. 
However, with some caution I can confirm hypothesis 2d.  
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VII. Conclusion 
Before summarising my findings I want to remind of the high level of abstraction and 
generalisation in this work. Already in the MIPEX framework actual policies are evaluated 
of their inclusive or exclusive effects on immigrant integration. Eventually they are given 
scores representing inclusiveness and compliance with EU legislation, international 
conventions and policy recommendations. These scores are then summarised to scores of 
policy areas, which I analysed eventually. Thus, the findings on integration policy 
divergence alone are highly generalised. When these are compared to welfare system 
typologies and indicators, another large issue of generalisation comes into play. As I have 
noted, the issue of commensurable welfare types itself is subject to a lot of academic 
disagreement. If these are taken as a measurement of independent variables for explaining 
the MIPEX results, we sort of multiply the generalising effect inherent in the variables. 
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to argue that there factually is a causal 
relationship of welfare systems and integration policy in every single policy. This implies 
that whatever conclusions I draw, they represent just general tendencies of integration 
policy configurations and welfare system structures underlying it. 
The case-by-case, bivariate and cluster-analysis of integration policy in chapter three 
revealed that national integration policies are fairly individual in their inclusive and 
exclusive effects, making it difficult to identify common features of national policy 
configurations. In short, I suggested that if a country does not have inclusive policies 
throughout, the areas of Long-term Residence, Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, 
and to some extent Education are often similarly inclusive or exclusive. Spain, Austria and 
Ireland provide good examples for this observation. The same can be said for Access to 
Nationality and Anti-discrimination, with the examples of Switzerland, France and 
Norway. Political Participation was argued to be a rather independent issue. The cluster 
analysis models did not provide convincing results hence it is difficult to identify groups of 
countries with similar policies. In sum, there remains a highly diffuse picture of national 
differences and commonalities in the area of immigrant integration policy. This confirms 
the expectation of individual policy approaches towards immigrant integration.  
Given the idiosyncratic nature of national integration policies that was suggested in theory 
and found in the comparative analysis on policy inclusiveness and exclusiveness it is 
surprising that welfare regime types can explain integration policy considerably well. But 
first I would like to focus on welfare system indicators again: In the analytical chapter on 
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welfare system indicators I concluded that both the hypothesis on welfare expenditures and 
the hypothesis on welfare system redistribution cannot explain integration policy 
inclusiveness. The variables on public spending and on redistributive effects did not 
provide significant results, implying that some welfare systems with large spending and 
redistribution levels have sometimes inclusive and sometimes exclusive integration 
policies. In the same way, countries with little welfare programmes and small redistributive 
effects have inclusive or exclusive policies. Interestingly, the variable of Political 
Participation, which I argued to be rather independent from other areas of integration 
policy, provided some significant results: Political Participation policy tends to be 
inclusive in countries with low pension expenditure, high income supports to the working 
age, high service expenditures except health and high decommodification rates. As already 
mentioned I did not specify my hypotheses to single areas of integration policy. If I did 
that, I could conclude that countries with large welfare systems not directed towards the 
elderly have inclusive policies of Political Participation. Looking at overall integration 
policy, however, I have to conclude that the size and redistributive effect of welfare 
systems does not influence integration policy inclusiveness.  
Except for the Conservative welfare types, the hypotheses derived from the work of Carl-
Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen and Stephen Castles (2006) on welfare regimes influencing 
integration policy were confirmed. In this context the areas of Access to Nationality and 
Anti-discrimination did not play an important role. As already mentioned, the analysed 
countries are likely to have similar scores on these variables. This means that they are both 
either low, average or high and not that scores are similar across countries. Although I 
found some effects of private social expenditures influencing these areas, the welfare 
regime analysis could not explain Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policy 
inclusiveness. Thus, I suggest that these variables can be left aside for arguments on 
welfare system effects on integration policy. Despite being rather independent from other 
integration policy areas, Political Participation policy is distinctly inclusive in Social-
democratic welfare systems and exclusive in Southern welfare systems. Thus, against the 
implication from the bivariate analysis of integration policy consistency, Political 
Participation policies can be explained well by welfare regime types. As expected, Long-
term Residence, Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Education policies have 
similar welfare system foundations with Liberal welfare regimes having exclusive policies 
(not significant for Education) and Social-democratic regimes having inclusive policies 
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(not significant for Family Reunion). Family Reunion is instead most inclusive in Southern 
welfare regimes.  
Finally, I would like to propose three arguments for further analysis on the issue of welfare 
system structures causing different integration policies:   
First, in the analysis of the relation between Family Reunion policies and welfare system 
indicators I found the surprising result that inequality pre-redistribution and not post-
redistribution might explain Family Reunion inclusiveness. For an analysis of welfare 
system causes of integration policy inclusiveness this result appears useless at the first 
glance. In chapter two I argued that the MIPEX framework provides a very broad concept 
of integration, including areas - like Family Reunion - that are not included in other 
concepts, but treated separately (Boswell/Geddes 2011). If we distinguish between 
immigration policy and integration/immigrant policy we might very likely subsume Family 
Reunion under immigration policy (ibidem; Freeman 2006: 228). Diane Sainsbury showed 
in her analysis that immigrants’ social rights and thus to some extent integration policy 
inclusiveness depend on welfare regimes and immigration policy regimes (Sainsbury 
2006). Thus we might argue that Family Reunion policies are not extraordinarily inclusive 
in high-redistributive Social-democratic and well-developed Conservative welfare regimes, 
because it is not a matter of immigrant integration, but of governing access and thus a 
matter of immigration policy. Then it would not surprise that countries with high demands 
for low-skilled workers like Italy or Spain have inclusive Family Reunion policies (see 
chapter two; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 163-93). However, for an analysis of 
immigration and integration policy inclusiveness the MIPEX data lacks information on 
most areas of immigration policy, like border control or the granting of visas. Thus, if we 
want to apply a quantitative cross-country empirical analysis on this issue, other data needs 
to be scrutinised.  
Second, why are the results for welfare system indicators and typologies so different? 
Since I rejected the hypotheses that welfare systems with large expenditure levels and high 
redistribution rates cause inclusive integration policies the hypotheses on welfare system 
types lose their relevance: Why, if not for the reasons of welfare system size and 
redistribution would different welfare regimes have different integration policies? I think 
that the mismatch of the findings on welfare system indicators and welfare system 
typologies may have two causes: One argument might be that countries reflecting certain 
welfare types do not inhibit some characteristics they are expected to: For example, the 
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ideal-type of a Social-democratic welfare system per se, Sweden, would have high rates of 
redistribution and low voluntary private social expenditures according to Esping-Andersen 
(1990) and Korpi/Palme (1998), because its public welfare system crowded out private 
programmes. In contrast, the OECD data revealed that voluntary private social 
expenditures are above average of the selected countries in Sweden and the redistributive 
effect of the public welfare system is only little above average. Hence, it seems that there is 
a discrepancy of welfare types and welfare system indicators. Looking at GINI pre-
redistribution and post-redistribution data we see why Sweden’s public welfare system has 
just average redistributive effects: Its pre-redistribution inequality is fairly low, thus in 
order to achieve equally low rates of income inequalities post-redistribution the Swedish 
welfare system does not have to redistribute that much as, for example, Belgium’s welfare 
system. In this context the argued discrepancy of indicators and welfare types diminishes. 
However, the question whether welfare systems changed over time and thus do not 
represent the ideal types they did in the 1980ies cannot be answered here. The observation 
of Swedish redistribution and income equality leads to a second argument: Low income 
inequality rates indicate that Sweden has the egalitarian society Esping-Andersen (1990; 
1998: 45) speaks of despite its only average redistribution rates. Hence, not redistribution 
and welfare system size might cause different integration policies, but the objective of 
welfare systems might. In other words, aiming to achieve an egalitarian society, Social-
democratic welfare systems have inclusive integration policies, because these policies 
contribute to achieving this form of society. In Liberal welfare systems state non-
intervention and market obedience do not push for inclusive policies. Conservative welfare 
systems are not opposed to state regulation, but not focused on equality as much as Social-
democratic ones. Accordingly, their integration policy would be averagely inclusive. 
Implications for Southern European countries would be less clear since their welfare 
systems are less developed. Hence, integration policies would rather have different causes 
in these countries. The argument of welfare system types’ different objectives underlying 
integration policy was partially included in my analysis, but this issue could of course be 
analysed in a more detailed fashion.  
Third, there is no evident reason why other possible causes of inclusive or exclusive 
integration policies should not be included in the analysis of welfare systems as a causal 
factor of integration policy divergence. It can hardly be argued that welfare systems are the 
only factor underlying integration policy. Furthermore, countries that did not fit well in my 
analysis, for example Austria, Denmark or France would require a consideration of other 
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causes. In this context, I suggest that party systems and the role of far-right parties might 
provide a fruitful explanation of integration policy exclusiveness. A combined analysis of 
political parties and welfare systems as explanatory variables of integration policy might 
then provide a more complete picture on foundations of immigrant integration policy.  
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IX. Annex 
 
1. MIPEX 2011 indicators 
List of MIPEX indicators, (MIPEX 2011: 212-3) 
1. LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY  
1.1 Access 
 
1. Immediate access to employment,  
2. Access to private sector,  
3. Access to public sector,  
4. Immediate access to self-employment,  
5. Access to self-employment; 
1.2 Access to general support 
 
6. Public employment services,  
7. Education and vocational training,  
8. Recognition of qualifications; 
1.3 Targeted support 
 
9. State facilitates recognition of qualifications,  
10. Measures for economic integration of third-country nationals,  
11. Measures for economic integration of migrant youth and women,  
12. Support to access public employment services; 
1.4 Workers’ rights 
 
13. Accessing trade unions,  
14. Accessing social security,  
15. Working conditions,  
16. Information policy; 
2. FAMILY REUNION  
2.1 Eligibility 
 
17. Time and documents considered,  
18. Partners and age limits,  
19. Minor children,  
20. Dependent relatives,  
21. Dependent adult children; 
2.2 Conditions for acquisition of 
status 
 
22. Pre-departure integration conditions,  
23. Upon arrival integration conditions,  
24. Accommodation,  
25. Economic resources,  
26. Maximum duration,  
27. Costs; 
2.3 Security of status 
 
28. Duration of validity,  
29. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal,  
30. Personal circumstances considered,  
31. Legal protections; 
2.4 Rights associated with status 
 
32. Autonomous permit for partners and children,  
33. In case of widowhood, divorce, death, violence,  
34. For other family members,  
35. Access to education and training,  
36. Employment and self-employment,  
37. Social benefits; 
 
3. EDUCATION  
3.1 Access 
 
38. Accessing pre-primary education,  
39. Compulsory education as a legal right,  
40. Assessment of prior learning, 
41. Support to access secondary education,  
42. Accessing vocational training,  
43. Accessing higher education,  
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44. Advice and guidance; 
3.2 Targeting needs 
 
45. Induction programmes,  
46. Support in language(s) of instruction,  
47. Pupil monitoring,  
48. Educational situation of migrant pupils,  
49. Teacher training; 
3.3 New opportunities 
 
50. Option to learn immigrant languages,  
51. Immigrant cultures,  
52. Promoting integration and monitoring segregation,  
53. Measures to support parents and communities; 
3.4 Intercultural education for all 
 
54. Inclusion in school curriculum,  
55. State supports information initiatives,  
56. Modifying curricula to reflect diversity,  
57. Adapting daily life,  
58. Bringing migrants into the staff,  
59. Teacher training; 
4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
4.1 Electoral rights 
 
60. Right to vote in national elections,  
61. Regional elections,  
62. Local elections,  
63. Right to stand in local elections; 
4.2 Political liberties 
 
64. Right to association,  
65. Political parties,  
66. Creating media; 
4.3 Consultative bodies 
 
67. Consultation at national level,  
68. Regional level,  
69. Capital city level,  
70. Local city level; 
4.4 Implementation policies 
 
71. Information policy,  
72. Public funding/support for national immigrant bodies,  
73. For regional immigrant bodies,  
74. At local level in capital city,  
75. At local level in city; 
5. LONG-TERM RESIDENCE  
5.1 Eligibility 
 
76. Required time of residence and documents considered,  
77. Counting time as pupil/student,  
78. Periods of prior-absence allowed; 
5.2 Conditions for acquisition of 
status 
 
79. Language and integration conditions,  
80. Economic resources,  
81. Duration of procedure, 
82. Costs; 
5.3 Security of status 
 
83. Duration of validity,  
84. Renewable permit,  
85. Periods of absence,  
86. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal or refusal,  
87. Personal circumstances considered before expulsion,  
88. Expulsion precluded,  
89. Legal protections; 
5.4 Rights associated with status 
 
90. Residence after retirement,  
91. Working and conditions,  
92. Social benefits,  
93. Recognition of qualifications; 
6. ACCESS TO NATIONALITY  
6.1. Eligibility 
 
94. Time of residence for first generation immigrants,  
95. Periods of absence,  
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96. Partners/spouses of nationals,  
97. Birthright citizenship for second generation,  
98. For third generation; 
6.2 Conditions for acquisition 
 
99. Language,  
100. Citizenship/integration,  
101. Economic resources,  
102. Criminal record,  
103. Good character,  
104. Maximum duration of procedure,  
105. Costs; 
6.3 Security of status 
 
106. Additional grounds for refusal,  
107. Discretionary powers in refusal,  
108. Personal circumstances considered before refusal,  
109. Legal protections,  
110. Grounds for withdrawal,  
111. Time limits for withdrawal,  
112. Statelessness; 
6.4 Dual nationality 
 
113. Dual nationality for first generation,  
114. For second/third generations; 
7. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION  
7.1 Definitions and concepts 
 
115. Definition includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, 
instruction to discriminate,  
116. Discrimination by association and on basis of assumed 
characteristics,  
117. Applies to natural and legal persons,  
118. Applies to public sector,  
119. Legal prohibitions,  
120. Freedom of association restricted when impeding equality, 121. 
Multiple discrimination; 
7.2 Fields of application 
 
122. Anti-discrimination law covers employment and vocational training 
on grounds of race and ethnicity, religion and belief, and nationality,  
123. Education,  
124. Social protection including social security,  
125. Social advantages,  
126. Access to and supply of public goods and services, including 
housing,  
127. Including health; 
7.3 Enforcement mechanisms 
 
128. Procedures available,  
129. Alternative dispute resolution,  
130. Grounds,  
131. Duration,  
132. Burden of proof,  
133. Situation testing and statistical data,  
134. Victimisation,  
135. State assistance,  
136. Role of legal entities,  
137. Range of legal actions,  
138. Sanctions,  
139. Discriminatory motivation; 
7.4. Equality policies 
 
140. Specialised equality agency established,  
141. Assists victims,  
142. Acts as a quasi-judicial body,  
143. Has legal standing,  
144. Can instigate proceedings, lead investigations, enforce findings,  
145. State disseminates information and facilitates dialogue,  
146. Mechanisms ensure compliance at national level with dedicated 
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government units,  
147. Public bodies promote equality in functions and contracts,  
148. Positive action; 
 
2. MIPEX scores 2007/2010 
MIPEX scores by country, 2007/2010, (MIPEX2011) 
 
Labour Market Mobility Family Reunion Political Participation Long-term Residence 
Country 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Austria 43,8 56,3 43,3 40,8 32,5 32,5 54,2 58,3 
Belgium 52,7 52,7 70,4 68,3 61,0 58,5 64,1 78,7 
Denmark 63,8 73,1 36,8 37,0 66,3 61,9 63,9 65,8 
Finland 71,0 71,0 69,8 69,8 86,9 86,9 58,5 58,5 
France 48,8 48,8 52,8 51,6 43,5 43,5 45,6 45,6 
Germany 76,9 76,9 62,1 60,2 64,4 64,4 50,3 50,1 
Greece 44,6 49,6 47,1 49,2 25,0 39,6 56,1 56,3 
Ireland 42,3 39,2 35,8 33,8 78,8 78,8 42,6 42,6 
Italy 69,0 69,0 77,7 73,5 49,8 49,8 69,2 65,6 
Luxembourg 44,6 47,7 53,3 66,7 76,0 77,7 56,8 55,8 
Netherlands 85,4 85,4 59,3 57,6 79,4 79,4 67,9 67,9 
Norway 76,3 73,1 72,1 67,5 93,8 93,8 61,1 61,1 
Portugal 80,2 93,8 88,5 90,6 69,0 70,2 55,2 68,5 
Spain 79,4 84,4 76,3 84,6 55,8 55,8 71,6 77,5 
Sweden 100,0 100,0 88,5 84,4 75,0 75,0 77,7 77,7 
Switzerland 52,5 52,5 39,8 39,8 58,1 58,8 41,4 41,4 
United Kingdom 55,4 55,4 56,3 53,8 52,5 52,5 74,1 31,5 
Minimum 42,3 39,2 35,8 33,8 25,0 32,5 41,4 31,5 
Average 63,9 66,4 60,6 60,5 62,8 63,5 59,4 59,0 
Maximum 100,0 100,0 88,5 90,6 93,8 93,8 77,7 78,7 
 
MIPEX scores by country, 2007/2010, (MIPEX2011) 
 
Access to Nationality Anti-discrimination Average (without Education) Education 
Country 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2010 
Austria 21,6 21,6 40,0 40,0 39,2 42,0 44,4 
Belgium 68,6 68,6 69,5 78,7 64,4 68,0 65,7 
Denmark 33,1 33,1 41,7 46,5 50,9 53,0 51,4 
Finland 54,3 56,8 76,6 78,0 69,5 70,0 63,5 
France 59,0 59,0 74,5 77,0 54,0 54,0 28,9 
Germany 52,0 59,2 47,9 47,9 58,9 60,0 43,2 
Greece 18,3 56,8 49,7 49,7 40,1 50,0 42,2 
Ireland 60,0 58,2 54,5 62,8 52,3 53,0 24,6 
Italy 64,6 62,9 61,6 61,6 65,3 64,0 40,6 
Luxembourg 34,3 66,4 46,5 47,6 51,9 60,0 51,7 
Netherlands 65,1 65,6 67,5 67,5 70,8 71,0 50,7 
Norway 40,7 40,7 59,4 59,4 67,2 66,0 63,0 
Portugal 82,0 82,0 83,8 83,8 76,4 81,0 63,1 
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Spain 38,6 38,6 48,7 48,7 61,7 65,0 48,1 
Sweden 79,3 79,3 87,7 87,7 84,7 84,0 77,4 
Switzerland 35,5 35,5 30,6 30,6 43,0 43,0 44,6 
United Kingdom 75,2 59,3 81,5 86,1 65,8 56,0 57,7 
Minimum 18,3 21,6 30,6 30,6 39,2 42,0 24,6 
Average 51,9 55,5 60,1 62,0 59,8 61,2 50,6 
Maximum 82,0 82,0 87,7 87,7 84,7 84,0 77,4 
 
3. Foreign-born residents as part of the population 
Foreign born as percentage of total population 
  2000 2005 2009 
Austria 10.4 14.5 15.5 
Belgium 10.3 12.1 9.1* 
Denmark 5.8 6.5 7.5 
Finland 2.6 3.4 4.4 
France 10.1 11.0 11.6 
Germany 12.5 12.6 12.9 
Greece 10.3*** 10.3 8.3* 
Ireland 8.7 12.6 17.2 
Italy 3.9*** 4.2** 6.5* 
Luxembourg 33.2 35.0 36.9 
Netherlands 10.1 10.6 11.1 
Norway 6.8 8.2 10.9 
Portugal 5.1 6.3 6.3 
Spain 4.9 11.1 14.3 
Sweden 11.3 12.5 14.4 
Switzerland 21.9 23.8 26.3 
United Kingdom 7.9 9.4 11.3 
Average (median) 10,1 11,0 11,3 
(OECD 2011a; own calculations, *data taken from MIPEX 2011, **data taken from MIPEX 2007, indicates rates of TCNs, ***scores are for 2001) 
 
4. Labour market participation of TCNs 
TCN employment and unemployment, second quarter 2006 
 
Employment Unemployment 
Country TCNs Citizens Ratio TCN/citizen TCNs Citizens Ratio TCN/citizen 
Austria 59,6 70,8 0,84 11,7 4,2 2,79 
Belgium 33,1 61,5 0,54 32,4 7,6 4,26 
Denmark 65 77,3 0,84 12,2 3,9 3,13 
Finland 48 70,2 0,68 29,2 8,8 3,32 
France 42,9 63,8 0,67 23,2 8,3 2,8 
Germany 47,9 68,5 0,7 23 9,5 2,42 
Greece 70,8 60,6 1,17 7,4 9 0,82 
Ireland 58,6 58,9 0,99 8,1 4,1 1,98 
Italy 52,9 57,9 0,91 * * 
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Luxembourg 47,3 60,9 0,78 21,1 3,1 6,81 
Netherlands 46,6 75 0,62 12,2 3,7 3,3 
Norway 56,9 75,5 0,75 13,1 3,8 3,45 
Portugal 72,6 68 1,07 10,4 7,6 1,37 
Spain 71,9 63,9 1,13 12,2 8,1 1,51 
Sweden 46,4 74 0,63 22,9 7,8 2,94 
Switzerland 64,3 78,7 0,82 14,1 3,3 4,27 
United Kingdom 62,3 71,7 0,87 9,8 5,1 1,92 
Minimum score 33,1 57,9 0,54 7,4 3,1 0,82 
Average score 55,7 68,1 0,82 16,4 6,1 2,94 
Maximum score 72,6 78,7 1,17 32,4 9,5 6,81 
 (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 219-20; own calculations; *data not available)  
 
5. OECD public expenditure data 
Public social expenditure by country and year (OECD 2011b: 41-5) 
 
Total public expenditure Pensions 
Income support to the 
working age 
Health Other services 
Country 2004 2007 2010* 2004 2007 2010* 2004 2007 2010* 2004 2007 2010* 2004 2007 2010* 
Austria 27,7 26,4 28,9 12,7 12,3 12,2 6,2 5,3 5,8 6,8 6,8 6,9 2,0 2,1 4,0 
Belgium 26,5 26,3 29,4 9,0 8,9 9,1 7,2 7,2 8,0 7,5 7,3 7,4 2,8 3,0 4,9 
Denmark 27,7 26,0 30,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 8,8 7,0 8,0 6,1 6,5 6,6 7,6 7,0 9,7 
Finland 26,0 24,9 29,1 8,3 8,3 8,8 7,1 6,0 7,2 6,0 6,1 6,2 4,6 4,6 6,9 
France 29,0 28,4 31,0 12,2 12,5 13,0 5,3 4,6 5,1 7,7 7,5 7,6 3,9 3,8 5,4 
Germany 27,1 25,2 27,3 11,6 10,7 10,5 4,8 4,0 4,1 8,0 7,8 8,1 2,8 2,7 4,6 
Greece 19,9 21,3 23,2 11,1 11,9 11,8 2,0 2,0 2,3 5,1 5,9 6,0 1,6 1,6 3,1 
Ireland 16,0 16,3 22,8 3,4 3,6 3,7 5,0 5,3 8,1 5,9 5,8 5,9 1,7 1,6 5,2 
Italy 24,7 24,9 27,5 13,8 14,1 14,1 2,8 2,8 3,1 6,6 6,6 6,6 1,5 1,4 3,7 
Luxembourg 23,9 20,6 23,5 7,3 6,5 6,5 7,0 5,7 6,6 7,3 6,4 6,5 2,2 2,1 4,0 
Netherlands 21,1 20,1 22,6 5,0 4,7 4,6 6,5 5,3 6,1 5,8 6,0 6,1 3,9 4,1 5,8 
Norway 23,3 20,8 24,0 5,1 4,7 5,1 6,7 5,4 6,1 6,1 5,7 5,8 5,4 5,0 7,1 
Portugal 22,4 22,5 26,1 9,9 10,8 11,2 4,2 4,0 4,7 7,0 6,6 6,7 1,3 1,1 3,4 
Spain 21,2 21,6 26,7 8,1 8,0 8,5 5,0 5,1 6,6 5,8 6,1 6,2 2,2 2,4 5,3 
Sweden 29,5 27,3 28,2 7,7 7,2 7,3 7,0 5,6 5,7 6,7 6,6 6,7 8,1 8,0 8,6 
Switzerland 20,2 18,5 19,6 6,8 6,4 6,3 5,0 4,3 4,8 5,9 5,6 5,6 2,5 2,2 3,0 
United Kingdom 20,5 20,5 24,4 5,5 5,4 5,4 4,6 4,5 5,5 6,5 6,8 6,9 3,9 3,8 6,5 
Minimum 16,0 16,3 19,6 3,4 3,6 3,7 2 2 2,3 5,1 5,6 5,6 1,3 1,1 3 
Average 23,9 23,0 26,1 8,4 8,3 8,5 5,6 4,9 5,8 6,5 6,5 6,6 3,4 3,3 5,4 
Maximum 29,5 28,4 31,0 13,8 14,1 14,1 8,8 7,2 8,1 8,0 7,8 8,1 8,1 8,0 9,7 
*Scores for 2010 are estimates 
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6. OECD data on means-tested and private social spending 
Means-tested and voluntary private spending by country and year  
(OECD 2009: 27, 29; 2011: 19, 24) 
 
Spending on means-tested 
programmes 
Voluntary private social expenditure 
Percentage of private spending 
(voluntary and mandatory)in total 
social spending 
Country 2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 
Austria 3,9 7,1 1,0 1,0 6,5 6,5 
Belgium 3,5 5,1 4,5 4,7 14,7 15,3 
Denmark 3,7 6,2 2,4 2,3 8,9 9,0 
Finland 10,1 5,6 1,1 1,1 4,0 4,1 
France 6,4 14,5 2,6 2,6 9,3 9,3 
Germany 5,8 13,1 1,9 1,8 10,1 10,2 
Greece 6,4 10,3 1,7 1,5 7,6 6,7 
Ireland 15,3 26,3 1,3 1,5 7,4 8,5 
Italy 2,7 5,0 0,6 0,6 7,6 7,9 
Luxembourg 2,0 2,7 0,9 0,7 4,6 4,3 
Netherlands 5,2 18,1 7,6 6,3 28,5 25,6 
Norway 4,9 6,8 0,8 0,8 8,7 8,8 
Portugal 7,6 11,8 1,5 1,5 7,5 7,7 
Spain 7,6 12,3 0,5 0,5 2,2 2,2 
Sweden 2,1 4,0 2,4 2,5 8,7 9,5 
Switzerland 5,2 9,0 1,1 1,1 29,3 30,8 
United Kingdom 12,6 24,1 6,3 5,0 25,1 22,0 
Minimum 2,0 2,7 0,5 0,5 2,2 2,2 
Average 6,2 10,7 2,2 2,1 11,2 11,1 
Maximum 15,3 26,3 7,6 6,3 29,3 30,8 
 
 
7. Welfare system effects: decommodification and redistribution 
Welfare system effects: decommodification and redistribution by country and year  
(OECD 2011c; Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008) 
 
Decommodification GINI before redistribution (1) GINI after redistribution (2) Redistributive effect ((1-2)/1) 
Country 2002 mid-2000 late-2000 mid-2000 late-2000 mid-2000 late-2000 
Austria 28,8 0,433 0,472 0,265 0,261 0,388 0,447 
Belgium 30,9 0,494 0,469 0,271 0,259 0,451 0,448 
Denmark 34,9 0,417 0,416 0,232 0,248 0,444 0,404 
Finland 30,1 0,483 0,465 0,254 0,259 0,474 0,443 
France 27 0,485 0,483 0,288 0,293 0,406 0,393 
Germany 30,2 0,499 0,504 0,285 0,295 0,429 0,415 
Greece 
 
0,454 0,436 0,321 0,307 0,293 0,296 
Ireland 28,9 
  
0,314 0,293 
  
Italy 26,7 0,557 0,534 0,352 0,337 0,368 0,369 
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Luxembourg 
 
0,454 0,482 0,258 0,288 0,432 0,402 
Netherlands 34,6 0,426 0,426 0,284 0,294 0,333 0,310 
Norway 37,3 0,447 0,41 0,276 0,250 0,383 0,390 
Portugal 
 
0,542 0,521 0,385 0,353 0,290 0,322 
Spain 
  
0,461 0,319 0,317 
 
0,312 
Sweden 32,5 0,432 0,426 0,234 0,259 0,458 0,392 
Switzerland 21,9 
 
0,409 0,276 0,303 
 
0,259 
United Kingdom 24,7 0,445 0,456 0,331 0,345 0,256 0,243 
Minimum 21,9 0,417 0,409 0,232 0,248 0,256 0,243 
Average 29,9 0,469 0,461 0,291 0,292 0,386 0,365 
Maximum 37,3 0,557 0,534 0,385 0,353 0,474 0,448 
 
8. Welfare system effects: poverty reduction 
Welfare system effects: poverty reduction (OECD 2011c) 
 
Poverty before redistribution, at 50% of 
median income 
Poverty rate after redistribution, at 50% of 
median income 
Reduction effect ((1-2)/1) 
Country mid-2000 late-2000 mid-2000 late-2000 mid-2000 late-2000 
Austria 23,1 28,8 6,6 7,9 0,714 0,726 
Belgium  32,7 31,4 8,8 9,4 0,731 0,701 
Denmark 23,6 22,1 5,3 6,1 0,775 0,724 
Finland 30,5 30,1 6,6 8 0,784 0,734 
France 33 32,6 7,2 7,2 0,782 0,779 
Germany 32,7 32,5 8,3 8,9 0,746 0,726 
Greece 32,5 31,1 12,6 10,8 0,612 0,653 
Ireland 
  
13,6 9,1 
  
Italy 33,8 33,3 11,4 11,4 0,663 0,658 
Luxembourg 29,1 26,9 8,1 8,5 0,722 0,684 
Netherlands 24,8 24,1 7,8 7,2 0,685 0,701 
Norway 25,7 23,8 6,8 7,8 0,735 0,672 
Portugal 29 28,4 12,9 12 0,555 0,577 
Spain 17,6 27,2 14,1 14 0,199 0,485 
Sweden 26,7 26,5 5,3 8,4 0,801 0,683 
Switzerland 
 
19,9 8,7 9,3 
 
0,533 
United Kingdom 30,9 31,2 10,3 11 0,667 0,647 
Minimum 17,6 19,9 5,3 6,1 0,199 0,485 
Average 28,4 28,1 9,1 9,2 0,678 0,668 
Maximum 33,8 33,3 14,1 14 0,801 0,779 
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